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Abstract 
Parliamentary scrutiny and oversight can be seen as the 
most important tool to hold the executive, and therefore 
government, to account. It enforces an effective system of 
checks and balances in order to ensure that taxpayers are 
receiving value for their money, and that their needs are 
being catered for. This thesis will analyze the oversight 
framework in South Africa by examining the structures 
and functions of the Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts (SCOPA) in contrast to other strong oversight 
frameworks such as exist in the US Congress and 
Scandinavia. Dominant factors that affect the manner in 
which the executive is held to account, such as the role of 
the Chapter Nine Independent Institutions (the Auditor 
General and the Public Protector) and their respective 
Constitutional mandates (versus the committee system 
which has not been included as a section in the 
Constitution), will be brought into the spotlight. Also, the 
effect that a dominant party system (ensuring an ANC 
majority) has on parliamentary oversight will be compared 
with the Westminster system, which fails to effectively 
separate governing party interests from the respective 
mandates of the three spheres of government (the 
judiciary, legislature and the executive). This can 
degenerate into feckless pluralism. An examination of 
these actors and factors will help determine the extent to 
which SCOPA has been successful in enforcing the 
accountability of organs of the state. By determining the 
strengths and weaknesses of SCOPA, this thesis will 
determine whether the committee can be seen as the potent 
watchdog of parliament, or the friendly 'Goofy-dog' of 
government. Important findings rest on the assumption 
that COPA is not isolated from party politics, and an 
interdependent and complementary relationship between 
Parliament, Parliamentary Committees and the Chapter 
Nine Independent Institutions have not been consolidated. 
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Opsomming 
Parlementere ondersoek en oorsig kan beskou word as die 
belangrikste meganisme waardeur die uitvoerende gesag en 
derhalwe die regering verantwoordbaar gehou kan word. Dit 
versterk 'n effektiewe stelsel van kontrole om sodoende te 
verseker dat die belastingbetalers waarde vir hul geld ontvang 
en dat hul behoeftes na wense bevredig word. Hierdie tesis 
analiseer die oorsigraamwerk in Suid-Afrika deur die 
strukture en funksies van die Staande Komitee vir Openbare 
Rekeninge (SCOPA), in teenstelling met ander strenger 
oorsigraamwerke soos die in die VSA Kongres en 
Skandinawie te vergelyk. Dominante faktore wat 'n invloed 
het op die wyse waarop die uitvoerende gesag 
verantwoordbaar gehou word, insluitend die rol van die 
Hoofstuk Nege Onafhanklike Instellings - die Ouditeur-
Generaal en die Openbare Beskermer - sowel as hul 
onderskeie grondwetlike mandate (teenoor die komitee 
sisteem wat nie ingesluit is as 'n seksie in die Grondwet nie), 
sal ook in oenskou geneem word. Verder sal die uitwerking 
wat 'n dominante partystelsel (behoudend 'n ANC 
meerderheid) op die parlementere oorsigfunksie het, in 
verband gebring word met die Westministerstelsel wat nie 
daarin slaag om die belange van die regerende party te skei 
van die onderskeie mandate van die drie sfere van die 
regering (wetgewend, reggewend en uitvoerend) nie. Dit kan 
lei tot futlose pluralisme. 'n Ontleding van hierdie rolspelers 
en faktore sal help om die omvang van die sukses van 
SCOPA te bepaal in terme van die implementering van die 
verantwoordbaarheid van die verskeie dele van die regering. 
Die tesis sal deur middel van 'n analise van die sterk- en 
swakpunte van SCOPA bepaal of hierdie komitee inderdaad 
beskou kan word as die streng waghond van die parlement of 
as die vriendelike "Goofy-hond" van die regering. 
Belangrike bevindinge steun op die aanname dat SCOPA nie 
ge'isoleerd is van party politiek nie, asook dat 'n 
interafhanklike en 'n komplimentere verhouding tussen die 
Parlement, Parlementere komitees en die Hoofstuk Nege 
Onafhanklike Instellings nie gekonsolideerd is nie. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Background: Why SCOPA? 
Good governance is crucial to mobilising South Africa's Constitutionali aspirations in 
our twelfth year of democracy. As indicated in the Constitution, as well as in most 
Parliamentary research and review reports to date, Parliament should work in a 
transparent way, ensuring the oversight and accountability of the executive in all 
spheres of government. 
Within the structures of the South African Parliamentii' SCOPA (the Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts) was established to provide assistance in facilitating 
Parliamentary oversight and accountabilityiii. This committee, consisting of members 
from the National Assembly, functions on a national basis and can be seen as unique, 
compared to other Parliamentary committees. The committee focuses on the 
oversight of the financial management of government resources in order to assure that 
the taxpayers are receiving value for their money (ldasa, 2003), rather than on policy 
issues. According to the Rules of the National Assembly, SCOPA must consider the 
financial statements of all executive organs of State, including Constitutional 
institutions, when those statements are submitted to Parliamentiv (Corder et al, 1999: 
29). It is within this context that the importance of SCOPA and its future impact on 
transparent and accountable government should be assessed. 
Within the South African Parliament, section 57(l)(a) of the Constitution (1996) 
empowers the National Assembly to determine and control its own internal 
arrangements, proceedings and procedures. Section 57(1 )(b) states that Parliament is 
also empowered to make rules concerning its business, with due regard to 
representative and participatory democracy, by enforcing means of accountability, 
transparency and public involvement. Therefore, the National Assembly (not the 
committees, since they are not specified) has the responsibility to provide for the 
establishment, composition, powers, functions, procedures, and duration of its 
committees (The Constitution, 1996: 57(2)(a)). It is important to note that all 
committees' powers are subject to the discretion of the National Assembly, since they 
are not specifically described in the Constitution as separate or independent entities. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
SCOPA was established in terms of the National Assembly's standing Rules, and falls 
under the authority of the Speaker. 
In order to understand the significance of the oversight role that SCOPA is 
responsible for, it is necessary to examine how all committees are equipped 
institutionally with the necessary powers and functions. Section 55(2) of the final 
Constitution (1996) deals with the powers of the National Assembly, describing its 
responsibility to construct competent committee structures. This section specifically 
states that the National Assembly should "ensure that all executive organs of state in 
the national sphere of government are accountable to it". In addition, they should 
"maintain oversight of the exercise of national executive authority, including the 
implementation of legislation [and] [of] any organ of state" (The Constitution, 1996: 
55(2)). It therefore emphasises the importance of Parliamentary oversight and the 
instituted channels responsible for Parliamentary oversight. Rule 52(1) of the 
National Assembly's Standing Rules outlines the functions of the portfolio 
committees as 
"[to}consider or deal with bills or other matters which are referred to it by 
the Speaker under these Rules, or by or under a resolution of the house ... . 
[and to} monitor, investigate, enquire into and make recommendations 
relating to any aspect of the legislative programme, budget, rationalisation, 
restructuring, functioning, organisation, structure, personnel, policy 
formulation or any other matter it may consider relevant, or the government 
department or departments falling within the category of affairs consigned to 
the committee". 
Therefore, these committees (inclusive of standing committees, portfolio committees, 
select or joint committees, performing on either an ad hoc or permanent basis) 
facilitate public participation in the Parliamentary decision-making processes (of the 
respective government departments), and although they form part of the Assembly, 
· they do not perform independently from the Assembly. Rule 53 of the National 
Assembly elaborates on the specific powers portfolio committees are equipped with: 
2 
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"(Committees may) summon any person to appear before it to give evidence 
on oath or affirmation ... [and} summon any person to appear before it to 
produce any documents required by it " 
One can therefore conclude that institutionally the committees are "given legal teeth" 
in Rule 53 of the National Assembly and Section 58(2) of the Constitution 
(Macozoma, 1996: 112). For the purpose of this thesis, it is necessary to note that 
SCOPA was created with the Parliamentary objective of having a specialised 
committee on public oversight and scrutiny, managing oversight of a broad spectrum 
of interests, departments, and public organs of the state. 
Apart from SCOPA there are at least two other independent institutions of relevance 
here. As structured within the Constitution, the independent Chapter nine institutions 
were designed to be complementary to the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces in assisting Parliament in its oversight function of the executive, 
specifically as far as reports of the Auditor-General and Public Protector are 
concerned. According to section 18(1) of the Constitution (1996), these independent 
institutions arc responsible for strengthening our Constitutional democracy. In a 
Parliamentary system, a Parliament has a mandatory role to keep executive power in 
check. Therefore, these Chapter nine institutions should be seen as complementary to 
Parliament's oversight function, when the official reports and competence of the 
relevant state organs are assessed, by providing it with information that is not derived 
from the executive (Corder et al , 1999: 27). 
In short, SCOPA was assigned the task of enhancing Parliamentary oversight over all 
state organs, in order to hold the executive accountable to Parliament. Therefore, they 
have the responsibility to identify, and make recommendations for proper action, 
when financial misconduct has taken place within any organ of the state, essentially 
so that taxpayers receive public services that resemble value for their money. The 
focus of this thesis goes wider than Parliament, as it will also investigate how SCOPA 
reacts to cases of financial misconduct within private and public entities. The latter 
· issue will be discussed in the context of committee systems, which are still a new 
phenomenon in most modem democracies, South Africa being one of the examples 
where the convention is barely developed. General comments by authors such as 
Heywood (1997), and Hague & Harrop (2004), will serve as a basis for developing 
3 
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the structure of this thesis. Work done by Kotze (1996), February (2006), Calland 
(1997), and the Report by the Ad Hoc Joint Sub-Committee on oversight and 
accountability (2002) - in the specific South African context - are used for further 
refinement. 
1.1 Problem statement 
In order to understand the challenges SCOPA is faced with, it is necessary to 
understand the structures of the South African Parliament and the Constitution. 
Although one could learn from other existing models such as the American or 
Scandinavian models (Hague & Harrop, 2004:252), one must not simply rely on best 
practice elsewhere, but also on local experience, since these models apply in different 
contexts. Also, as mentioned by Heywood (1997: 295), although the British 
Parliament has been described as the 'mother of all Parliaments', many democratic 
systems in place today do not follow this Parliamentary model, while others that can 
be described as Parliamentary have not fully adopted the Westminster system. In 
these cases, one could argue that Parliamentary systems have often failed to live up to 
the high expectations of effectively incorporating a committee system to assist the 
Parliaments in their oversight of the executive. The latter point still applies to South 
Africa since the committee system is a work-in-progress, as evidenced by the fact that 
a chapter on committee systems has not been structured in the South African 
Constitution. Therefore, even though there are many competing models, the most 
functional model for South Africa is yet to be explored. 
A powerful assembly needs a well-developed committee structure if it is to develop 
the detailed expertise needed for real influence (Heywood, 1997: 305; Hague & 
Harrop, 2004: 250). In the US Congress, legislative and scrutinizing responsibilities 
are vested in standing committees, whereas in the UK Parliament, separate select or 
supervisory committees are set up to perform as watchdog committees. Heywood 
(2002: 324) provides the reasons for the partial failure of these committees in the UK, 
despite their authorisation to perform oversight functions. Most significant in his 
study is the observation that the hoped-for less partisan character of committees is not 
assured in all cases. The UK system of committees failed to materialise because "the 
government ha[ d] ensured that party disciplines intrude into the work of committees" 
(Heywood, 1997: 305). The apparent reason for this (since no alternative career 
4 
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structure has developed around the committees), is that MPs tend to be more sensitive 
to party pressures than Parliamentary ones (Heywood, 1997: 305). Chapter Two will 
highlight these difficulties as experienced within SCOPA, given that we have a 
Parliamentary system consisting of many opposition parties where a ruling party is 
dominant, but consensus is often sought. 
In contrast, Hague and Harrop (2004) make reference to the United States and the 
Scandinavian countries, where committee systems work well. The committees in 
these countries, like SCOPA, can examine government papers, and cross-examine 
ministers and senior civil servants of the state organs if deemed necessary. More 
particularly, Hague & Harrop (2004) argue that, apart from the party system, the key 
to the influence of committees lies in three factors: expertisev, intimacyvi, and 
supportvii. Therefore, these key elements will feature in analysing the outcomes of 
SCOPA, where a brief comparison will be drawn between the prominent features 
found in the American and Scandinavian models, and those found in SCOPA. 
As mentioned, according to the Rules of the National Assembly, SCOPA must 
consider the financial statements of all executive organs of the State, and 
Constitutional institutions, when those statements are submitted to Parliament 
(February, 2002:3). The Auditor-General has identified at least six hundred public 
bodies, which according to the Rules of the National Assembly, SCOPA would be 
responsible for overseeing. Cunently SCOPA oversees two hundred, and are already 
finding it demanding to revise and react on these reports efficiently (Corder et al, 
I 999). In South Africa, as in the UK, the proceedings are further complicated by the 
inability to ensure that questions made to the accounting officers, civil servants, or 
ministers are fully answered, or that they attend the hearings. Therefore, Heywood 
(2002: 324) states that, thus far, most committees have proved to be inadequately 
resourced, and have limited powers (Heywood, 2002: 324). A survey conducted by 
the Commonwealth (Survey of Public Accounts Committees in the Commonwealth, 
2001) indicated that public account committees have eleven members on average. 
Here it can be noted that SCOPA cunently has seventeen members. The question to 
be answered is whether the quantity of work that has to be done is being done 
efficiently, given the size of the committee and its utilization of all possible resources. 
5 
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These factors therefore arguably act as capacity constraints that feature m the 
composition of the committee, which could be changed if deemed necessary. 
It is significant to note that the American Congress has been unique in the impact of 
its committees. There, the committee system has succeeded in becoming the 
'Congress at Work' (Hague & Harrop, 2004: 251). Lees & Shaw (1979: 387) found 
that the "committee system in the American Congress is not only the strongest 
system ... it is by far the strongest". The committees are uniquely well-supported, 
employing over 3 500 policy specialists, in deciding the "fate and shape of most 
legislation" (Hague & Harrop, 2004: 251 ), and are even active in creating effective 
subcommittees. Why is this scenario not similarly triumphant in the UK and South 
Africa? Hague & Harrop (2004: 252) provide the argument that committees have less 
influence on legislation in party-dominated legislatures (such as in the British House 
of Commons), since these committees do not challenge executive dominance in 
framing legislation, unlike those of the Congress. With respect to this argument, it 
can be observed that Scandinavia provides the best example of influential committees 
in combination with strong parties, since, in these countries, influential standing 
committees negotiate the policies and bills on which the whole Parliament later votes. 
The dominant factor inhibiting the success of this system in South Africa is the lack 
of strong parties, since only the main opposition seems to be influential, but still 
functions as a minority vote. In addition, conflicting interests within committees, as a 
result of opposing party interests (as will be discussed by means of case studies in 
chapter four), should also be taken into account. 
It is therefore necessary to evaluate the current structures and functions of SCOPA. 
This is required in order to determine its effectiveness within a multiparty system 
where proportionalviii representation leaves the governing party with a big majority 
vote, thereby influencing the mandate for the committee's actions in a big way. If the 
Assembly continues to rely on oversight assistance from SCOPA in order to keep the 
executive accountable to Parliament, and for government to maintain its vote of 
confidence, it needs to acknowledge that committees will reflect ruling party interests, 
which might compromise the oversight function. One can argue that the inflexibility 
of a party-dominated representative structure removes the focus from compromise for 
what could be the common good, to demand for what the different parties lobby for. 
6 
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Murray and Nijzink (1999: 103) raise their concern about the Constitutional 
obligation to hold the government accountable. They are of the opinion that this 
obligation is complicated by the loyalty demanded by the party system in any 
Parliamentary model worldwide, not just in South Africa. Some people regard 
oversight solely as a challenge to the ruling party, and some members of the ruling 
party are not certain that oversight is their responsibility. These complexities will be 
dealt with in chapters Two and Three. 
Since SCOPA has the task of scrutinizing government administration and overseeing 
the exercise of executive power, it has been established as a permanent and 
specialized committee. However, as will be shown in Chapter Three, it has 
sometimes been the case that the detailed knowledge and expertise has not always 
been present in South Africa.. The chairperson of this committee, as part of a long-
standing tradition in many Parliaments, is usually from the opposition (this principle 
is adhered to in two-thirds of existing public accounts committees in the 
Commonwealth) (Wehner, 2002:21). The appointment of SCOPA's current 
chairperson on 2 November 2005 (Mr T Godi: PAC) has provided reason to doubt the 
motive for having a member from such 'weak opposition' (the PAC is a party with 
dwindling support, whose political future is regarded as doubtful) chair SCOPA. As 
opposed to upholding the principle of having a member from a convincing opposition 
fill this significant position. The latter concern is relevant because the chairperson is 
responsible, in consultation with the committee and the Auditor-General, for setting 
the agenda of the committee, (Strengthening accountability and oversight of key 
Parliamentary commHtees in Kenya, 2001: 7). Chapter Three will explore the reasons 
for members and chairs having resigned from SCOPA in the past, explaining some of 
the implications of these for ensuring the future success of SCOPA. 
In South Africa, as well as in the Congress of the United States and in Scandinavia, 
the oversight responsibilities are mainly vested in the Standing Committees 
(Heywood, 2002: 323). However, this has proved to be one of the weaknesses of the 
system. Experts propose that the reason for this weakness is that, as has been found to 
be the case in South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (all with 
Westminster Parliamentary systems), countries have been subject to committees who 
have been driven by loyalty towards the government of the day (Heywood, 2002: 
7 
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324). According to Kotze, (1998: 16) the horizontal separation of powers within the 
executive is neutralised by having the Cabinet and the executive consist of the same 
members. Heywood (2002: 318) also explores the idea of MPs compromising their 
traditional loyalty to constituents by the growing influence of business interests. This 
idea will be discussed more in-depth in the case studies in Chapter Four. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the US Congress, which operates within a presidential 
system, provides good examples where the use of qualified staff to advise committees 
(by means of expert researchers), and the small size and stable membership of 
committees (with specialised responsibilities and expertise within permanent 
committees), have outbalanced the difficulties many other countries have battled with 
(Hague & Harrop, 2004: 251). In South Africa it seems that, as in many other cases 
(as evident from other Westminster models), with the price of the committee system 
came the tag of strict party loyalty and discipline (Heywood, 2002: 317). However, in 
contrast, Scandinavia has succeeded in having influential standing committees, with 
their governing style sometimes being called the "committee Parliamentarianism" 
(Hague & Harrop, 2004: 252). What lessons are there for SCOPA to learn? 
This thesis will argue that the committee system in general is an essential institution 
within the South African democracy, provided that it includes the 'best practices' as 
understood from local experience, and lessons learned from successful models such as 
in the USA and Scandinavia. Firstly, South Africa will gain from experiencing 
diversity within a multiparty system, where representatives from many minorities may 
contribute as members. Secondly, committee members need a shared enthusiasm for 
accountable governance by combining expertise, and maintaining the capacity to 
perform effective oversight, irrespective of party politics. If not, Richard Calland 
(Idasa, 1997), on the transformation of the South African Parliamentary committee 
system, has noted that the increasing influence of parties has, in the past, caused the 
legislature to lose control of the executive (particularly in Westminster systems, 
where the same ruling party is always in charge of both the legislature and the 
executive). In such cases the major task of holding the executive accountable in 
public affairs, lies in the hands of the "whistle blowers" and a vigilant media. These 
issues, however, fall outside the scope of this thesis. 
8 
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1.1.1 The Westminster-based heritage 
The Westminster-based system is based on a tripartite division of powers (' trias 
politica'), but is not as divided as in typical presidential systems such as practised in 
the USA. In Westminster-based systems, the executive is elected from members of 
the strongest party in Parliament: it is a system of government in which the executive 
is drawn from, and accountable to, the assembly or Parliament (Heywood, 1997: 31 ). 
According to Heywood (2002: 318), the prime function of the assembly in a 
Westminster-based system has been to uphold and support government, since the 
majority of the members of the assembly belong to the governing party. Therefore 
the need was created to ensure better communication between the branches of 
government by means of a horizontal separation of powers, as supported by an 
effective committee systemix, which can perforn1 independently of unconditional 
loyalties to the government of the day. But, as indicated above, this ideal is often 
compromised, resulting in a weakening of the oversight role as part of an extended 
system of checks and balances. 
Heywood (1997: 304) labels the rise of committee systems as the 'powerhouses' of 
assemblies, since they become a central part of the legislative process. Committee 
systems first originated, in 1979, as an attempt to strengthen Parliament in the UK 
against the executive. They were later modelled on the example of the US. This 
original system wanted to promote open government by allowing for cross-
examination of ministers and senior civil servants, as well as the examination of 
government papers (Heywood, 1997: 305). The aim of these attempts was to let these 
committees become effective watchdogs that would be able to influence government 
policy effectively. The same reasoning resulted in the rise of a committee with 
similar goals in South African Parliament. However, as already mentioned, the 
experiment has not been foolproof in all instances: there remains much to be learned 
in order for committees to become more effective in the management of their 
portfolios. 
In South Africa, with the rise of committee systems (as in other Westminster 
systems), there are common areas within its practises that still remain unsatisfactory. 
Since all the members of the executive are also members of Parliament, it becomes 
problematical to assess whether the agenda of committees (especially in oversight and 
BIBLIOTEEK 
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scrutiny functions) are non-partisan in nature. One model that has been widely 
pursued as a gesture of transparency and non-partisanship is that the chairpersons of 
these oversight committees have traditionally been from opposition parties (Heywood, 
2002: 318). This is also the case in South Africa. 
1.1.2 Constitutional requirements 
As identified in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No 108 of 
1996), one of Parliament's core Constitutional responsibilities is to conduct oversight 
of the executive, as set out in section 92(2) and 55(2) and the PFMA (Public Finance 
Managing Act) (Act 1 of 1999). However, no draft or formal section on the specific 
functions and structures of these committee systems, which constitute a fundamental 
part of Parliamentary oversight and its other core responsibilities, has been introduced 
into the Constitution. Parliament has to date not compiled a document that clearly 
connects the inter-related themes of non-partisan oversight, accountability, 
transparency, and responsiveness. Therefore no broad understanding of the oversight 
role and purpose thereof exists. The existence of such a document is crucial in order 
to guide the increasing importance of the role that oversight committees, such as 
SCOPA, need to play in the near future. Currently, section 55(2) of the Constitution 
(Act 108 of 1996) reads as follows: 
"The National Assembly must provide for mechanisms-
( a) to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of 
government are accountable to it. 
(b) To maintain oversight of-
(i) the exercise of national executive authority, including the 
implementation of legislation; and 
(ii) any organ of state. " 
Therefore, the responsibility falls upon the National Assembly to hold organs of state 
accountable. However, no reference is made to the support from committees on 
public accounts, or what bodies can be seen as organs of state. Parliament has not yet 
commissioned an audit of the various bodies exercising public powers, or specified 
which departments are responsible for the various organs of state. It is for this reason 
that portfolio and select committees within Parliament have consequently assumed the 
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necessary oversight responsibilities (Final Report of the Ad Hoc Joint Sub-committee 
on oversight and accountability, 2002: 9). 
Within the scope of this thesis, it is relevant to note that the Constitution (1996) only 
makes provision for Parliamentary oversight in general, and not for a watchdog 
committee. There is no provision made for SCOPA, even though it can be seen to be 
the main executive oversight committee of Parliament, in collaboration with the 
Auditor-General and the Public Protector. The only effective committee discussed in 
section 78(1) of the Constitution (1996) is the Mediation Committee which consists of 
members from the NA and NCOP, but only in the case of disputes between the 
houses . Therefore, according to the Constitution (1996), the executive is, strictly 
speaking, only obliged to comply with the requirements of the legislature, and this can 
be enforced by the "legal teeth" given to committees in Rule 53 of the National 
Assembly and section 58(2) of the Constitution (Kotze, 1997: 112). The only 
Constitutional power SCOPA has is that given to it by the National Assembly, and the 
acknowledgment of its legitimacy by its committee members and members of the 
state organs. 
The Constitution (1996) does not list any of the permanent and more prominent 
committees amongst the state institutions that support our Constitutional democracy 
in section 195(1 ), other than the Chapter nine institutions. As already mentioned, it is 
especially important to analyse SCOPA' s relationship with the Auditor-General and 
the Public Protector, because both provide independent information on the executive. 
Therefore, these institutions legitimately and independently serve and implement their 
powers, and even though SCOPA may call for accounting reports from these 
institutions, SCOPA is not recognised as an independent institution. This fact limits 
SCOPA' s powers to the extent that they work in collaboration with these Chapter nine 
institutions, or claim further assistance from these institutions based on their 
respective expertise. Therefore they can also differ in opinion and findings, in some 
instances undermining each other' s legitimacl, as will be discussed later in the case 
studies - more specifically, within the Oilgate report. 
l.l.3 Broad-based recognition for oversight 
It is crucial to demonstrate our Constitutional democracy by advancing an underlying 
culture of accountability in all spheres of government. It is therefore necessary not 
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only to embed a culture of oversight via the Constitution, but also to enforce it 
through the existing oversight bodies of Parliament, thereby creating broad awareness. 
This need is supported by the Ad Hoc Joint Sub-Committee, which reported on 
Parliamentary oversight in 2002 that "the mere existence of oversight mechanisms 
will do little to enhance the practice of oversight, if there is a lack of appreciation of 
the role and function of oversight by MPs and the broader South African Community" 
(Final Report of the Ad Hoc Joint Sub-committee on oversight and accountability, 
2002:5). 
With respect to SCOPA, it is therefore necessary to focus on the conditions that could 
contribute to a culture of public accounts committees being more effective. As 
mentioned previously, if the interaction amongst committee members and the 
relationship between the executive and legislative is politicised (examples of such 
cases will be provided in chapters Three and Four), it cripples the efficiency of 
enforcement strategies. The problem with non-compliance (and the prevalence 
thereof in a committee such as SCOPA) is that civil servants evade any strict 
precaution or rectifying actions, without any real consequences (Dreyer, 2005). 
The contributing conditions that could enhance a culture of broad-based recognition 
for oversight were identified in a report on the Workshop for Select Committees 
dealing in finance as: 
I. strong media coverage on the committee's reports; 
2. an active civil society that puts pressure on government to implement 
recommendations; 
3. networking with committees in other Parliaments in order to develop new 
basic financial systems and to share experience on how to fight financial 
malpractices; 
4. submissions of accounts which is timely, and sanctions applied to any delay. 
Crucial to all of the above is the recruitment of a strong chairperson, well-trained 
staff, and researchers who are collectively transparent to the public (Strengthening 
accountability and oversight of key Parliamentary committees in Kenya, 200 I: 12). 
These pre-conditions will help guide the analysis of the findings in chapter four, in 
order to identify the possible areas of concern. 
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In addition, chapters Three and Four will try to determine what can arguably be seen 
as the biggest disadvantage of the committee system. This disadvantage can be 
spotted in cases where committee members are manipulated by fellow members of the 
same political party (mostly the party with proportionally more seats in Parliament), 
consequently narrowing the range of views or interests that are taken into account in 
the decision-making process. This behaviour encourages partisanship and the 
centralisation of decision-making. However, this problem is usually addressed by 
having a chairperson from the opposition party chair the proceedings (Heywood, 
1997: 304). As will be discussed later in this thesis, one should recognise that cases 
in which this remedy has been applied in South Africa have been increasingly 
criticised. The recent appointment of Mr T Godi (PAC) as chairperson of SCOPA in 
2005, for example, received much criticism. In this instance, it would appear that 
having a member from "weak opposition" as chairperson (rather than disobeying the 
principle of electing a member from the most influential opposition party) still 
provides an easy way for the ruling party to be influential in the committee 
proceedings. 
On the other hand, the most noticeable advantage of the public account committees 
that SCOPA will be weighed against is the opportunity they provide for detailed 
discussions, with a variety of expertise presumably sharing specialist knowledge. 
Although the chairperson is expected to encourage discussions to be made more 
efficient by restricting the range of opposing opinions, the complexity of this arguably 
catch twenty-twoxi situation will be analysed. 
In summary, Saki Macozoma has argued that, in our National Assembly, " ... the 
executive and the bureaucracy have not yet fully embraced the new paradigm of 
effective Parliamentary supervision (as is the argument for the committee system) ... 
[t]his disjuncture between what Parliament wants done and what the executive and the 
bureaucracy are willing to do has generated considerable tensions between certain 
portfolio committees and the departments they are supposed to oversee." (Macozoma, 
1996:113). 
1.2 The Purpose and Significance of Study 
This thesis describes the complexity of the intertwined problems raised thus far, as a 
first step to determine whether they weaken the capacity of Parliament to deliver on 
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its oversight responsibility. This thesis will analyse whether the oversight watchdogs 
(specifically SCOPA in collaboration with the Auditor-General and the Public 
Protector) maintain a complementary, co-operative relationship, without being 
weakened by the possibility of the executive authority (made up of members of the 
ruling party) pushing a mandate for the governing party. 
Consequently, this thesis will assess SCOPA's role in Parliamentary oversight and 
accountability by focussing on the structures and functions of SCOPA within 
Parliament. By discussing the selected case studies and the relevant observations 
made by members of Parliament and other selected authorities, this will help 
determine the strengths and weaknesses of SCOPA. The final assessment will 
therefore determine the outputs and attributes of SCOPA, in order to conclude 
whether or not the watchdog's teeth have been pulled and if an alternative oversight 
structure for the South African Parliament could be more feasible. 
Questions that will contribute to this analysis and inform and form the subject of this 
thesis are: what are the future prospects of SCOPA within an increasingly one-party-
driven state-structure (which arguably has taken root within committee structures as 
well) that could threaten its credibility? How can SCOPA ensure that they are taken 
seriously in order to prevent the expectation that financial misconducts and debts be 
written off, but rather are acted on? How can a new culture of political accountability 
and oversight amongst all organs of state and all state powers (including the leading 
and opposition parties) be implemented with an agenda that, above all, supports the 
demands of our democracy? These questions identify possible areas of concern 
within SCOPA's strategies and organizational structures, which need to be addressed 
in order to improve on the areas that question their own integrity and credibility. 
The issues these questions address will aid the analysis of whether or not the limited 
rectification procedures that exist for the testing of unqualified public accounts, and 
the treatment of unauthorised expenditures, have become more lenient towards 
writing off debt or unsatisfactory behaviour, rather than on following strict recovery 
procedures. This could prove significant, since this issue has not been dealt with 
formally within the Constitution, and neither has it led to effective alternative 
structures for oversight and increased government accountability. 
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Ultimately, as one of the outcomes of this thesis, Addendum A provides a detailed 
project proposal, with relevant recommendations, in order to assist in creating an 
alternative inter-connected oversight structure for Parliament. 
1.3 Methodology 
This thesis uses a combination of approaches for both the collection and analysis of 
the relevant research material that are within the scope of the qualitative method to 
achieve its objectives. 
A critical review of existing literature and research reports was done in order to grasp 
the full context of the problem this thesis attempts to address. Interviews were used, 
reporting on the attitudes and dispositions of MPs (both from the ruling and leading 
opposition party), as well as statements made by some of SCOPA's previous 
chairpersons. The analysis of these discussions focuses on the performance of the 
oversight institutions of the Constitution in collaboration with the oversight functions 
of SCOPA, deliberating on their successes and failures, in order to make further 
recommendations. 
An assessment of the minutes of meetings held between SCOPA and the accounting 
entities (of the relevant case studies) was also made. These relevant minutes (as taken 
by the Parliamentary Monitoring Group in Parliament), including all media articles 
that provided reports on these meetings, provided additional research material to the 
case studies. 
The case studies that were analysed are: 
(a) The Arms Deal 
(b) Oil gate: PetroSA and Imvume 
(c) State Housing Subsidies 
These case studies analysed how managerial bad practice (within government 
departments or public organs of the state) can be connected with the government 
(such as corruption and illegal party funding). These case studies were chosen due to 
their complexity, and also because they enjoyed much media coverage, receiving 
' 
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widespread critique that provided reason to doubt both the integrity and the 
transparency of SCOPA, the Chapter Nine Independent Institutions, and Parliament. 
Constitutionalism can best be explained as the practice of limited government, ensured by the 
existence of a Constitution. Therefore, government institutions and political processes are constrained 
by Constitutional rules. It can also be seen as a set of political values and aspirations that reflect the 
desire to protect liberty by means of internal and external checks on government power. It is a typical 
example of political liberalism in practice. Finally, it is typically expressed in the fonn of support for 
Constitutional provisions that achieve this goal : such as the codified Constitution, a bill of rights, a 
separation of powers, bicameralism, and federalism (Heywood, 2002: 297). 
ii The basic functions of Parliament are central to understanding the essential role that SCOPA has to 
play. According to Pols by ( 1975: 22), a Parliament is a group of individuals that operate on behalf of 
the general public in a binding and legitimate manner, making collective policy decisions and 
overseeing all activities of the governing executive. 
iiiAccountability consists of both answerability and enforcement (Schlemmer in Diamond, Plattner, and 
Schedler, 1999: 14-16). 
ivThese reports include Audit Reports, Reports by the Auditor-General, Reports by a Constitutional 
institution or public body, financial statements, or financial reports. 
v Expertise emerges over time from committees with specialised responsibilities and a clear field of 
operation. Expertise is most likely to develop in permanent committees with continuity of operation 
and membership (Hague & Harrop, 2004:252). 
vi Intimacy emerges from small size, and is reinforced by stable membership. Particularly when 
meetings take place in private, a small-group setting can encourage co-operation and consensus, 
overcoming any initial hostility between members from competing parties (Hague & Harrop, 
2004:252). 
vii Support refers to the use of qualified staff to advise committees. Expert researchers can enable busy 
politicians to produce well-founded recommendations (Hague & Harrop, 2004:252). 
viii Jn South Africa, this means that the committee consists proportionally of the members of parties, as 
represented by their number of seats in Parliament. In this case, one could argue that a model such as 
used for the Zambian Parliament's Public Accounts Committee could be feasible and successful in 
South Africa. This model ensures inclusiveness by giving each party (because there are only as many 
members as there are parties represented in the house), one representative on the committee (Wehner, 
2002: 7). 
;'Even though these committees would still be proportionally represented as mentioned in the previous 
footnote, the goal would be to still maintain diversity of inputs, but within a committee as a whole, with 
a shared purpose, and not based on the agendas of the different political parties that are represented. 
• Even though healthy tension between the legislative and executive generally can be seen as essential, 
non-compliance with the requirements for government accountability means the end of oversight, 
which is a crucial building stone for our Democracy. 
xi On the one hand it is important for the committee to be consistent with their values and findings 
within the reports they handle, but on the other it is important for the chairperson to recognise that it is 
a fair version of all the members' contributions, and that it in no instance simply reflects on what would 
contribute to a untarnished image of government actions. This can be related to Gavin Woods (IFPl 
resigning as chairperson of SCOPA in 200 I, partly due to his disapproval of the committee's 14 
report (on the Anns Deal case study). This issue will be raised again in chapters Three and Four. 
16 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 2 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
AND PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT 
2. Background 
With the opening of the third democratic South African Parliament in 2004, the ANC's 
Chief Whip proclaimed that the focus of Parliament would be on strengthening 
committees and their oversight over implementation of legislation and policy. February 
(2006: 140) argues that thus far, it would appear that there was little to suggest that this 
was anything more than rhetoric, or ' hot air'. However, this chapter will shed light on 
the interconnected framework of government accountability and Parliamentary oversight, 
introducing the broad spectrum of actors who contribute to maintaining an effective 
oversight climate in our Constitutional democracy. 
In theory, much of the expertise surrounding the exercise of oversight exists within 
Parliament (particularly in the form of the committees and committee chairpersons). 
Conversely, according to the Ad Hoc Joint Sub-Committee on oversight and 
accountability (2002: 11), there is no consistent understanding or approach to the 
exercising of the oversight role within the South African Parliament. This, in contrast to 
the ANC Chief Whip 's proclamation, would arguably weaken committees in their 
oversight role. 
In order to provide a true measure of how successful Parliament has been in exercising 
oversight, one needs to understand the origins of Parliament ' s oversight facilities. Since 
1994, Parliament has been faced with a lack of institutional memory by not maintaining 
detailed records, or structuring a long-term plan, of oversight and scrutiny of the 
executive. Parliament's attempts to exercise public scrutiny have therefore been 
hampered by the absence of detailed minutes or debates on the reports received. Given 
the nature of Parliament thus far, it is to be expected that the expertise acquired during 
the first and second democratic Parliaments will largely have been lost over time, since 
the new crop of MPs were only elected into their seats for the third democratic 
Parliament. It is crucial to develop an institutional memory, to ensure that future 
17 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Parliamentarians will continue to build a strong foundation for Parliamentary oversight in 
years to come. One suggestion that could effectively be applied to the South African 
context, as mentioned by the Ad Hoc Joint Sub-Committee on oversight and 
accountability (2002:69), requires that Parliament takes measures to develop a Best 
Practice Guide which will capture inter-alia the best oversight practices of committees, 
and the experiences of chairpersons of the various Select and Portfolio committees. This 
document would contribute to the institutionalisation of a working structure, thereby 
preventing Parliamentary committees from making the same blunders twice. 
On the other side of the spectrum, the strengths of the oversight role have been its 
flexible nature, and the fact that Parliament has been able to adapt its oversight work to 
fit the particular oversight contingency. "Oversight is a developing practice in our 
nascent Parliament particularly now as it shifts gears from legislating to implementation 
mode" (Ad Hoc Joint Sub-Committee on oversight and accountability, 2002: 13). This 
has been key to making oversight measurable, in order to create the basis for a record-
keeping administrative structure. The transformation has been from a "part-time, cynical 
rubber-stamp into a full-time, vibrant place of work" (February, 2006: 1). This 
transformation process has provided the right incentives for future Parliamentary 
oversight structures, although this thesis holds that it has not been without serious 
problems, or that challenges remain. 
Calland ( 1997: 4) argues that, within Parliamentary systems based on the Westminster 
model , committees of the Lower House always have to contend with two challenges: 
1. The strong demands of the government for control of the business of Parliament; 
2. The desire of opposition parties and government alike to continue the electoral 
battle in both the house and its committees. 
In this chapter, the 'principle-agent' theory will be of relevance (Rommetveldt, 1998: 
129). This theory specifies that assemblies pressurise committee members to behave as 
agents of the party. This can be described as "an analytic expression of the agency 
refationship, in relationship with another, the agent, in the expectation that the agent will 
subsequently choose actions that produce outcomes desired by the principle" (Moe, 1984: 
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756). These circumstances make it difficult for Parliamentary committees to find a role 
for themselves - as a cohesive body performing independently of both government and 
party politics. Ideally, their mission should be recognised collectively by committee 
members, government, political parties and the media (Franks, 1997: 199). Oversight 
committees should uphold the general interest of Parliament, and the public, in 
overseeing the activities of government. To some extent, they should also participate in 
the governance of the country, independent of party loyalties. 
In May 2005, Parliament released a strategic plan entitled Mapping the Future 2004-2008 
(South African Parliament, 2005). Judith February (2006: 124) notes that central to this 
plan is the notion of a 'people's Parliament', which is responsible and open to 
engagement and interaction with citizens, and which will have as a priority the function 
of 'scrutinising and overseeing executive action'. The question remains: how well are 
these engagement structures developed and do they ensure effective public participation, 
or are there more advanced oversight alternatives which should be given preference? It is 
necessary to integrate civil society in public scrutiny so that one builds an interconnected 
and co-operative oversight structure. Such a structure could arguably enhance the 
political will of members of committees and public trust in government accountability, 
thereby ensuring higher levels of legitimacy in oversight committees such as SCOPA. 
Another factor to be noted, in addition to the influence of the party-governance structure 
on the committees, is the influence of lobbyists on members of Parliament. A case study 
in Norway found the corporate functional channel to be more important than the 
territorial election channel. Rommetvedt found that "leaders of all the interest 
organisations reflected their preference for the corporate channel" (Rommetvedt, 1998: 
78). Therefore, power could in some cases be moved towards the bureaucracy and the 
interest organisations when contacts are formed between organisation representatives and 
MPs (Olsen, 1983). Although the MPs are not necessarily members of the oversight 
committees, when such contacts are formed between MPs of the local government and an 
organisation from the corporate sector - in order to promote certain interests or to receive 
funds for the governing political party - it still falls within the jurisdiction of the oversight 
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committees to hold MPs accountable. This issue will be further discussed when 
considering the Oilgate (PetroSA-Imvume) case study. 
A third factor is that of consensus seeking. In agreement with the perspectives from 
Heywood ( 1997) and Hague & Harrop (2004 ), Call and ( 1997) sees the committee system 
as the 'engine room'. More specifically with regards to the South African Parliamentary 
renaissance, they see the committee system as the driving force behind the 
implementation and management of the decision-making-process. Politics, as 'rule by 
the many' (Heywood, 1997: 5), ideally resembles consensus-seeking by most members of 
Parliament which includes participation from all parties represented in the Assembly and 
committees, by means of proportional representation. Consensus amongst all parties on a 
specific issue, or 'consensus' won by a majority vote, is necessary in order to make 
authoritative decisions. Such decisions go towards forming a plan of action to represent 
the will of the people in the community as a whole, without directly imposing the agenda 
of each party above the values and goals of the specific committee. However, this chapter 
argues that the hands-on, face-to-face political realities of the Parliamentary committees 
should not be accepted as the only model that unconditionally succeeds in maintaining a 
separation of powers within the Parliamentary executive structures when forming 
consensus. It forms part of a more complex interaction between various actors, 
influenced by many independent factors. These structures must be understood when 
reviewing SCOPA as the responsible watchdog committee in South Africa. 
lt is within this context, that we can define government accountability as a principle that 
is not merely applicable to the administrators of our public services, but is fundamental to 
our entire political system and therefore binding on us all (Simey, 1985:21 ). Simey notes 
that it is not only the executive who has to be held accountable for their activities, 
because the elected members to whom they are accountable are themselves under an 
obligation to submit to scrutiny and, if need be, control by the people who elected them. 
In this light one can view Parliament as the institutional centrepiece of democratic 
goyernance in theory and in practice (Call and, 1997: 1 ), being dependent on a well-
functioning committee system for effective implementation. 
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2.1 Conceptualisation 
2.1.1 Parliamentary oversight and accountability 
The committee system within Parliament plays a central role in the transformation and 
development of the institutions of the country. As the third branch originating from the 
concept of separation of powers, it plays a key role in mobilising the executive to both 
perform and actively oversee Parliamentary actions. The critical question is therefore: 
when and how does Parliament engage in oversight interventions? Parliament 
promulgates laws on the one hand, whjJe on the other it oversees the action of the 
executive in implementing those laws (Nhleko, 2002). 
Oversight can best be described as an extensive concept that refers to the crucial role of 
legislatures in monitoring and reviewing the actions of the executive organs of 
government. To 'oversee' implies scrutinising, surveying, reviewing or looking carefully 
at how something is being done or achieved. The term is used to describe a large number 
of activities carried out by legislatures in relation to the executive (Corder et al, 1999: 4). 
In the case of Parliamentarians tills would involve examining whether there is adequate 
delivery of services on the part of the executive, and furthermore whether such delivery is 
efficient, widespread, economical and of good quality. Oversight is generally conceived 
in terms of the implicitly proactive ' watchdog' role to be played by an elected legislative 
assembly towards the activities and functions of the executive and administrative arms of 
government. Jn addition, oversight refers to the invaluable role of legislatures in 
monitoring and reviewing the actions of the executive organs of government. The term 
oversight traverses a far wider range of activity than does the concept of accountability 
(Ad Hoc Joint Sub-Committee on oversight and accountability, 2002: 2). However, 
oversight is not only about holding government accountable: it also carries with it a 
historic responsibility to co-operate with the rest of society. 
Accountability is intrinsically a quality, and extrinsically a policy, whereby government 
ministers and officials are made subject to both a moral and a legal obligation to report, 
explain, and justify their decisions to Parliament in respect of how they implemented 
policies, legislation and other responsibilities conferred on them through various legal 
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instruments. Accountability can therefore be understood in two senses. In a narrow, 
technical sense, it firstly refers to the duty of the head of a department to account as 
'accounting officer' to his or her Minister, the Auditor-General, and finally the Public 
Accounts Committee (Corder et al, 1999: 4). Accountability, " ... at the basic textual 
level ... means to give account of actions or policies, or to account for spending and so 
forth." (Ad Hoc Joint Sub-Committee on oversight and accountability 2002: 8). 
Therefore, accountability requires a person to explain and justify their decisions or 
actions. More importantly, accountability requires that the decision-maker compensates 
for any misconduct, and takes steps to prevent its recurrence in the future. This 
requirement is supported by The Constitution ( 1996), under the condition that the 
administration or executive is checked by being held accountable to an organ of 
government distinct from it (Ad Hoc Joint Sub-Committee on oversight and 
accountability, 2002: 8). Secondly, accountability refers to enforceability: SCOPA is 
equipped to make recommendations concerning changes that should be made when 
reports seem unsatisfactory, or to recommend that members responsible for malpractice 
should be held accountable accordingly. 
When implementing these seemingly rational concepts of Parliamentary oversight and 
government accountability in practice Corder et al ( 1999: 5) raise concerns about 
difficulties arising from the separation of powers in Parliament. The research teams' 
report learned that while our Constitution gives expression to the principle of separation 
of powers by recognising the functional independence of the three branches of 
government, our Parliamentary system of government does not give full expression to 
this notion because of the close links between the legislature and the executive. Our 
executive is not only chosen from the legislature but also from the leadership of the 
majority party. In the US, there is a true separation of powers, in the sense that the 
administration is separate from Congress (Idasa, n.d). South Africa, like Scandinavia, 
operates through a strong party-based system, where the executive consists of members 
from the assembly. There is therefore a specific need for constructive oversight to be 
' 
encouraged, by being pro-active and dependent on impartial cross-party co-operation. In 
what manner does our Constitution provide for these priorities and how do committees 
specifically contribute do these democratic ideals? 
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Within South Africa's bicameral Parliamentary structure, one needs to define the 
respective roles of the two Houses of Parliament (the NA and the NCOP) in 
Parliamentary oversight, in order to understand the NCOP's complementary role to the 
NA). The focus of the NCOP's oversight role is determined and limited by its 
Constitutional role, as are its committees. The role of the NCOP is to represent the 
provinces, and to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in the national 
sphere of government (The Constitution, 1996: 42(2)). Its oversight role is therefore 
restricted to matters concerning local and provincial government, as well as those special 
cases where a decision in national government affects provincial and local matters. The 
Constitution (1996) does not specifically mention a general oversight role for the NCOP, 
unlike for the National Assembly (The Constitution, 1996: 42(3), 55(2)). However, the 
executive is accountable to the NCOP, since section 92(2) (The Constitution, 1996) 
unequivocally states that members of the cabinet are responsible to Parliament as whole 
and not only to the NA (Corder et al, 1999: 11 ). 
A widespread concern linked to growing committee structures, is the observation that 
many legislative committees are behaving as if oversight is a secondary, as opposed to a 
primary, responsibility (Rosen, 1982: 54). There is no clarity between who should take 
on the responsibility of Parliamentary oversight or in which circumstances, and what the 
formal links are between the relevant oversight actors. Rosen (1982: 55) comments only 
on the expertise of the standing committees, mentioning a number of useful tools to their 
benefit in order to achieve effective oversight. Their oversight powers include: the right 
to· conduct investigations in order to determine the competence with which programmes 
are being administered; holding hearings to look into specific allegations by reviewing a 
nominee ' s qualifications; and examining the adequacy and effectiveness of programmes. 
Most significantly, Rosen (1982: 54) notes that these processes can lead to provisions 
being written into law concerning establishment of systematic reporting and evaluation 
requirements to be fulfilled by the agency in order to facilitate program review by the 
sta11ding committee. In South Africa, this could contribute to building institutional 
memory as referred to previously. 
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South Africa has several existing mechanisms already in place to ensure accountability. 
These include: 
1. The budget votei ; 
2. The power to summon members of the executive and the public to appear before 
Parliamentary committees; 
3. Parliamentary question time (Corder et al , 1999: 19). 
The annual budget vote is potentially one of the most direct tools that Parliament can use 
to enforce accountability, recognising that the budget process in any Parliament is an 
important tool. It brings the full scope of Parliament' s oversight role to bear on 
government's priorities. However, there is neither a full evaluation of the current 
practice in our Parliament, nor a comparative analysis of the budget process in other 
Parliaments. Parliament' s role in the budget process is inseparable from its oversight 
work - Parliament should draw from its oversight experience to inform and influence the 
budget (Ad Hoc Joint uh-Committee on oversight and accountability 2002: 39). 
I lowever, the focus of this thesis is the other two mechanisms of oversight as practised by 
COPA, namely the power to summon members of the executive and the public to 
appear before Parliamentary committees, and Parliamentary question time. 
In context, the Ad Hoc Joint Sub-Committee on oversight and accountability (2002 : 9) 
stresses that effective and efficient oversight of the executive in South Africa, requires 
members of a) Parliament, and b) the executive, to understand the Constitutional 
justifications and rationale behind accountable government, and the purpose it serves. 
Accountability and oversight can be at their most effective if recognised by those in 
power as the central organising principle of our Constitution. 
2.1.2 Constitutional democracy: Oversight framework 
Essentially, Parliaments ' oversight role originated from, and continues to be shaped, by 
the Constitution. ection 55 (The Constitution, 1996) stipulates that the legislature' s role 
is: to pass, initiate or prepare legislation (except money bills); to ensure executive 
accountability; and to exercise oversight over organs of state. Section 92(2) (The 
Constitution, 1996) states that "Members of the Cabinet are accountable collectively and 
24 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
individually to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their 
functions". Oversight mechanisms have been employed with the aim of building a 
strongly entrenched democratic culture operating within the underlying values and spirit 
of the Constitution. It is against this that all oversight mechanisms or practices should be 
measured. Parliament is yet to landscape the Constitutional provisions relating to the 
interconnected themes of oversight, accountability, transparency and responsiveness, 
learning from practical experience and international trends (more specifically the USA 
and Scandinavia). 
The design of a Constitution is dependent on the composition of the governmental 
structures, which are unique to each country. Within democracies, the composition of an 
executive varies within presidential (such as the USA) and Parliamentary (such as South 
Africa and Scandinavia) systems. Both have their strengths and weaknesses, as 
applicable in their different contexts. However, what these systems do have in common 
is their well-structured committee systems, even though they has not formally been tabled 
within their Constitutions. It is therefore still a process of learning, as much to 
understand the oversight committee's specific role within the legislature as to create 
guidelines for effective committee practices in the relevant contexts, so as to learn from 
different countries and from own experience. 
Consequently, Constitutional provisions in South Africa still represent challenges in their 
implementation. The Ad Hoc Joint Sub-Committee on oversight and accountability 
(2002: I I) mentions that section 55(2) of the Constitution (1996) presents problems of 
interpretation. lt requires the National Assembly to provide mechanisms (most likely in 
the form of committees and procedures for the passing of legislation), firstly, to ensure 
accountability, and secondly, to maintain oversight of the exercise of the national 
executive authority and all organs of state. The Committee argues that section 55(2) sets 
an obligatory minimal standard of accountability for executive organs of state in the 
natiqnal sphere of government. Therefore this section of the Constitution does not 
adequately deal with all of the Constitutional provisions relating to oversight. It is 
therefore, according to the Committee, necessary to develop an understanding of the 
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entire oversight theme in the Constitution, in order for all members of the Executive to 
act without hesitance. 
Strom (1998: 23) introduces the theme of institutionalisation, by identifying committees 
as a separate and sub-group of legislators, a group entrusted with specific organisational 
tasks within the broader context of governmental organisation. Strom labels committees 
as one of the 'privileged groups', arguing that legislative organisations generate two 
forms of differentiation: hierarchy and specialisation. It is within these terms that 
SCOPA should be recognised: as an entity specialised in Parliamentary oversight within 
the Constitution, enhancing its powers as an important link in the general oversight 
structure. However, as a means to ensure proper checks and balances by the separation 
of powers, committees have less power than other privileged groups (such as decisive 
groups, veto groups or dictatorsii), and for this reason are arguably considered with less 
idolisation (Strom, 1998: 24). The legislative institutionalisation, as explained by Strom 
(1998), is brought into context by the organisation theory of Norton (1998). The 
organisation theory, and work on legislative institutionalisation, suggests that 
institutionalisation occurs at two levels (Norton, 1998: 143). The first and most basic 
level is in terms of specialisation within the legislature, namely the delegation of tasks to 
particular bodies, usually committees. Legislatures may be arrayed on a spectrum, from 
chamber-oriented legislatures which make little or no use of committees at one end, to 
legislatures which are committee-oriented, to the extent of giving committees power to 
enact legislation, at the other (such as the American Congress) (Norton, 1998:144). The 
second level is that of institutionalisation within committees. Committees may 
themselves be arrayed on a spectrum: those with highly developed procedures and norms, 
continuity in membership, and some degree of corporate ethos at one end; and those with 
few developed procedures, practices and membership continuity at the other (Norton, 
1994: 15-32). 
Norton (1994: 149) therefore stresses the following aspects within the term 
institutionalisation: the permanence of committees; small membership facilitating; 
detailed investigation; jurisdictions paralleling those of the main government agencies, 
with little scope for overlapping jurisdictions; agenda setting and evidence-taking 
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powers; and lastly, the use of specialist advice. South African committees have 
increasingly been institutionalised since 1994, with the aim of gaining institutional 
memory for future reference. As mentioned, in South Africa, the institutionalisation 
process has not been successful in all regards, and much remains to be learned from other 
Parliamentary experiences - especially when taking the specific factors that contributed 
directly to the success of the American model, into account. In the American model, 
most of the above factors flourish effectively, and this appears to be because the 
committees have so much power and therefore freedom to act effectively (enhancing 
time- and cost efficiency of all programs) (Norton, 1994: 150). 
Within the organisational structures of Parliament, it is crucial to take into account that 
"[p]arties and committees are a contradictory and even mutually exclusive means of 
internal organisation [in the legislature] ... The importance of each is inversely 
proportional to the other. . . The more important the committees, the less important the 
parties" (Olson, 1980: 269). Jn South Africa it seems that party politics plays a 
predominant role within committees ' agendas and decision-taking procedures, as opposed 
to the American Congress' committees that are immensely resilient and strong regardless 
of party politics. They are well supported with policy specialists, and are highly 
influential in the passing and shaping of legislation. Hague & Harrop (2004: 251) make a 
statement that supports Olson (1980 : 269), by noting that committees have less influence 
on legislation in party-dominated legislatures (such as in the British House of Commons, 
Scandinavia and South Africa). The British committees, unlike the Congress, do not 
challenge executive dominance in framing legislation. "They are unpopular, 
unspecialised and under-resourced" (Hague & Harrop, 2004: 251 ). However, if 
committees are a natural arena in which to seek compromise and consensus, influential 
committees can and should coexist with strong parties. In this instance, Scandinavia 
provides the best example of influential committees combined with strong parties (Hague 
& Harrop, 2004: 252). 
What South Africa can and does thrive on are the Constitutional Chapter 9 Institutions 
(The Constitution, 1999), which enjoy independence from the executive and form an 
integral part of the overall oversight framework. However, the question has increasingly 
27 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
been: how can Parliament ensure the accountability of these institutions, listed in Chapter 
nine, in co-operation with SCOPA, without infringing their financial and administrative 
independence? Although the President appoints these institutions, this is done on the 
recommendation of the Assembly (The Constitution, 1996: 193(4)). Effectively, these 
Chapter nine institutions are held accountable to the Assembly, and predominantly have 
two roles in relation to Parliament. Firstly, together with Parliament they act as watchdog 
bodies over the government and organs of state. Secondly, they support and aid 
Parliament in its oversight function, by providing it with information that is not derived 
from the executive (Ad Hoc Joint Sub-Committee on oversight and accountability 2002: 
57). 
Therefore, the independence of the Chapter nine institutions is vital for many reasons. 
These institutions must be respected by the public as independent and free from possible 
influence or pressure from the executive branch of government. However, they must also 
be held accountable and be placed under scrutiny when their own reports on malpractice 
by other entities seem unsatisfactory. The Public Protector, for example, has as its main 
fonction the investigation of improper conduct in state or government affairs and in the 
public administration, which also forms a crucial part of Parliament's oversight role (The 
Constitution, 1996: 182( I)). The Auditor-General must audit and report on the accounts, 
financial statements, and financial management of all national and provincial state 
departments (and administrations), all municipalities, and any other institution or 
accounting entity as required by national or provincial legislation (The Constitution, 
1996: 188(1)). The Auditor-General also "has the additional powers and functions 
prescribed by national legislation" (The Constitution, 1996: 188(4)). At present, the role 
of the Auditor-General extends beyond pure compliance auditing. Section 3(4) of the 
Auditor-General Act 12 of 1995 states that: '[t]he Auditor-General shall reasonably 
satisfy himself or herself that: ... satisfactory management measures have been taken to 
ensu~e that resources are procured economically and utilised efficiently and effectively'' 
and on these premises provide SCOPA with the necessary reports (Corder et al, 1999: 
23). 
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Specifically in relation with SCOPA, the most important contribution to oversight by the 
Public Protector and the Auditor-General, is the invaluable information they provide that 
is not derived from the executive, ideally ensuring its objectivity. However, the nature of 
the interaction between the Chapter nine institutions and the various committees in 
Parliament is not adequate in all regards, since "there is no tangible or visible follow up 
of matters raised, or of the recommendations made in reports" (Ad Hoc Joint Sub-
committee on oversight and accountability 2002: 59). This problem is also a result of 
not having formalised the working structure between committees and the Chapter nine 
institutions. 
Finally, one is left with a query regarding the separation of powers in our Constitution: 
not whether the separation of powers is weak or strong, but whether or not the fact that 
the executive is drawn from the legislature weakens the oversight role of the legislature. 
(The Ad Hoc Joint Sub-Committee on oversight and accountability, 2002: 10). The Sub-
committee (2002: 42) proposed a noteworthy recommendation for an "Accountability 
Standards Act'', which would compliment the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA). 
This proposed act would bind the executive to comply with its specific provisions or face 
judicial sanctions. Even though this could be seen as pre-mature, Parliament should 
develop systems to address these issues, in order to determine whether or not they should 
be housed in legislation. 
The proposed Act would serve the following purpose; 
i. to fulfil the NA 's Constitutional obligations for establishing accountability 
mechanisms 
ii. to set a broad frame work and minimum requirements for accountability; 
and 
;;i. to provide an authoritative and mandatory framework within which 
committee members can perform their oversight task. 
' 
These requirements could help strengthen the impact of existing Constitutional provisions 
for Parliamentary oversight, thereby ensuring that the legislature does not only become 
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an extension of the executive, but that strong checks and balances remain central within 
the implementation of Constitutional oversight measures. 
2.2 The Committee system in the Oversight Framework 
Within weeks of the opening of the first session of the new Parliament on 26 May 1994, 
the committees were flourishing. Today there are a total of over fifty committees: twenty 
seven portfolio committees of the National Assembly which shadow departments of state, 
fourteen select committees of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), seven joint 
standing committees, two joint committees and a number of ad hoc committees (Calland, 
1997: 7). Committees consist of 15 to 25 members and are composed of the various 
parties within Parliament according to a system of proportional representation. This 
entails that committees are established either by the Constitution or an Act/Rules of 
Parliament. 
If one had to put a specific date to the formal recognition of the important role 
committees need to play in the oversight framework, it can arguably have been on a 
National Constitutional Conference held from 31 March to 1 April 1995, where the ANC 
considered and passed the following proposal: 
The ANC proposes to use the Parliamentary committee system, structured to 
ensure executive accountabiUty to an informed Parliament, a role for minority 
parties through such committees, and greater and informed public debate on 
legislation and lo suggest new legislation to the relevant ministry. The 
committees shall have the necessary powers to conduct public inquiries into 
matters with;n their area of jurisdiction ". (Macozoma, 1996: 112). 
rt is against this background and other contributing factors , as will be discussed below, 
that the powers and functions of oversight committees in South Africa should be 
considered. 
According to Zajc (1997: 490), committees are seen not only as key to the efficient 
dispatch of Parliamentary matters, but as arenas of specialist expertise - developed over a 
period of time - in which the back bench member of Parliament can find a useful role for 
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him or herself. They form an integral component of the wider institution, with 
connections beyond to the 'real world' of interest groups and expert knowledge. While 
the world-wide trend towards the development and institutionalisation of Parliamentary 
committee systems appears uniform, according to Calland (1997: 4) it should not be 
allowed to mask the very substantial differences in style, powers and format. February 
(2006: 129) argues that while the structure, powers and duties of Parliament are spelt out 
unambiguously and ambitiously in the Constitution, there remains a gap between the 
Constitutional aspirations for Parliament and how Parliament and its committee structures 
have fulfilled its mandate. She proceeds to argue that Parliament as an institution has 
played its role "patchily, unevenly and sometimes hesitantly." The validity of this 
statement will be measured within the case studies in chapter four. 
2.2.1 Powers and functions of Oversight Committees 
As mentioned above, Constitutionally, committees are given "legal teeth" in Rule 53 and 
Section 58(2) of the Constitution (Macozoma, 1996: 112). More specifically, Rule 52(1) 
of the National Assembly's Standing Rules outlines the functions of the portfolio 
committees as follows: 
" ... a portfolio committee shall .. . 
(a) consider or deal with bills or other matters which are referred to it by the 
Speaker under these Rules, or by or under a resolution of the house ... ; 
(b) monitor, investigate, enquire into and make recommendations relating to any 
aspect of the legislative programme, budget, rationa/;sation, restructuring, 
functioning, organi ation, structure, personnel, policy formulation or any 
other mailer it may consider relevant, of the government department or 
departments falling within the category of affairs consigned to the 
committee ... " 
Whilst Rule 53 states that the powers of portfolio committees shall include the power to: 
"(a) summon any person to appear before it to give evidence on oath or 
affirmation,· 
(c) summon any person to appear before it to produce any documents required by 
it ... IJ 
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Based on these premises, Professor Christina Murray (in Calland, 1997: l 0), once an 
advisor to the Constitutional Assembly, believes that the final Constitution gave the 
legislature and its committees more power than any comparable Constitutional/political 
system in the world. That is why Calland (1997: 10) sees the South African 
Parliamentary committee system as ' all dressed up' , asking whether it has 'anywhere to 
go?' 
In attempt to explain why our committee system might be geared to go, but struggles to 
institutionalise accordingly, February (2006: 127) argues that it is necessary to take into 
account how Parliament as an institution has changed since 1994. The old Apartheid 
Parliament lacked many facilities the post-1994 Parliament is equipped with today, such 
as: no email connectivity; only one fax machine per floor; and a library with limited 
holdings and virtually no support or research staff complement. February (2006: 128) 
emphasises that the post-1994 Parliament has an "efficient operational infrastructure with 
good library facilities, large numbers of researchers and other administrative support 
staff." fn this sense, Parliament has grown and improved extensively in order to adapt to 
the enormity of demands it is faced with. 
Providing background on committees in general, Hague & Harrop (2004: 250) defined 
committees as small workgroups of members created to cope with the volume of 
Parliamentary business, particularly in the larger and busier lower chamber. These 
committees traditionally became known as standing committees who consider bills and 
financial proposals together with conference or mediation committees, in order to 
reconcile differences in bills passed by the two houses of a bicameral assembly. Hague 
& Harrop (2004: 250) argue that the more recent development has been the strengthening 
of select committees, which "scrutinise government administration and investigate 
matters of concern, drawing on external witnesses as needed." As mentioned in section 
2.1.1, ·committees have the power to enforce executive accountability by means of the 
budget vote, the power to summon members of the executive and the public to appear 
before Parliamentary committees, and Parliamentary question-time (Corder et al, 1999: 
19). While summoning members of executive bodies to explain their policies or actions 
represents a less direct method of enforcing oversight than budget approval, the value of 
32 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
public exposure can be a significant tool to impose sanctions or influence policy. In 
order for this type of enforcement to be applied effectively, committees must be proactive 
about holding public hearings or requesting presentations from executive bodies (Corder 
et al, 1999: 32). 
The growing status of select committees has reflected the increasing importance of the 
scrutiny function to contemporary legislatures. Hague & Harrop (2004: 250) argue that a 
strong committee system defines a workingiii (committee-oriented) as opposed to a 
talking (chamber-oriented) assembly. Therefore it lies within the domain of the 
committees to take the responsibility of scrutinising bills, overseeing government, and 
exploring policy options. Heywood (1997: 305) mentions that committees which are set 
up to scrutinise government administration and oversee the exercise of executive power 
must be permanent and specialised, since they have to rival the executive in terms of 
detailed knowledge and expertise. The US Congress has the most powerful committees 
to be found anywhere in the world, and these provide a model that many other assemblies 
have tried to adopt. Heywood ( 1997: 305) argues that their power stems from their 
specialist responsibilities, permanent membership and lavish support in terms of funding 
and access to advice. 
Committees' different powers include: the committees' right to initiate legislation and 
rewrite bills, their control of the committee's timetable, and their methods of obtaining 
information (specifically the rights to summon witnesses and documents). Significantly, 
Strom (1998: 47) mentions that these formal powers are likely to have an important 
impact on the committees' ability to influence legislation independently of such external 
actors as party leadership, chamber majorities, and the government. On the other hand, 
Baerwald, ( 1979: 345-6) is of opinion that committees and ''their authority is a chimera 
and their accomplishments largely meaningless." Which of these characteristics is most 
identifiable within the South African context? ls it already safe to accept that the nascent 
South African Parliamentary oversight committees have adequate means of enforcing the 
necessary recommendatory or rectifying measures to accounting entities, irrespective of 
other factors that might hamper its impartiality in its decision-making process? 
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In order to place this discussion into context, consider the following observations. 
Within Cabinet, government is dependent on consensus seeking in order to make 
decisions or to pass legislation. Consensus does not necessarily involve a search for 
agreement on all issues, but rather a "search for maximum common ground among 
governing parties by means of negotiation, bargaining and trade-offs" (Kotze, 1998: 3). 
Kotze argues that the restructuring and extension of the committee system has important 
advantages for the legislative process. It creates a more informal forum where members 
can debate with one another since members of the committees have a great degree of 
political independence. Also, submissions from independent experts create the 
opportunity to test the views of civil servants that serve in the committees (Kotze, 
1998:5). Committees therefore play a vital role in drafting legislation by making it a 
widespread, participatory process, bringing the process much closer to the citizens. 
Strom ( 1998: 26) is of opinion that committees must enjoy some institutional advantages 
within their respective jurisdictions, such as proposal powers or gate-keeping powers, 
restrictive amendment rules, and effective oversight functions. As mentioned in Chapter 
one, Hague & Harrop (2004: 252) argue that, apart from the party system, the key to the 
influence of committees lies in three factors: expertise, intimacy and support (of which all 
three factors are present in the American Congress but not necessarily in South Africa). 
It is in the light of these criteria that South Africa's oversight committees need more 
experience and resilience in order to perform on a more independent basis. However, by 
keeping a close eye on SCOPA, the public should continue to probe its actions and 
thereby ensure that the committee is on the right track. 
Bearing the consensus-seeking principle in mind, our executive is not only chosen from 
the legislature but also primarily from the leadership of the majority party. South 
Africa's strong party-based system ensures that the majority party has the most votes 
within any Parliamentary committee. This can hamper effective oversight, as members 
of SCOPA may be reluctant to call to account a government that is made up of leaders of 
their party. This is further exacerbated by the electoral system of proportional 
representation because members of Parliament presently retain their seats through their 
membership of political parties. South Africa arguably displays the traits and biases of 
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its membership and structure within the national legislature. By being bicameral, with 
each chamber retaining separate electoral and procedural customs, many competing 
geographic interests are involved, complicating even the simple groundwork that 
committees are faced with. 
Jn the case of the US Congress, leaders and committees of both chambers attempt to 
control the legislative agenda, especially in the absence of unified party control of both 
the House and the Senate (Campbell & Davidson, 1998: 138). While a less strong party-
based system (such as in the USA) is probably a feature of a totally unconstrained 
legislature, South Africa (as in Scandinavia) needs a Constitutional dispensation that 
provides for a system of checks and balances within the ambit of a strong party-based 
system. Members of the majority party in particular may be "unwilling to subject the 
government to rigorous scrutiny for fear of being perceived as disloyal or even expulsion 
from the party" - and the obvious resulting loss of their Parliamentary positions (Ad Hoc 
Joint Sub-Committee on oversight and accountability 2002: 8,9). 
Therefore, even though the South African Constitution ( 1999) gives expression to the 
principle of separation of powers (between the legislature, executive and judiciary), our 
Parliamentary system of government does not give full expression to the notion of 
separation of powers because of the close links between the legislature and the Executive. 
South Africa's electoral system, and the role of the party leadershjp in compiling election 
lists, also threatens to have a real impact on the ability of Parliament to exercise effective 
oversight. Patricia de Lille (Corder et al, 1999) took a dim view of this: 
"ParUament has become ... useless because we are controlled by the Executive 
and have to hold the Executive to account ... The reason for that is the way that the 
majority party [the ANC} is structured, with all senior members of the party in the 
Executive as Ministers and all the junior members are members of Parliament, 
. 
and the juniors will not challenge the seniors. And most of the seniors are also on 
the national Executive of the party [which, in turn, compiles the final version of 
the party's candidates list}" 
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And according to Nathi Nhleko (the former Chief Whip of the ANC), "The area of 
oversight. .. by Parliament over the Executive ... is an area that must be sharpened" 
(Corder et al, 1999). These statements will be taken into account in chapters Three and 
Four. 
In the context of global patterns, why are American committees seen as exceptional? In 
seeking an explanation, Shaw (1998: 228) is of opinion that one should first turn to the 
party system. American parties normally exert sufficiently loose control over House and 
Senate committees that this circumstance provides an important explanation as to why 
US congressional committees can function as they do. One should take into account that 
there are parties that exert weak control over committees in the legislatures of a number 
of other countries, yet their "committees do not conduct themselves like American ones" 
(Shaw, 1998: 228). However, there seem to be sensible explanations for what 
distinguishes American-style committees from those found in South Africa and 
elsewhere. Firstly, American committees support the values of anti-statism. The 
"American public has indicated in opinion polls that it continues to favour a divided 
government and a weak state" (Shafer, 1991 ). This is where the committees of Congress 
come in. Complying with public preferences, their job is to hold the executive in check 
by exposing and excising misguided policies, incompetence, and venality. Secondly, 
unspoken arrangements exist whereby neither the White House nor Congress (which 
would be the committees and the assembly in the South African context) interferes with 
the other's staffing arrangements. Therefore, in practice, Congress has a relatively free 
hand to acquire the financial resources needed to operate a committee-driven counter-
bureaucracy. Shaw (1998: 229) is of impression that this is where other Parliaments do 
not enjoy comparable resource autonomy. 
Whether in America or elsewhere, it is widely agreed that the impact a legislature has is 
crucially dependent on its committee arrangements. Mezey (1979: 64) notes that if a 
legislature is to have strong policy-making power, it also has to have a highly developed 
committee system generating policy expertise. More specifically, the Norwegian 
Parliament in Scandinavia has been characterised as one of the stronger Parliaments in 
that region, due to their highly developed committee system that answers to the country's 
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demand for policy expertise. What magic ingredient in the committee-success-recipe is 
South Africa short of? 
Scandinavian party politics is characterised by strongly organised and future-orientated 
parties, decentralised and relatively non-hierarchical legislatures (where the opposition 
can be effective), and competitive elections. These conditions induce political parties to 
defer the gratification of holding office and thus facilitate minority government formation 
(Strom, 1986: 583-605). Within South Africa, February (2006: 140) argues that 
reconciling tensions between the executive and the legislature will always be difficult, 
particularly where government is headed by a powerful chief executive who appears to 
dominate a party with an overwhelming majority in the legislature. The US Congress has 
a relatively weak party system, which allows its committees considerable independence 
from the presidency (Heywood, 1997: 305). Stricter party discipline (as in the UK and 
Australia) has been proved to neutralise committees, because the majority of their 
members are loyal to the ruling party (Heywood, 1997: 305). South Africa seems to be a 
victim of the same deficiencies. 
After reviewing the powers of parties and committees in eight national legislatures, 
Strom ( 1998: 27) concludes that they are inversely related: 'Where the committees are 
strongest. .. one finds the lowest level of party control over the committees'. However, as 
in Scandinavia, they are also found in Parliamentary systems where no single party 
dominates the legislature and opposition functions effectively. Also, some Parliaments 
restrict minority rights by not permitting them to submit reports (such as the United 
Kingdom, Denmark and France). In these Parliaments, the majority party and the 
government have important prerogatives regarding agenda control and legislative 
initiatives (Strom, 1998: 45). 
One can conclude that committees are of critical importance within the oversight 
framework, as they constitute the deliberative powers of Parliaments. They carry out a 
variety of time-consuming but highly significant tasks in the legislative process, such as 
scrutinising bills, collecting information, proposing amendments, and recommending 
final decisions to the floor. Strow (I 998: 62) acknowledges that from time to time even 
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committees have showdowns (by having to decide by a majority vote). However, Satori 
(1987: 214) argues that if the recourse to the majority principle is not an exception but 
becomes the rule, this means that a committee no longer works. Hence, we may say that, 
in such a situation, a committee ceases to be a committee. Therefore Satori is of opinion 
that what matters most is to understand why the majority principle represents the 
watershed between committees and non-committees (or between functioning and 
malfunctioning committees). Strom (1998: 47) explores the same concept by stating that 
committee power can be negative and positive. Negative committee power is the ability 
to defend the status quo despite the pressure for change from other actors, whereas 
positive power is the ability to influence policy changes. 
The Public Accounts Committee has traditionally occupied a heightened status over other 
committees in the legislature. In many countries, it is the oldest Parliamentary committee 
(Wehner, 2002: 3). Let us now examine the specific nature of South Africa's Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts. 
2.2.2 The specific and significant purpose of SCOPA 
The Standing Committee on Public Accounts' mandate is found in Rule 206(1) of the 
National Assembly (Annual Report: Standing committee on Public Accounts, 2005: 4). 
According to the Rule the Committee is expected to consider: 
(a) the financial statements of all executive organs of state and Constitutional 
institutions when those statements are submitted to Parliament; 
(b) any audit reports issued on those statements; 
(c) any reports issued by the Auditor-General on the affairs of any executive 
organ of state, Constitutional institution or other public body,· 
(d) any other financial statements or reports referred to the Committee in terms 
of the rules. 
The National Assembly Rule 206(2) determines that the Speaker must refer the financial 
statements and reports mentioned in paragraph (a)(i), (ii) and (iii) to the Committee when 
they are submitted to Parliament, irrespective of whether they are also referred to another 
committee (February, 2002: 3). The NA Rules are very broad and make it possible for 
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SCOPA to consider almost anything it wants, should it relate to "ensuring effective and 
efficient financial management of public funds by departments, Chapter nine institutions 
and public entities ... " (February, 2002: 3). Generally, the major source of SCOPA's 
work has been derived from the Auditor-General's reports which have been referred to it, 
even though the committee may also initiate any investigation in its area of competence. 
It is especially important to take SCOPA's mission into account, given that it determines 
the manner in which the committee engages with its oversight activities. The 
committee's mission is to: 
"[pjromote effective and efficient financial management of, and the 
accountability for, all matters concerning public finance . To this end it will 
exercise a rigorous oversight role to ensure maximum value for each taxpayer 
rand in such a way that it contributes towards the improvement in the quality of 
life of all South Africans. " (Annual Report: Standing committee on Public 
Accounts, 2005: 4) . 
In accordance, SCOPA set out four broad goals in order to complement the mission of 
their committee proceedings; 
(a) to cover a greater volume of work which is of relevance to its mission. This 
in terms of the number of state related bodies and finance-related issues it 
actively exercises oversight over. 
(b) To strengthen the qualitative aspects of its investigative work. This in order to 
more fully understand and more fully respond to existing areas of financial 
management weakness and under-performance 
(c) To increase the consistency, regularity and assertiveness of follow-up actions 
where corrective action has been deemed necessary 
(d) To more assertively and creatively influence improvements in financial 
management, wherever this might be necessary in the broader public sector. 
Rule 122(2) of the National Assembly Rules makes provision for a committee to assign a 
task to one or more of its members for an internal or administrative purpose. In line with 
this rule SCOPA divided itself into two workgroups/sub-committees to facilitate its work 
39 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
better. Each work group has a convenor that is elected by the Committee. Both 
workgroups consider Auditor-General reports which are allocated to them, and make 
recommendations to the plenary during their weekly meetings (Annual Report: Standing 
committee on Public Accounts, 2005: 20). 
Regarding their direct sphere of influence, SCOPA has to attend to more urgent needs. 
This includes the following: to properly understand their relationship to the Assembly, 
and for all MPs to understand SCOPA's role; and to co-ordinate its oversight activities 
and objectives with the decisions made and projects considered, therefore not allowing 
them to be determined by their respective political parties ' interests. SCOPA should also 
bear in mind that it is the executive that is accountable to them, not departmental officials 
or departmental accounting officers. The committees currently tend to engage with 
departmental accounting officers most of the time. This is not necessarily inappropriate, 
since, in the Commonwealth, 97 per cent of public accounts committees normally 
summons departmental officials and only 31 per cent summons Ministers as a matter of 
course (Murray & Nijzink, 1999). However, public accounts committees do need to 
remember that the accounting officer is there to provide information and answer 
questions on behalf of the Minister or MEC. They are accountable to their political heads 
who, in turn, are accountable to the legislature. Thus, serious concerns should be raised 
with the Minister or MEC who is responsible for the performance of the department, and 
not with the accounting officer alone. 
In short, COPA should conduct public hearings by means of written or oral reports and 
Parliamentary question time, in order to hold the accounting entities liable for all 
expenditures undertaken that were considered unqualified. They should also conduct 
oversight visits to government departments and agencies (as a tool to measure 
compliance with financial legislation) on a regular and well-scheduled basis (Annual 
Report: Standing committee on Public Accounts, 2005 : 3). When first identifying 
SCOPA as the watchdog of Parliament, high standards for the committee to comply with 
were created . SCOPA must be held responsible and commit themselves wholeheartedly 
to ensure that any financial malpractice within all accounting entities are restored by 
responsible and efficient alternative practises. 
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2.3 Summary 
What is a strong committee? Shaw (1998: 237) is of opinion that a strong committee in a 
legislature is one that has a significant independent impact on public affairs. He 
concluded his own study on "Parliamentary Committees: A Global Perspective" by 
arguing that " ... domination of Parliamentary committees by the leadership of a single 
governing party has tended to mean a constricted impact by the committees, as in Japan 
and Britain. In general, partisan co-ordination, Washington style, does not seem to 
provide a widespread example". Therefore, we are left with the understanding that it is 
indeed best for the relevant legislatures to learn from other good practise, but also from 
their own experience within their unique context and history. 
Due to a strong one-party state in the old South African regime, Parliament today is 
synonymous with a vibrant party system, comprising of various opposition parties 
structured as single or coalition parties, including various minorities. Therefore, 
members of Parliament, as proportionately represented within the assembly, are also 
proportionately represented in the committees of our Constitution. The discontinuity of 
our committee system (due to the assembly being radically restructured since becoming a 
democracy) has counted to our disadvantage. This has become both a motivational 
driving force within Parliament for reconstruction and transfonnation, as well as a 
challenge to our committee system, in order to institutionalise effectively before the 
fourth democratic Parliament is elected. 
' Each year Parliament must approve the annual budget of the government. All financial reports must 
adhere to the requirements of the Public Finance Managment Act (Act 1 of 1999), serving as one of the 
relatively new methods for ensuring structured oversight. The PFMA demands financial accountability 
from a range of li sted entities in different forms in its schedules. It is due to replace the Reporting by 
Public Entities Act 93 of 1992. The use of budget approval power by the committees gives them the power 
to make sure that executive reporting is useful and meaningful in the future (Corder et al, 1999: 20). 
;, Dictators are referred to as groups that can unilaterally impose their will on the legislature. They can 
make legislative policy at will and they can similarly prevent any change in the status quo. In other words, 
their consent is both necessary and sufficient for a legislative decision (Strom, l 998: 23). 
;,, In a working assembly, such as in the American Congress, the core activity takes place in committee 
rooms. There, legislators shape bills, authorise expenditure and scrutinise the executive (Hague & Harrop, 
2004: 251). 
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Chapter 3 
THE STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS OF SCOPA 
3. Background 
According to Johns (1997: 85), if party pre-selection is the 'secret garden' of politics, 
then the operation of Parliamentary parties is the magic pudding. As discussed in 
Chapter Two: South Africa is a multi-party democracy, and therefore it is only logical to 
assume that our democracy is based on the parties. The proportional system of 
representation in South Africa makes provision for party lists, thus placing enormous 
power in the hands of the party management in deciding the lists of candidates. Section 
4 7 of the Constitution ( 1996) adheres to the principle of the imperative mandate, which 
might reduce the freedom of MPs permitted in previous South African Parliaments 
(inherited from the British tradition). However, this Chapter argues that the party 
system in South Africa has encouraged MPs to become party delegates who follow the 
agenda of the leadership in all the spheres of government which they participate in, 
including the respective committees (Venter, 1998: 73). 
What could be the root of all challenges in maintaining an interdependent multi-party 
Parliament in South Africa? Increasing critique from the media, the SACP and 
COSATU, has been raised against the ANC, stating that the appearance of consensus-
seeking hampers critical debate, and the ANC dominance has been condemned as an 
emerging de facto one party state, (DA, 2004c: 5) irrespective of its coalition 
arrangements with both the SACP and COSATO. The essential problem of a dominant 
party system is that there are few autonomous voices in Parliament. The ANC has a 
large majority (279 out of 400 MPs) consisting of members that are restrained from 
scrutinising the executive (DA, 2004: 5). The ANC has proved itself capable of 
becoming an independent party since the NNP was eventually absorbed after Marthinus 
van Schalkwyk accepted an ANC membership card. And if earlier speculations made 
by th~ media are anything to go by, the PAC will be absorbed into the ANC in the near 
future (PAC's Pheko Under fire, 2004), which would defy the principle of having a 
member of the opposition party chair SCOPA. 
In the context of the oversight functions of the Public Accounts Committees, the DA 
(2004c: 5) argues that the "hegemonic aspirations" of the ANC, combined with a largely 
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co-opted opposition, seriously hinder the abilities of Parliament to call the executive to 
account. Under South Africa's closed-list proportional representation electoral system, 
ANC MPs are essentially appointed by their party bosses, usually Ministers in the 
Cabinet. The Ministers (subject to scrutiny from the oversight committee) therefore 
determine the political survival of the respective ANC MP's that represent the ANC in 
the oversight committee. The electoral system would be more effective if it were similar 
to Britain, where MPs are elected directly by their constituency and their political 
survival depends on voters who assess their performance in Parliament (DA, 2004c: 6). 
The problem is summed up best by one of the ANC's own MPs: 
"Obviously if you have a constituency system then you have a greater degree of 
latitude to challenge your party leadership ... but we are a new regime .. . we feel 
we cannot confront our own leadership because it exposes us as a party and a 
movement ... an attack on the executive is an attack on blacks by whites. We are 
very sensitive about this: perhaps too sensitive about it .. . it is more difficult for 
backbenchers in the majority party to raise questions of their own ministers than 
it is for opposition parties. " (Carrim, 1999: 120). 
In addition, the AN C's policy of cadre deployment dictates that all ANC cadres are loyal 
first and foremost to the ANC leadership. The ANC's national deployment committee 
deploys these cadres (Lodge, 2003: 3 7). The reason why the latter might be relevant in 
terms of party politics within committees, can best be expressed in the words of a 1998 
ANC discussion document: 
"[the) national liberation movement needs to extend its influence to all levers of 
power: the army, the police, the bureaucracy, intelligence, the judiciary, 
parastatals, and agencies such as the regulatory bodies, the public broadcaster, 
the central bank and so on " (ANC, 1998). 
The entrenched tradition of democratic centralism, and the development of a cadre 
policy, compound the problems of the party list system and the dominant party system, 
seriously undermining the ability of individual ANC MPs to hold the executive to 
account (DA, 2004c: 8). ANC MPs are for the same reasons less likely to call their 
comrades in state agencies to report to SCOPA, and are also less inclined to cause an 
uproar that could damage the status quo. 
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In order to bring this into context with the transformation of the committee system, 
consider the following. The National Party used the Constitutional negotiations to 
create a plural executive (Mattes, 1994: 2-3) which meant that until May 1996, it was a 
partner in a government of national unity (GNU), along with the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP) and the ANC. It has been suggested that the NP failed to foresee the importance 
of the committees in the new Parliamentary dispensation, and that it should have insisted 
upon a sharing of the committee chairpersonships. Section 58 of the Interim 
Constitution was also silent on this specific issue (The Constitution, No 200 of 1993). 
In addition, February (2006: 136) notes that Parliament did not have a central database 
on which all the submissions made since 1994 could have been captured. There is "no 
formal record of who has been accessing Parliament and making submissions". This has 
led to the groups who would participate, in terms of making submissions and attending 
public hearings of committees, being limited to "better-resourced NGOs and private-
sector business interests" (February, 2006: 136). However, these private actors do not 
enjoy the legitimacy such as Parliamentary institutions do, and valuable inputs may 
either be rejected or labelled as invalid by Parliamentarians (depending on the specific 
case). In some cases it appears that critique is restricted as the core responsibility of the 
opposition parties or non-governmental actors, since the majority party can then easily 
deny it, if they see it as uncomplimentary to the status quo. 
Therefore, prior to 1997 Parliament operated under the interim Constitution, which did 
not clearly outline Parliamentary oversight functions. When the committees first began 
to expand their work in 1994, there were no researchers and no secretaries to serve 
either the chairperson or the committee itself (Calland, 1997: 10). There were no 
Hansard-verbatim-records of committee meetings, and the minutes taken were thin, 
recording only the basic decisions taken. SCOPA, like the other committees, also 
initially struggled with young and unskilled employees receiving no training, supervised 
by 'old' bureaucrats. Another observation regarding the skills indicated that: 
"Skills may be the more significant issue, as opposed to infrastructure. Those 
who were skilled recognised their need for infrastructure and went out 
and ... hired, borrowed and scrounged equipment and staff and researchers. 
They worked with volunteers and rapidly learned to use NGO capacity in the 
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area of research. Those who were not sufficiently skilled in office work, paper 
management, public speaking and legislative process found themselves 
disempowered by the system. That adequate steps around training were not 
taken is the single biggest criticism that I have. " (Tilley, quoted in Calland, 
1997: 11). 
The cost of transformation was that a great majority of MPs (who entered Parliament in 
1994) were new to Parliament. There was an immense amount of inexperience. 
Parliament, as an institution, was not prepared for this, and had not prepared any sort of 
induction course. New MPs had to sink or swim (Calland, 1997: 11). The resultant 
effect of this situation was that it caused committees to lack expertise. This lack was 
first demonstrated by the fact that the material used by opposition MPs in their 
questioning of the Minister was almost entirely derived from the press; secondly, the 
most material documents were sought at the meeting itself, and not in advance (Calland, 
1997: 12). 
According to Heywood (2002: 319); there exists, generally speaking, a formal education 
gap in the preparation of politicians. He argues that assemblies corrupt the politicians 
by socialising them into norms and values that distance them from the needs of the 
taxpayers. This chapter explores his opinion that " ... committees have increasingly been 
perceived to provide legislatures with a more efficacious modus operandi" (Senay & 
Besdziek, 1999: 8). This opinion is evaluated critically in the subsequent chapters. As 
explained in Chapter One, it is important to note that this concern strongly correlates 
with outh Africa' s Westminster heritage. 
The question that therefore arises considers whether or not oversight is the role of the 
opposition only. The Final Report of the Joint Ad Hoc Sub Committee on Oversight 
and Accountability (2002: 22) noted that a legislature has an inherent function to 
oversee the executive organs of state and hold it accountable. It is a function of the 
Legislature as whole, and not of individual parties. The Joint Ad Hoc Sub Committee 
(2002: 22) sanctioned the following: 
"The oversight role is often seen as that of the opposition parties alone, designed 
to police and expose mat-administration and corruption. Such a view is limited 
and deficient. Oversight and accountability help to ensure that the executive 
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implement laws in a way required by the legislature and the dictates of the 
Constitution. The legislature is in this way able to keep control over the laws 
that it passes, and to promote the Constitutional values of accountability and 
good governance". 
These elements of opposition and party politics form an inherent component of the 
committee structures, when tal<lng South Africa's history and Parliamentary structures 
into account. These elements cannot be done away with by undemanding 
recommendations within the Constitution. They rather form part of an established 
culture that needs to be transformed as the committee structures become stronger, in 
order for members of Parliament to prioritise the requirements of SCOPA as their 
primary concern. The following sections consider the structures and functions of 
SCOPA specifically, in order that a clear idea can be formed of how the committee 
needs to be equipped to cope with the requirements of the Rules of the Assembly. 
3.1 Structures of the committee 
This section will provide an introduction to the organisational structures within SCOPA, 
so as to provide the reader with an understanding of the complexities that arise from the 
composition of, and compliance within, SCOPA. Initially, it will consider the complex 
issue of party politics within the functioning of SCOPA, thereby providing a better 
understanding of the road the Committee has embarked on, and what challenges remain 
to influence the oversight and decision-making processes within the Committee. The 
other sub-sections will stress the importance of chairpersons and their influence within 
SCOPA, following by a discussion on the organisation of the Committee in compliance 
with other actors and factors. 
According to Sherman ( 1997: 148), one major criticism of Parliamentary committees is 
that they often lack the back-up research resources to conduct full and comprehensive 
inquiries. Another criticism is that they tend to be political in the sense that they split on 
party lines, with government members' defensive of the government, and opposition 
members looking for political points to score. In the case of the latter, Sherman (1997: 
149) argues that it is the role of oppositions to scrutinise and criticise government. 
However, this thesis argues that it is the duty of all members of SCOPA, irrespective of 
the party they represent, to oversee the executive impartially. In any event, there is a 
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good deal of bi- partisanship in Parliamentary committees. 
According to Kotze (1998: 59), there are a number of institutional phenomena in South 
Africa, which inhibit the mobilisation and expression of opposition, both amongst and 
within the respective parties. These include the coalition nature of the Government 
(with associated uncertainty about where co-responsibility, and loyalty and opposition 
begins), and the indefinite state oflocal government (since the absence of transformation 
could be the result of lack of local democracy). The latter is identifiable with the 
criticism the ANC has been receiving from its tri-party alliance members - the SACP 
and COSATU - who have argued that the ANC is harnessing a dictatorship (News 24, 
2006). The same tensions can be seen within committees, where fine lines of political 
divide amongst MPs of the same parties have provided tensions within consensus-
seeking. Kotze (1998: 69) affirms that intra-ANC opposition is manifested within the 
following spheres: the Parliamentary Caucus, the Parliamentary Committees, SACP, 
ANC Youth, Women And CO ATU Influence In The ANC, the Provincial 
Governments and lastly, the individual ANC politicians. 
Two concepts are of concern in this section: consensus-seeking and majority-rule. The 
one is an ideal, while the other is a reality. Even though minorities within the 
committees should contribute to the overall agenda and decision-making process, the 
majority still has the power to veto or mandate their responses within the committee as a 
whole (which was partly the cause for Gavin Woods' resignation). As mentioned 
before, consensus in this context does not mean agreement by all parties on all issues all 
of the time, however it should aim to represent the institutionalisation of a search for 
maximum common ground among governing parties by means of bargaining, 
negotiation, and trade-offs (Kotze, 1998: 104). 
3.1.l Chairpersons of the committee 
According to Hahndiek (2005: 17), the political weight that individual members and 
particularly chairpersons wield within their respective parties is arguably more 
significant than the issue of continuity for committee oversight capabilities. This is true 
in the South African context, given the electoral system of proportional representation 
and the uncontested strength of the majority party (both factors which independently 
47 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
weaken the Parliamentary committees). Murray & Nijzink (2002) support this 
assumption by noting that: "[ o ]nee (their) representatives are elected, parties need to 
manage and support their members in a way that enhances their ability to represent the 
electorate". 
According to Engel, committee chairs are "all important" in terms of their conception of 
the role of the committee, and in terms of their political outlook and ambition: "some 
treat it as an individual crusade; whilst some make massive empowerment efforts with 
their colleagues on the committee; some see themselves as 'second deputy minister'; 
others, as leaders of a different estate" (in Calland, 1997: 16). The fact that as many as 
four committee chairpersons were promoted into government in the first six months of 
1996 tends to support this contention (Calland, 1997: 16). 
The chairperson has to ensure the smooth and effective running of the committee. 
Therefore, stability and long-term membership are important cornerstones to the success 
of the committee. In particular, Public Accounts Committee chairpersons are 
responsible for setting the committee's agenda, usually in consultation with the 
committee and the Auditor-General. This should indicate the flow of reports to be 
released, which would allow the committee to plan ahead reasonably well. The 
chairperson is also crucial in fostering a culture of consensus in the committee, by 
guiding the committee away from political divisions as far as possible (Wehner, 2002: 
7). This underlined the need for an unbiased chairperson from preferably a strong 
opposition party. 
Another way to look at this is as follows. Calland (quoted in Corder et al, 1999: 31 ), in 
the Report on Parliamentary Oversight and Accountability, notes that the role each 
committee plays is essentially linked to how active its chairperson is. However, Calland 
concluded his observation by stating that it is an indication of institutional failure when 
committee efficacy is determined by the will of the committee chairs. Their position 
requires them to direct debates, prepare agendas, manage the committee's budget and 
' 
organise meetings with impartiality. At the very least, a requirement exists for 
chairpersons to balance their political convictions with the specifications of their office. 
Chairpersons' leadership qualities, and their ability to perform their function 
independently and without interference from party superiors, directly affect their ability 
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to sustain the effectiveness of their committee's oversight capacity (Besdziek & Senay, 
1999: 13). Understandably, due to the centrality of the chairperson to the oversight 
function, a tradition has developed in a number of foreign legislatures that accords the 
chairpersonship of crucial oversight standing committees to opposition party members. 
" ... [I]f the committee is shadowing a minister from a different party then the level of 
oversight tends to be greater" (Calland quoted in Besdziek & Senay, 1999: 13). 
A quick overview of some of the chairpersons who have headed SCOPA in the last 6 
years provides some illustrations regarding the problems discussed above. It is argued 
that SCOPA has been weakened in the past four years as a result of the Arms Deal. Not 
only did the Arms Deal provoke conflicting opinions within the committee, but it also 
led to the resignation of then chairperson Gavin Woods (IFP). According to February 
(2006: 134), the first blow was struck in 2001 when Andrew Feinstein was removed as 
the head of the ANC study group within SCOPA and replaced by an ANC MP, Vincent 
Smith, whom February (2006: 135) claims to have been an effective handmaiden of the 
ANC Whips. Smith apparently frustrated the investigative efforts of Woods into the 
Arms Deal. Woods held onto his position as chair, until the ANC majority on SCOPA, 
led largely by Smith, pushed a report through to Parliament on its investigation, which, 
according to Call and and February (2001 ), was Jess than satisfactory and left several 
questions unanswered. These are the circumstances under which Woods resigned. 
Prior to releasing the results of the investigation on the arms deal, the Auditor-General 
South Africa (AGSA) passed the report to Cabinet, which had made the procurement 
decision, on the basis that it was a special report. According to Woods, there were 
allegations that Cabinet changed, or at least had privy to the content of the report prior to 
SCOPA, which was an example of Executive intervention designed to weaken the 
oversight power of Parliament, (National Integrity Systems, 2005: 36). He found 
support in these concerns from ANC member Andrew Feinstein, who also resigned from 
SCOPA in protest on 1 September 2001. The result, some MPs argue, is that SCOPA, 
far from being the independent-minded body it once was, became more susceptible to 
the wishes of the executive, and less rigorous in its investigations. It was accepted that, 
should another controversy like the Arms Deal surface, it would lead to the final ruin of 
the legitimacy of SCOPA. Fears were brought to light during both the Travelgate and 
Oilgate cases that had to be scrutinised by SCOPA. Most recently, February (2006: 
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135) noted that SCOPA is rarely heard from these days, and that even the reports of a 
scandal involving the "use of public funds by a state-owned corporation in the form of 
PetroSA appears not to have sparked any activity on the part of what was once, albeit 
briefly, a fiercely independent oversight grouping". 
Gavin Woods' replacement was Francois Beukman, an NNP MP. His appointment 
continued the practice of appointing opposition party MPs to chair SCOPA. Although 
this meant that the ANC upheld its tradition of appointing a member of the Opposition 
to the position of Chair, it selected a party, with whom it was developing a close 
working relationship, leading to questions regarding the impartiality of the new Chair. 
At the time, the NNP's recent signing of a co-operation pact with the ANC undermined 
the tradition, and Beukman was widely seen as a footman of the ruling party (DA, 
2004c: 14). Woods asserts that: "Francois Beukmann knew the least about finances. So 
he could be managed [by the ANC]. He is a lawyer, and he may be a brilliant lawyer, 
but he knows precious little about finances. With the emergence of sub-committees 
[chaired by the ANC] the work has been taken out of the hands of the Chair, leaving him 
basically to do administrative work" (National Integrity Systems, 2005: 37). 
In May 2004, the ANC appointed Vincent Smith, an ANC 'super-loyalist' as head of 
SCOPA's research committee. According to the main opposition, the DA claimed that 
this was arguably the turning point that indicated that SCOPA would act in a partisan 
manner (DA, 2004a). In November 2005, Mr T Godi (PAC) was appointed as the new 
chairperson of SCOPA, and together with credible allegations from the media and 
opposition, the question of whether or not the PAC will be absorbed into the ANC, 
provides reason to doubt the impartiality of the chairpersonship. 
Nevertheless, SCOPA faces many other challenges as well. A close examination of the 
organisation of the committee will be of valuable assistance. As will be demonstrated, 
in accordance with oversight committee practices elsewhere, the requirement of 
expertise and specialisation remains central to the execution of good practice. 
3.1.2 Organisation of the committee 
Each Committee is composed according to the proportion of seats held in the National 
Assembly. This entails that smaller parties have greater difficulty in spreading their 
members across all the Committees. SCOPA consists of one manager, 4 clerks and 2 
50 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
administration staff, one researcher and one legal advisor, and support from the Auditor-
General' s office. The committee consists of 17 members who face many challenges, 
consequently indicatingthe need for expertise in all the areas that have to be overseen 
(Annual Report: Standing committee on Public Accounts, 2005: 18). As mentioned 
previously, in the majority of Parliaments, and as tends to be the case in most other 
committees, the proportion of government and opposition members reflects the 
proportions in the House. SCOPA consists of ten ANC members, two DA members, 
two members from the IFP, and one from the UDM , MF and the PAC respectively 
(PMG, 2006). It is especially relevant to note that the only representative from the PAC 
is also the chairperson, and not a member from the DA or the IFP, which are stronger 
opposition parties. Generally speaking, the system of proportional representation also 
depends on the size of the committee, and the number of parties represented in the 
house. While the size of a Public Accounts Committee varies, it has on average 11 
members (Wehner, 2002: 7). In the US Congress, however, a typical committee could 
have as many as between 50-100 staff, but also from Congress' own position in relation 
to the executive arm of government. 
With regards to specialisation, an early study within the South African context suggested 
that MPs were spreading themselves too thinly by having some MPs be members of at 
least seven committees and sometimes, in the case of the smallest parties, as many as 15 
(PIMS Record, 1995). It is important that members are developing genuine interest in 
the particular subject area, something which has remained a challenge to date. It is 
therefore logical to assume that SCOPA needs to build sustainable expertise and 
capacity amongst its members. There are certain instances where assistance from 
NGO's and other organisations may be harnessed to conduct research needed, but 
SCOPA should be sure to incorporate diverse views from a range of organisations and 
most definitely from all its committee members (February, 2002: 14). Keep in mind that 
each committee member does not have their own researcher, which stresses the 
workload (Corder et al, 1999). 
Wealthy legislatures (such as the US Congress) can call on legislative research teams to 
verify some of the material that was presented to them by government. They also 
schedule research projects at predetermined stages in the implementation of new policies 
(Murray & Nijzink, 2001 ). This ensures that implementation of policy is on track and 
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helps to prevent unintended consequences. South African legislatures, like their 
counterparts in many Commonwealth countries, are unlikely to have this level of 
research support in the near future. 
One comment regarding SCOPA's research competence, by the UDM's former MP, 
Annelise van Wyk (now a member of the ANC) pointed out that "[their committee] 
ha[s] one researcher serving 17 members and he (the researcher) is also the speech-
writer for the leader (of the party). [They] are in need of independent research" 
(National Integrity Systems, 2005: 41 ). This could indicate the necessity for a window 
period in Parliament, in order to introduce an independent expert research panel. Such a 
panel could better co-ordinate the existing oversight structures and introduce 
independent reports. Such complaints as the one lodged by Annelise van Wyk appear to 
be legitimate because, while reports make MP's aware of problems, they do not 
necessarily empower MP's to ask the correct questions thereby enabling them to 
properly discharge their oversight responsibility (February, 2002: 4). Although SCOPA 
is still better supported than other Public Accounts Committees, the main problem area 
is still to be found in the research capacity. Currently, there are about 600 public bodies 
which are accountable to SCOPA, and according to the Corder Report (Corder et al, 
1999) only 200 lodge their reports, a workload which SCOPA is already struggling with. 
In terms of time allocated for committee meetings, the only available time for 
discussions and preparations in Parliament are Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday 
mornings. During these sessions, SCOPA's committee members have to do 
preparations in their workgroups and in plenary, while ensuring that they are not 
overlapping any work and that they are performing efficiently. The responsibility to 
ensure that all members are well-informed, prepared, and that they are participating 
productively, is solely dependent on the capacity and willingness of the committee 
members. 
The departmental reports SCOPA is responsible for overseeing have, due to certain 
factors - not excluding the quantity thereof - delayed the committee's efforts to 
independently verify the information presented to it. In order to assist the committees 
by broadening their capacity, Parliament currently employs and pays a research division 
situated at Regis House. However, the direct relationship between this research facility 
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and Parliament's committees is unclear. This could either be due to its lack of 
appreciation by committee members, or an ineffective working relationship that lacks 
active communication concerning the direct priorities for research. Nijzink and Murray 
(1999: 90) quote a study, which found that few MPs are aware of their oversight powers 
- few "knew that they could and may even have a responsibility to demand the presence 
of a Minister in a legislative committee". This causes a diversion from the purpose of 
the committee: while government departments are theoretically obliged to report to 
committees and committees have the power to summon Ministers, reporting may not 
take place at all. 
At present, SCOPA's organisational structure relies heavily on the Auditor-General for 
the bulk of its work. The quality of the oversight work of SCOPA therefore depends on 
the quality of the reports tabled by the Auditor-General. MP's should demand reports 
that they can engage with and that will put them in a position to properly fulfil their 
oversight responsibilities (February, 2002: 11 ). The Auditor-General did offer to assist 
SCOPA in strengthening its ability to follow up audit reports, thereby ensuring that 
departments have taken the corrective action. SCOPA needs to make use of such offers. 
However, members of SCOPA have often complained that the reports of the Auditor-
General sometimes do not offer much assistance to them in performing their oversight 
role. What are the Constitutional provisions that empower the committee to expand its 
capacity? 
Rule 122(2) of the National Assembly Rules makes provision for a committee to assign 
a task to one or more of its members for an internal or administrative purpose. In line 
with this rule, SCOPA divided itself into two workgroups to facilitate its work better. 
Each workgroup has a convenor that is elected by the Committee. The workgroups 
consider Auditor-General reports allocated to them and make recommendations to the 
Committee. The workgroups usually meet every Tuesday morning between 09:00-
12:00, whilst plenary meetings are held on Tuesdays between 12:00-13:00 and 
Wednesdays between 09:00-13 :00 (Annual Report: Standing committee on Public 
Accounts, 2005: 20). The subcommittees roughly consist of between nine and eight 
members respectively (with the majority members representing the ANC and only three 
or for members, one from each minority party, represented in each group). 
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Essentially, the organisation of the committee should strive towards stable committee 
membership, in order to conduct effective oversight. SCOPA has been relatively stable 
in maintaining most of its members, although it does have a high turnover rate for 
chairpersons. The latter statistic is not optimal, since chairpersons play a central and 
influential role in determining the agenda and coherence of the committee while 
attending to the relevant MPs' questions and needs impartialy. Compromise and 
consensus are easier to obtain when members develop relations with their colleagues 
from all the relevant parties (Hahndiek, 2005: 16). For consensus to have substance, the 
chair has to acknowledge the opinions of minority parties within all reports and sessions 
and be homogeneous in his/her actions and decisions. This has been difficult: from 
1994 to 2004, as a total of twenty-six committee chairs (mostly from the ANC) have 
departed from their respective committees in that time period (Hahndiek, 2005: 17). 
This is also demonstrated within the Final Report of the Ad Hoc Joint Sub Committee 
on Oversight and Accountability (2002): "experience acquired during the First and 
Second Parliaments will largely be lost as a new crop of (Members) get elected into their 
seats. It is therefore critical to develop institutional memory ... " 
Whips were appointed strategically as part of support initiatives for greater stability 
within the structures of political parties and committees. They are tasked more 
specifically with arranging and informing Members of Parliamentary business, securing 
attendance at meetings, and acting as intermediaries between party leaders and ordinary 
representatives (Hahndiek, 2005: 19). The numbers of whips are also proportionally 
allocated to the number of seats held by the party, with one whip for every 8.69 
members (formula agreed to by the Assembly Rules Committee in June 1999). 
However, the majority party has an additional Chief Whip and deputy Chief Whip and 
the Head of Opposition party also receives a Chief Whip, which is not brought into 
account in this formula. In 1997, the ANC introduced a policy according to which one 
whip was appointed to each Assembly committee (Hahndiek, 2005: 19). The chief 
Whip at the time, Max Sisulu, explained: "By appointing a whip to each committee, the 
ANC has placed a strategic political manager in every committee, able to support the 
work of the Chairperson ... and to provide a crucial link between backbenchers and the 
executive (party leaders)" (Transformation and Communication, 1997). In spite of this, 
the whips have not been adequately successful in securing attendance of members at the 
meetings, a situation which impinges on the decision-making process when there is no 
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quorum. According to Hahndiek (2005: 19), part of the problem can be attributed to the 
multiplicity of the demands placed on members, with many having to sit on a range of 
committees. 
To conclude this part of the discussion, Hahndiek (2005: 18) noted that the 
responsibilities of political parties in terms of supporting the work of committees are 
"not limited to judicious nominations". In order to be effective, parties develop their 
policy positions on all substantive issues before the Assembly and communicate it to 
their members. When parties in the Assembly have their weekly caucus meetings (and 
portfolio-specific study groups), they provide co-ordination and support to the members. 
The functioning of the committee is to a large extent determined by the abilities of its 
members, and the external influences that steer their decisions and motivations. On the 
one hand, political parties nominate their representatives with due consideration given to 
members' experience, knowledge, and political influence, while on the other hand, these 
members are expected to act according to the best interests of the specific committee 
they serve in. In the oversight function exclusively, in which SCOPA falls, the latter is 
the predominant factor that would determine the success or failure of the committee in 
ensuring government accountability. Only then will the framework of activities the 
committee is faced with start to be addressed effectively. 
3.2 Functions of the committee 
According to February (2006: 129), while the structure, powers, and duties of 
Parliament are spelt out unambiguously and determinedly in the Constitution, there 
remains a gap1 between the Constitutional aspirations for Parliament and how Parliament 
and its committee structures have fulfilled its mandate. This section outlines some of 
the ways in which Parliament has been undermined, with specific reference made to the 
preparation and training of members of SCOPA, oversight of written and oral reports, 
and committee question time. This section will start by giving a brief outline of actors 
and factors (which will not be included in detail in the sub-sections) that should assist 
SCOPA in its oversight functions. 
Significantly, the Constitution provides an opportunity for citizens to be involved in the 
law-making process, and institutional mechanisms exist for public participation in the 
legislature. Section 59(1) states that the "National Assembly must facilitate public 
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involvement in the legislative and other processes of the Assembly and conduct its 
business in an open manner" (The Constitution, 1999). It is important to include the 
citizenry in the structures and decision-taking process of the Assembly/committee 
system, by including their opinions. Therefore, MPs are assigned a constituency and are 
expected, particularly during recesses, to visit their constituencies and listen to the 
concerns of citizens (February, 2006: 135). According to February (2006: 136), 
committees often give outside bodies too little notice for them to prepare effective or 
detailed submissions, and also often set aside "too little time for full and proper hearings 
and debate ... [t]he ways in which committees deal with the submissions and how these 
are integrated into the committee's activities on a Bill also differ". Habib and 
Herzenberg (2004: 174) support this statement by mentioning that no "uniform rules 
apply ... to the weight attached to or the treatment of submissions (by the public)". 
Section 56 of the Constitution (1996) grants committees considerable powers: "The 
National Assembly or any of its committees may summon any person or institution to 
report to it (and may) receive petitions, representations or submissions from any 
interested person or institution". The National Assembly Rule 138 also permits any 
committee member to "conduct public hearings, determine its own procedure, meet at a 
venue determined by it (and) confer with other committees". National Assembly Rule 
206(1)(a) states that SCOPA must consider the financial statements of all executive 
organs of State and Constitutional institutions when those statements are submitted to 
Parliament: any audit reports issued on those statements, any reports issued by the 
Auditor~General on the affairs of any executive organ of state, Constitutional institution 
or other public body; and any other financial statements or reports referred to the 
Committee in terms of National Assembly Rule 206(1)(d)ii and Rule 206(2)(a)iii. 
February (2002: 3) notes that the National Assembly Rules are very broad and make it 
possible for SCOPA to consider almost anything it wants, should it relate to ensuring 
effective and efficient financial management of public funds by departments, Chapter 
nine institutions and public entities. 
Ideally, SCOPA would consider all reports that have been referred to it in terms of the 
Parliamentary Rules, and also everything that members would want to add to the list. 
Currently, there is barely enough time in the year to consider the reports that are referred 
to it in terms of Rule 206 of the National Assembly, regardless of matters of public 
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importance that members might have wanted to deal with, which are not considered 
(February, 2002: 3). This stresses the issue of capability versus constraints. 
In supporting the heavy workload carried by SCOPA members, secretaries and clerks 
are responsible for providing procedural advice, record proceedings and draft reports. 
As part of the process of institutionalising committees, the maintenance of detailed 
records of all committee proceedings, including: programmes, attendance, decisions 
reached, and papers and submissions received and tabled, ensures that documentation is 
easily accessible both to the membership and to other interest groups (Hahndiek, 2005: 
21 ). As an indication of the problems relating to record keeping, it is noteworthy that 
the governmental organisation involved in tracking committee proceedings, the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG), is frequently dependent on the media, and 
other groups, for information - instead of the Parliamentary records. 
Lastly, one should keep in mind the function of the opposition within committees. 
According to Kotze (1998: 17), the opposition strives for change in government, 
criticises governmental action, monitors government, and designs political alternatives. 
The question is - how seriously are these actions and alternatives, as presented by the 
opposition, being taken into account? According to Kotze (1998: 18), the greatest 
disadvantage of monitoring by the opposition is that it lacks the Parliamentary strength 
and measures to enforce necessary consequences, such as interpretations and motions of 
no confidence that can pinpoint responsibility. Taking into account that the government 
of the day is lead by such a powerful party (ANC), and that it has increasingly being 
criticised for running a one-man show, how will opposition survive from being 
overpowered by their fellow ANC MPs upholding the status quo? It is necessary to 
maintain a thorough balance of power in all decisions taken by SCOPA, even though the 
truth is not always pleasant. This will contribute to ensuring higher levels of public 
trust, and a higher degree of political will to perform in the light of transparency. 
' 
3.2.1 Preparation and Training for Members of SCOPA 
Keeping in mind that SCOPA is responsible for reviewing financial reports, Murray & 
Nijzink (2001) noted that oversight of the budget in Parliament is "totally inadequate: 
Committees don't know what the departments are doing or what they are meant to be 
doing. They are not familiar with the policies and don't know the budgets. Before a 
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committee can have hearings, it needs to get to grips with what it is that the department 
is meant to be doing". In other words, proper scrutiny of the budget requires an 
understanding of the primary issues affecting the department concerned, and knowledge 
of how to translate the budget documents into policy terms. According to Murray & 
Nijzink (2001 ), many members do not have these skills. It is for these reasons that the 
committee members should be trained, and equipped, to handle an efficacious modus 
operandi within the available support structures Parliament offers. 
Although Parliament has provided training programmes ('induction sessions') for 
members, after both the 1999 and 2004 elections, which covered financial management, 
matters of Parliamentary procedure - including those applicable to committees etc., 
critics claim that the training has not been adequate in all respects. According to an 
Human Science Research Council (HSRC) report on these Training and Support 
Programmes (EUPSP: Human Science Research Council and Tsimeni Consulting: 
Members' Training and Support Programmes, 2002), a number of shortcomings exist. 
Hahndiek (2005: 23) mentions that the design of the induction itself was criticised for 
not offering effective training to Members entering legislatures between elections, and 
that there was no comprehensive mentoring system to sustain and reinforce the training. 
The information and research facilities provided to members do contribute to the 
preparation of members, as they assist committees in verifying information supplied by 
the executive, and conduct specialised research into government performance 
(Hahndiek, 2005: 22). The Parliamentary Research Unit (as referred to earlier), which 
was established in 1997 in order to support the committees, has been criticised for their 
lack of capacity. As one committee chair noted: "I don't think the research is adequate, 
it's (the unit) much too small; there should be at least one researcher per committee. I 
am absolutely convinced that until we have that situation, we will spread those we do 
have too thin ... " (EUPSP Research Evaluation Report, 2001). Although the Unit's 
research team has expanded to 25 members (originally consisting of only 13 members) 
in 200 l, there should be a more co-ordinated approach, which could be attained by 
having an independent research team assist all oversight and research units (view the 
proposal in Addendum A). 
The combination of the Committee's weekly meetings, the cluster system (splitting the 
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committee into the two workgroups ), and the introduction of oversight visits to the 
government agencies, has produced some challenges. The Committees' weekly 
planning meetings, which involve the Secretariat, Auditor-General's Office, 
Researchers, and Conveners (along with the presence of the Parliamentary Legal 
Advisor in the committee meetings), are vital for SCOPA to ensure that activities take 
place in a co-ordinated manner (Annual Report: Standing committee on Public 
Accounts, 2005: 2). The cluster system was intended to encourage productivity and 
specialisation amongst members, but it was not successful in all regards once conflicting 
interests emerged. In addition, the introduction of oversight visits to government 
departments and agencies as a tool to measure compliance with financial legislation, was 
initiated in the term of 2004 (Annual Report: Standing committee on Public Accounts, 
2005: 3), in order to enhance the Committee's efficacy. Although this introduced new 
channels for obtaining insight on comparative practices, it would appear (on perusal of 
SCOPA's 2004 and 2005 annual reports) that their budgets and opportunities have not 
been utilised to the maximum affect in this regard. 
It should be kept in mind that SCOPA battles with a common problem found throughout 
Parliament: the inadequate amount of time that is available to complete the year's work. 
This problem is compounded for SCOPA by the late submission of financial statements. 
ven though the Auditor-General has tried to facilitate the time-management of SCOPA 
by providing in advance a list of matters and reports that will come before the 
Committee during a year, it is apparent that the Committee has, in the past, relied solely 
on reports from the Auditor-General as opposed to those from other non-executive 
actors. February (2002: 7) mentioned that, as illustrated by the list provided in 2002, 
and the business plan of SCOPA, there were many matters that were carried over to the 
next year, as is usually the case. This has hampered the efficiency of SCOPA in both 
structuring and reviewing recommended modifications. 
Currently, after receiving a report from the Auditor-General, hearings are the principle 
mechanisms by which officials from departments, agencies, or other relevant bodies, 
answer to SCOPA. This is the reason for SCOPA planning its programme carefully in 
consultation with the Auditor-General, in order for the release of reports to be 
synchronised with Parliamentary hearings. 
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According to Wehner (2002: 13), a quality hearing requires preparation by committee 
members as well as witnesses. In some Public Accounts Committees, individual 
members are asked to scrutinise separate sections of a report. In others, each member is 
responsible for every audit report. An audit report is, in many systems, accompanied by 
a briefing document from the Auditor-General, which is then circulated prior to a 
hearing. Such a briefing document may suggest areas in a report that warrant particular 
attention. In addition, individual members sometimes conduct their own research on 
issues of their interest to supplement the available information (Wehner, 2002: 13). 
However, in the case of SCOPA, all members are not fully equipped with these 
competencies, which have lead to much critique on the manner in which reports have 
been overseen. 
3.2.2 Oversight of written and oral reports 
Until recently, the year-end oversight mechanisms in Parliamentary committees have 
been relatively poor, typically being limited to financial oversight as exercised by 
SCOPA. Certain types of oversight activity, such as comments on current issues or 
developments, are sometimes exercised only through oral presentation (Ad Hoc Joint 
Sub-Committee on Oversight and Accountability, 2002: 26). One advantage of using 
oral reports during question time is its efficiency in covering a much broader range of 
categories than written reports on financial management do. These categories can 
include "policy development, structural issues, and current issues or events" (Ad Hoc 
Joint Sub-Committee on Oversight and Accountability (2002: 27). In addition, 
historically the question time for hearings within Parliament originated from the 
Westminster practice, with the aim of playing a key role in making Parliament a 
dynamic and relevant debating forum, in order to exercise greater oversight on the 
executive. 
When SCOPA receives a written report from the Auditor-General on possible fiscal 
irresponsibility, it must call the implicated parties to give evidence into the matter. 
Following the conclusion of hearings, the Committee prepares a report of its findings, 
which is then tabled in Parliament. Implicated parties must reply to the Committee's 
report within sixty days, at which point the Committee reviews the replies and arranges 
further follow-up if necessary. The entire procedure is highly structured and organised, 
with a system of status reports used to track developments in the process (Corder et al, 
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1999: 19). 
The Constitution (1996) clearly intends departmental reports to assist oversight. 
Regular, Constitutionally mandated reports allow MPs and members of the legislature to 
keep track of departmental activities. While it is important that SCOPA considers the 
independent advice of the Auditor-General, the Committee should not be constrained in 
its choice of which aspects of an audit report should be further investigated. The Report 
on Parliamentary Oversight and Accountability (Corder et al, 1999:20) identified several 
problems that national Parliamentary committees have in dealing with these reports. 
Logistical problems surround a) the overload of reports, and b) late distribution of 
reports which leaves too little time to prepare responses. These problems arise partly 
because there is such a wide range of bodies that should be held accountable via 
reporting to Parliament, which in turn stretches resources even further. A proposed 
solution could be to streamline the procedure for the receipt of reports. However, 
improved procedures alone will not guarantee effective oversight: the legislative 
environment and members themselves must be geared towards oversight (Murray & 
Nijzink, 2001). 
According to the Final Report of the Ad Hoc Joint Sub-Committee on Oversight and 
Accountability (2002: 38), there is also an undeniable infrastructural constraint to 
effective enforcement of Parliamentary oversight: 
"There are no official procedures or requirements for committees to respond to 
reports that are submitted to them- a constraint that ... limits the value of written 
reporting. Without an established venue for submitting official responses, 
Parliamentary committees cannot effectively transmit decisions they have made 
either to the executive body in question or to Parliament as a whole. " 
As the above quote indicates, there are currently no formal or official structures through 
' 
which committees can respond to the reports submitted to Parliament. The process is 
therefore at the discretion of the individual committee clerks, who may or may not have 
specific instructions from their committee chair on the handling of reports. The 
committee clerk distributes copies of the report to committee members. There are no 
official procedures or policies for recording, indexing, or tracking submissions (Corder 
et al, 1999: 17). 
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One should also take into account what Members of Parliament themselves have 
identified as the shortcomings of the current structures, both in terms of submission and 
compilation of reports. These shortcomings were listed within the Final Report of the 
Joint Ad Hoc Committee on Oversight and Accountability (2002:40). Firstly, the six-
month timeframe for the tabling of annual reports can be seen as somewhat 
inappropriate. Committees are expected to review departmental budget votes during the 
first few months of the year without access to the departments' performance records of 
the previous year (because the departments and government entities require a reasonable 
period of time to compile the relevant data). The reports also have to be audited by the 
Auditor-General before being tabled in Parliament. It would be more practical if 
departments submitted their performance records to Parliament at the same time as they 
are sent for auditing. 
Secondly, the content and presentation of annual reports are not always helpful in 
explaining performance: they must be instructed via standard report guidelines (Public 
Service Commission, 2005). The failure to hand in reports on time (in 2004/05 eleven 
national departments had not submitted their reports on time and provided no 
explanation) should be addressed by SCOPA placing political pressure on the relevant 
departments and public entities that fail to table the necessary documentation. 
Lastly, the report also indicated that inadequate committee resources (to verify the 
information contained in reports) have undermined their usefulness as oversight 
mechanisms. The report proposed that independent sources of information are crucial in 
order to ensure that committees do not solely rely on the data provided by the 
departments and accounting entities, without being critical. 
In order to prevent the late submission of financial statements by the accounting entities 
(and to empower SCOPA to act accordingly), section 40(4) of the PFMA (Act 1 of 
1999) should be enforced. This section imposes an obligation on the accounting officer 
of a department to issue monthly reports on actual revenue and expenditure to the 
relevant treasury, which are then gazetted and available to members for scrutiny. A 
mechanism to monitor compliance with this provision should be in place, as it may 
impact on the submission of the annual financial statements. If this provision is fully 
complied with, there would be no reason for late submission, which could enable 
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SCOPA to stay on track with their tight schedule. 
As mentioned in SCOPA's report, the committee acknowledges that they must execute a 
developmental agenda without fear, favor or prejudice in its enforcement strategies, 
regardless of the political differences that might surface (SCOPA Report for 2003). 
However, Murray & Nijzink (1999) noted that committees appear unprepared when 
reports are presented and that debates tend to be shallow because members raise non-
contentious issues. Members rush through reports without asking substantive questions 
(such as the relationship between plans and deliverables). Therefore, in some cases at 
least, MPs are mistaken if they interpret their role as always requiring them to defend (or 
even protect) MECs from their party (Murray & Nijzink, 2001 ). 
Since SCOPA conducts its business on behalf of the Assembly, it must report on its own 
activities. National Assembly Rule 137(1) requires that: "A committee must report to 
the Assembly on any matter referred to the committee ... ". Rule 13 7 (2) further 
stipulates that "[a] committee must report to the Assembly on all other decisions taken 
by it ... and inform the Assembly on its activities at least once a year". Patricia de Lille 
has expressed fears that "SCOPA has become another compliance committee, stamping 
reports of government" (National Integrity Systems, 2005: 3 7). In addition, a trend that 
is of concern appears to be developing within SCOPA's own reports. For the term of 
2004, fourteen of the sixteen reports that were tabled by SCOPA, were given unqualified 
audit opinions. However, all of them were tabled and adopted by the House, requesting 
no further interaction with the accounting authority for the financial year under review, 
or only requesting some information to be provided within two weeks of tabling the 
resolution (Annual Report: Standing committee on Public Accounts, 2005: 7-12). In no 
way did SCOPA report that they found themselves performing inadequately when 
viewing the results of their meetings. The committee held 18 plenary meetings for the 
whole term of 2004 and 15 meetings each for both group one and two (therefore a total 
of 48), which on average is satisfactory, but while the numbers look good the results 
have not been remarkable. 
3.2.3 Committee Question Time 
Question time (along with the committee system) is the best practical example of 
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accountability, and is often seen as vital to the success of Parliamentary oversight 
procedures. It gives ordinary MP's the opportunity to question the President, the Deputy 
President, and Cabinet Ministers, on matters of importance (February, 2006: 137). 
Members of the executive are obliged under the principle of 'explanatory accountability' 
to explain their actions through answering questions. However, since 2000, alterations 
made to the rules of question time have diminished the usefulness of question time as an 
oversight mechanism, an effect which will be discussed in the following sections (DA, 
2004c: 8). 
Murray & Nijzink (1999) project question time as a public event providing an 
opportunity for committee members to engage in party-political competition. They are 
both of opinion that this is the reason members of the opposition (rather than the 
government) has used question time almost exclusively in the National Assembly. The 
format of the question time (usually short questions and short answers), and the timing 
(relatively short notice of questions is required), potentially provide an attention-
catching opportunity for politicians to challenge and defend the government's records 
(Murray & Nijzink, 2001 ). 
Between 1994 and 2000 question time revolved around three mechanisms: 
interpellations, questions for oral response, and questions for written reply. In 2000, the 
rules of question time were altered. Firstly, the interpellations provided for 15 minute 
'mini-debates' in order to ensure robust interchanges between a Minister and the 
questioner. 
Secondly, between April 1994 and 2000, questions for oral reply were placed on the 
order paper in the National Assembly in the order in which they arrived. This first-
come-first-served rule ensured that question time was an opportunity for proactive MPs 
to engage Ministers. Between 1994 and 1998, the NNP, DP and the IFP put a combined 
total of5 105 questions to Ministers compared to the ANC's 588 (Nijzink, 2001). 
In April 2000, the ANC (as discussed at a number of meetings of the Chief Whips' 
Forum) used its majority in the Joint Rules Committee to introduce a rotational system 
whereby parties were allocated questions for oral reply dependent on the strength or size 
of the party. The question time was increased from 30 minutes to two hours per week, 
interpellations were abolished and the rotational system, as described above, was 
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introduced. Some of the reasons provided for these changes were: interpellations were 
not seen as an effective form of interaction between Ministers and members; there was 
insufficient time to answer the large number of oral questions on the Question Paper 
each week, and; the first-come-first-served basis of tabling questions did not always 
allow for a fair spread of opportunity to ask questions (Murray & Nijzink, 2001 ). 
The new rules are not necessarily more effective. The old rules provided for an 
unlimited number of supplementary or follow-up questions relating to a main question. 
This gave the questioner a greater change of eliciting a satisfactory response from the 
Minister. Under the new rules, the number of follow-up questions has been reduced to 
four (DA, 2004c: 10). In addition, the new rules state that questions must be submitted 
to the question office some two weeks before they are answered, which makes it very 
difficult for MPs to question departments or Ministers on current issues. There is 
currently no National Assembly Rule that can be invoked to enforce a Minister to 
answer a question that requires them to explain their actions satisfactorily. Another 
problem is that, although the custom exists that Ministers have ten working days to 
respond to a written question, since there is no hard and fast rule concerning this issue, 
for example, in 2004 there were still 142 questions (120 written and 22 oral) for which 
answers should have been provided, but were still outstanding (DA Press Statement, 
2004b ). The inability to ensure that all questions are answered is a weakness in the 
system. 
As explained, under the new rules interpellations have been abolished, and question time 
has become party-based and not member-based as it was in the past, which explands the 
level of party dedication within the committee. The order of the questions is determined 
on the same basis as motions in the House. Ministers' portfolios are grouped in clusters, 
with a different cluster being the subject of question time each week. Provisions have 
been made for urgent questions, and questions to the President - on a quarterly basis, 
whilst questions to the Deputy President are scheduled for every second week. (Murray 
& Nijzink, 2001 ). The ministerial quota of four questions per department has been 
increased to eight, and committee members are allowed to ask five supplementary 
questions and express an opinion. It is too early to draw definite conclusions about the 
effect of the changes to question time. However, one of the motivations for the ANC 
proposal was to encourage government MPs to use the available question time 
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industriously. 
When assessing the success of these changes, attention will have to be paid to the type 
of questions asked: if the new process is intended to encourage government MPs to fulfil 
their oversight role, questions will need to be directed to issues of policy implementation 
(Murray & Nijzink, 2001). However, question time should not serve as a mechanism for 
party-political competition only. Above all, it should be valued for its information-
seeking aim. In this regard, questions for written and oral reply share a common 
problem: the danger of not being answered. Ultimately, it is a political matter whether 
or not unanswered questions are to be tolerated. However, the way in which question 
time is managed and planned may reduce the problem of Ministers or the President 
failing to attend question time (Murray & Nijzink, 2001 ). 
One cannot assume that question time, as an oversight instrument has been successful in 
all regards, partly because the media has shown little interest in the broadcasting of 
SCOPA' s meetings- aside from exceptional cases such as the Petro SA or Oil gate cases, 
where some controversial issues were addressed. The fact that not much 'newsworthy' 
footage is taken from the meetings is arguably because of 'question dodging' (February, 
2006: 137). SCOPA continues to be faced with the probability that Cabinet members 
fail to answer questions appropriately. This is reflected in the fact that few questions 
floored in the National Assembly in the past 11 years have opened up a national debate, 
or ignited even a degree of controversy. In order for our democracy to be vibrant and 
inclusive, greater transparency and bold debate is a necessity. 
3.4 Summary 
According to February (2006: 140), the strength of the legislature will ultimately be a 
question of political will, and thus far it would appear that this has been lacking. This 
thesis agrees with this statement, although by peeking at the roots, it tends to indicate 
that the lack of critical self-review by members of SCOPA (amongst themselves and 
towards all members of the committee), fails to question the true efficacy of oversight 
procedures. All procedures will ultimately fail if they do not adjust to the requirements 
of our Constitution, and if they are attempted without clear political will and purposeful, 
co-ordinated, and planned directives. 
Some legislatures are allocating more resources to oversight and establishing procedures 
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to ensure that oversight is systematic, and not ad hoc. Greater resources and improved 
procedures on their own will not guarantee effective oversight - the entire legislative 
environment must be geared towards oversight. For instance, the heavy workload that 
SCOPA faces clearly suggests that they could benefit from additional expertise and 
resources. However, with their competing political priorities and an absence of a 
common understanding of the oversight responsibility amongst members and legislative 
staff, the complexity of the problem is compounded. 
Calland (1997: 17) argues that minority parties within committees will need to create, 
consolidate and entrench an institutional culture that will enable the new political elite to 
apply a strong collective, and individual, mind to the task at hand, imbued with a defiant 
political will that is willing to take on and, where necessary, "vigorously and expertly" 
criticise the leadership of the ANC-in-government. If they fail to do so, they face a very 
real danger that both the work of the committees, and their legal and Constitutional 
authority, will be undermined and rendered relatively meaningless. This, according to 
Cal land (1997: 17), within the rapid transformation of the system as whole, will come to 
be regarded as an "ultimately disappointing chimera". 
i One such example is the confusion between oversight powers and appropriate oversight processes. In 
many legislatures, it is the departmental accounting officer and other officials who the politicians seek 
to hold accountable, rather than the relevant Minister or MEC. This misunderstanding is widespread 
and undermines the ability of the legislature to ensure proper political accountability. In South Africa, 
it appears to stem from a misreading of the Public Finance Management Act (Act I of 1999). The Act 
does spell out the responsibilities of accounting officers and in effect contains important elements of 
the employment contract of the accounting officer directly accountable to a legislature (Murray & 
Nijzink, 2001). 
ii SCOPA must perform any other functions, tasks or duties assigned to it in terms of the Constitution, 
legislation, these Rules, the Joint Rules or resolutions of the Assembly, including functions, tasks and 
duties concerning Parliamentary financial oversight or supervision of executive organs of state, 
Constitutional institutions, or other public bodies. 
iiiThe Speaker must refer the financial statements and reports mentioned in paragraph (a)(I), (ii) and 
(iii) to the Committee when they are submitted to Parliament, irrespective of whether they are also 
referred to another committee. 
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Chapter4 
CASE STUDIES: THE ROAD TRAVELLED 
4. Background 
The previous chapters of this thesis have dealt with the fact that oversight is complex, 
and yet is central to the effective functioning of the South African legislatures. It 
requires a delicate balance between party loyalties and enforcing accountability, which 
takes effort and wisdom to obtain. This is further complicated by the inadequate 
oversight procedures that MPs and members of the Legislature are faced with. The 
challenge remains to translate the SCOPA committee agenda item into political practice. 
Although there are many examples of good practice, the overall record on oversight 
desires much improvement. 
Maintaining the status quo can, in some instances, lead to greater political stability and 
maybe public support. If government performs well, oversight need not overwhelm 
opposition or unnecessarily delay investigative intervention. But maintaining the status 
quo (and all its aspects) has at times required government to be less transparent. For 
example, late submissions of financial statements by departments, public entities, and 
even by SCOPA itself are just cause for concern, and should not be dismissed as a 
consequence of 'too much to do in too little time' . The possibility of some information 
being concealed should always be considered when holding public entities to account 
for unsatisfactory financial reports. 
On the other hand, as mentioned in Chapter Two, lobbyists' influence can be used to 
push an agenda of a more partisan nature. The Norwegian Parliamentary system in 
Scandinavia offers an excellent example of a system exposed to many of the challenges 
the South African Parliament and its committees are vulnerable to. According to a study 
done by Rommetvedt ( 1998: 80), Norwegian MPs reported that they were contacted on 
a regular basis by specified types of lobbyistsi - business organisations, trade unions, 
environmental organisations, idealistic and other organisations, private and state owned 
companies and other state institutions. Yet the committee on Scrutiny and 
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Constitutional Affairs was the least 'popular' committee amongst lobbyists. 
When reviewing the case studies below, it will become apparent that SCOPA is 
vulnerable to such influences. This can partly be ascribed to its unique history, allowing 
that its Parliamentary practices differ significantly from Scandinavian countries'. 
Scandinavian countries have influential committees (in terms of determining legislation) 
in combination with strong parties. As mentioned in Chapter One, South Africa Jacks 
strong parties (since it tends to feature as a strong single-party system, having a large 
majority vote, thereby influencing all Parliamentary and committee decisions) and 
entertains conflicting private interests within the committees. These lobbyist influences, 
as in the Arms Deal and Oilgate cases, have been connected with alleged bribes to 
members of the executive and secret party-funding schemes to the governing party, or 
personal favours (for contract work and personal financial security, as in the Arms 
Deal). By taking South Africa's unique history and context into consideration, one can 
assume that 'corporate favours', more specifically by Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) companies, where procurement is prescribed, might take place in this context. 
This chapter will assess three case studies that have connected managerial bad practice 
(within government departments or public organs of the state) with the government 
(such as corruption and illegal party funding). These cases put the investigations and 
reports1i of the Auditor-General, the Public Protector and SCOPA in the open, either 
judging their manner of conducting oversight, or reinforcing it. The findings and reports 
varied between the cases, a fact which has been attributed to the complexity of each case 
study and critique received from the public and media, providing reason to doubt both 
the integrity and the transparency of these entities. 
This chapter will present the following case studies: 
Section 4.1 The Arms Deal 
Section 4.2 Oilgate: PetroSA and Imvume 
Section 4.3 State Housing Subsidies 
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4.1 The Arms Deal 
The Arms Deal can be seen as one of the biggest blows to Parliament's credibility in its 
12 years of practice. It impacted on the image of the Public Protector, the National 
Prosecuting Authority, the Auditor-General's office, SCOPA and the judiciary 
(February, 2006: 133). 
Between I 995 and 1996, the Ministry of Defence conducted a Strategic Defence Review 
of the capacity and requirements of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
concerning the possible need for large capital expenditure. However, Parliament did not 
foresee (or intentionally approve) the considerable budget increase that followed. This 
caused tensions to develop between the executive and the legislature with regards to 
how their relationship is defined Constitutionally. The result was that this undermined 
the principle of accountability, in that the executive is accountable to Parliament and not 
the other way around. 
This case study will analyse whether SCOPA "promote[d] effective and efficient 
financial management of, and the accountability for, all matters concerning public 
finance ... [in order to] exercise a rigorous oversight role ... [to] contribute towards the 
improvement in the quality of life for all South Africans" (Annual Report: Standing 
committee on Public Accounts, 2005: 4). 
4.1.1 Chronology of the Arms Deal 
According to Calland and February (2001: n.p), the problem surrounding the Arms Deal 
began as early as the approval of the Review (by Parliament), as presented by the 
Department of Defence (DOD), in 1996iii. As mentioned, the underlying issue was the 
Constitutional provisions defining the relationship between Parliament and the 
Executive (more specifically regarding oversight and accountability). Did the DOD 
operate within its Parliamentary mandate in constructing the Strategic Arms 
Procurement Package, and was the Cabinet's decision to approve the package consistent 
with national policy approved by Parliament? Parliament did not approve the Defence 
Review' as to mandate an increase in defence spending. It rather expected that "its 
budget [would] remain constant over several years at R9,7 billion in 1998 rand value" 
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(Calland and February, 2001: n.p). 
Parliament approved the provisional budget in April 1998, which provided details of 
new arms and equipment, which would be bought at the cost of R29,9 billion over a 
period of 12 years (February, 2006: 133). However, Calland and February (2001: n.p) 
reported that by 2001 the costs had already exceeded R50 billion. Many critics believed 
that this expenditure was unnecessary, since the money could have been better utilised 
elsewhere. 
In December 1999, the Executive entered into five contracts: the sub-marine contract 
was awarded to GSC; the helicopter contract was awarded to A GUST A; the lead-in 
fighter trainer ("LIFT") contract was awarded to British Aerospace (these were Hawk 
aircraft); the corvette contract was awarded to the German Frigate Consortium-
Thomson; and the light fighter aircraft ("ALF A") contract was awarded to British 
Aerospace (these were Gripen aircraft) (Calland and February, 2001: n.p). These 
contracts attracted allegations of corruption, which are discussed in the analysis of this 
case in Section 4.2.1.2. 
Jn September and October 2000, the Auditor-General and SCOPA respectively 
published their reports on aspects of the arms transactions. No concerns about the 
corruption allegations mentioned above were raised in these reports, but both entities 
recommended that further investigations be undertaken regarding areas of concern 
(February, 2006: 134). February (2006: 134) emphasises the mandatory role of SCOPA 
to perform a "non-partisan oversight role to ensure the effective management of fiscal 
resources" 
On February 2003, Deputy President Jacob Zuma's executive office denied the 
allegations of malpractice in the Arms Deal, and stated that "the continuing allegations 
and rumours linking him to corruption and bribery are ridiculous, malicious, insulting 
and defamatory" (Van Vuuren, 2005: n.p). Again, on 12 March 2003, in a written reply 
to a question posed in the National Assembly, Zuma denied the allegations. He said he 
had not discussed the issue of protecting any company or individual from the Joint 
71 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Investigating Team's probe into the Arms Deal with anyone. Zuma added that he had 
heard from media reports about the allegations that he "requested money in return for 
support or protection" to a company (Van Vuuren, 2005: n.p). However, he blatantly 
denied being involved with any acts of corruption or bribery. 
Towards the end of March 2003, allegations began to surface claiming that the final 
report given to Parliament, under the authority of the Auditor-General, Public Protector 
and the Prosecutions Authority, was heavily edited. The allegation threatened to re-open 
the Arms Deal case, and promised further damage to the key players ' credibility. 
Allegedly, the final report presented to Parliament omitted a section entitled 
"Inaccuracies in the presentation to SCOPA". In this section were details, uncovered by 
investigators, that highlighted the dubious connection between winning contractor 
African Defence Systems (ADS) and the brother of Chippy Shaik (former arms 
acquisition chief), Shabir Shaik. This section also highlighted inaccuracies in the DODs 
presentation to SCOPA, where the said Department apparently failed to make the 
connection public (Van Vuuren, 2005 : n.p). On 5 June 2003 the Auditor-General 
submitted a letter to the Business Day denying that he came under political pressure to 
materially change his office ' s report on the Anns Deal. 
Eventually, on 11 June 2003, Parliament issued statements regarding its role in the re-
investigation of the Arms Deal and its final report. The Speaker of the National 
Assembly, Frene Ginwala, confirmed that it was within SCOPA's mandate to conduct 
the investigation. Committee Chairperson for SCOPA, Francois Beukman, confirmed 
that the Committee would need to focus on the extent of editing applied to the report. 
He also stated that his approach would be ' to run an open and transparent process and to 
place huge emphasis on the legal opinion' (Van Vuuren, 2005: n.p). On 18 June 2003 
the Committee decided to wait for the Auditor-General to present a special report in 
response to the allegations; instead of calling him directly to account to the Committee. 
However, SCOPA did notice that the media allegations regarding the substantial editing, 
by the executive, of the draft Auditor-General's Report on the Arms Deal investigation 
held much truth . 
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At this stage, Zuma still referred to media reports as 'unacceptable and despicable' and 
denied any misconduct on his behalf. He also levelled criticism at the Directorate of 
Public Prosecutions office stating that their conduct was inappropriate. In his statement 
to the media Zuma highlighted his unhappiness about the way in which the investigation 
had progressed: 
"Having pledged my co-operation fully in the interests of justice, I now find 
myself having a serious problem with the manner in which the Directorate is 
conducting the investigation. ... !find it totally unacceptable and despicable that 
questions that they sent to me have appeared in a Sunday newspaper. This is a 
serious breach of confidentiality and is contrary to the spirit and terms of the 
National Prosecuting Authority Act, relating to the confidentiality of information 
received and disseminated. ... ! am now consulting with my lawyers with regard to 
the conduct of the (National) Directorate (of Public Prosecutions) and the nature 
of my response to this situation." (Van Vuuren, 2005: n.p). 
On 30 July 2003, President Mbeki called for a speedy resolution of the Scorpions' probe 
into the allegations of corruption by Zuma. The President announced that he could not 
comment on the possible political motives behind the investigation, but he would let the 
investigation run its course. Yet Mbeki remained concerned about the corruption 
allegations: 
"Of course I am concerned about this. I am concerned about the mere fact of the 
allegation. (But) I do not know who is right and who is wrong." (Van Vuuren, 
2005: n.p). 
On 19 August 2003 the ANC top leadership decided to enforce silence in its ranks 
regarding the corruption charges allegedly involving Deputy President Jacob Zuma, and 
in effect ensured that the arms row received limited coverage in the media. On 21 
August 2003 the Auditor-General was caught off-guard by SCOPA when Democratic 
' 
Alliance MP Nigel Bruce presented a letter showing that a winning bidder in the Arms 
Deal changed its price a day after the tender closed - and after having access to details of 
a rival offer (Van Vuuren, 2005: n.p). Auditor-General Shauket Fakie would not 
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comment on this matter until he examined the letter's contents - which referred to a 
document that C2I2 MD Richard Young had secured from Fa!Ge's office in terms of the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act. Richard Young was an SA arms contractor 
who had lost a contract for one of the 'combat suits' in the Arms Deal. On 22 August 
2003 Fakie's only response was to use the Joint Investigation Team's report to argue 
that irregularities in the bidding process were thoroughly investigated and adequately 
dealt with (Van Vuuren, 2005: n.p). 
ln January 2005, further fuel was added to the Arms Deal controversy when Richard 
Young used access to information legislation to wrestle earlier drafts of the 'Arms Deal 
Report' (the Joint Investigation Team's report) into the open. The document appeared 
to refute earlier claims by Fakie that the report was not edited in any material way. 
Some of the omissions from the final report include that: 
I. there were fundamental flaws in the selection of BAE/SAAB as the suppliers of 
training and fighter jets; 
2. former Defence Minister Joe Modise "caused" the more expensive Hawk fighter 
jets to be selected despite the South African Airforce traditionally supporting an 
Italian aircraft; 
3. the award of contracts to supply new engmes for military helicopters was 
irregular; and 
4. the so-called off-set programme favoured certain parties such as BAE/SAAB and 
in the case of the submarine purchase the off-set evaluation process was 
'materially flawed' (National Integrity Systems, 2005: 37). 
4.1.2 Analysis of the Arms Deal 
Generally speaking, widespread allegations of corruption plagued the Arms Deal. These 
allegations prompted the government to appoint three agencies to investigate, thereby 
forming the Joint Investigation Team. The National Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Bulelani Ngcuka; Auditor-General Shauket Fa!Ge; and Public Protector Selby Baqwa, 
headed these investigations (Sunday Times, 2001: n.p). SCOPA's initial report, based 
74 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
on the findings of the Auditor-General, was published on the AGSA (Auditor-General 
South Africa) website. 
The Arms Deal was complex, and so this analysis will consider each of the different 
aspects of the Deal in tum. 
4.1.2.1 Appointment of the Special Investigating Unit 
Much of the heat of the Arms Deal controversy derived from the question of whether or 
not it was the express intention of SCOPA that the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) be 
included in the multi-agency investigation (as recommended by SCOPA in its October 
2000 14th report) (Calland and February, 2001: n.p). The executive was reluctant to 
involve the SIU in the investigation, and the pre-existing controversy around the role 
and abilities of the SIU's head, Judge Heath, fanned the flames at the start of 2000. The 
majority resolution presented by SCOPA (as agreed to in their committee meeting held 
on 28 February 200 I) stated that the correct interpretation of their l 41h Report (as 
adopted by the National Assembly on 3 November 2000), did not make provision for the 
definite inclusion of the Special Investigative Unit headed by Judge Heath (Calland and 
February, 2001: n.p). 
4.1.2.2 The decision-making process 
The impartiality of the decision-making process in awarding the contracts for arms, and 
the selection of tenderers, was later questioned because the basis of evaluation (in order 
to award the contract to British Aerospace specifically) was changed from a costed to a 
non-costed basis (Call and and February, 200 I: n. p ). Allegations were made that the role 
the ADS company (mostly owned by Thomson) played in the Corvettes contract was 
connected with Thomson being a partner with the German Frigate Consortium. The 
dubious role ADS played in the helicopter contract (awarded to AGUSTA) was also 
brought to light. Apart from the ADS allegations, Shabir Shaik was also accused of 
improperly influencing the awarding of the contract due to nepotism, and this included 
Deputy President Jacob Zuma's involvement, who was, according to allegations, bribed 
into protecting business interests (though these allegations against him are as yet (mid 
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2006) untested in court) (Calland and February, 2001: n.p). 
4.1.2.3 Declaration of personal interest 
The Executive Ethics Code states that members of the executive; "must declare any 
personal or private financial or business interest that they may have in a matter a) that is 
before the Cabinet or an Executive Council; b) that is before a Cabinet Committee or 
Executive Council on which the member serves; or c) in relation to which the member is 
required to take a decision as a member of the Executive". (Van Vuuren, 2005: n.p). 
Despite the notable exceptions involving the former Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, 
and Deputy President Zuma, there appears to be a general awareness, particularly at 
national level, of the risk posed by public scrutiny of such interests (Van Vuuren, 2005: 
n.p). 
If the Constitution requires the executive to be accountable to Parliament, what exactly 
does accountability mean in practice, within the context of the proceedings of the Arms 
Deal? Calland and February (2001: n.p) argue that, although Parliament has the 
theoretical authority to hold the executive accountable, it is rarely taken up in reality. 
They conclude this matter of the complexity of the relationship between the executive 
and Parliament, stating that "the executive must explain itself to Parliament (account to), 
not the other way around". 
However, as mentioned in Chapter One, Westminster Parliamentary democracies 
complicate this relationship by 'allowing' a strong majority party to be in charge of the 
legislature and the executive, causing an Executive-Legislative divide (in cases having 
resulted in political divide within the same political party). Westminster Parliamentary 
democracies have a 'fusing'iv effect on the majority party, which "straddles" the 
Executive-Legislative divide (Calland and February, 2001: n.p). For example, this 
confusion was part of the reason the contents of the letterv written by Deputy President 
Jacob Zuma to SCOPA on his 'involvement' in the Arms Deal was inappropriate at that 
time, and did not respect the provision that "the executive must explain itself to 
Parliament (account to), not the other way around" (Calland and February, 2001: n.p). 
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4.1.2.4 Independence of the Auditor-General 
Although the independence of the Auditor-General is guaranteed by the Constitution, it 
is argued that this was severely compromised during the investigation into the Arms 
Deal. The Auditor-General made the findings of his investigation known to the 
executive (who were, in part, the subject of the investigation) prior to informing 
SCOPA, to whom he was to report. This happened despite the Auditor-General's 
important role as a Constitutional oversight body. The lack of political will to act and 
point out errant departments is worrisome (Van Vuuren, 2005: n.p). 
4.1.3 Conclusion 
February (2006: 134) concluded her study of the Arms Deal with blaming it for 
"[ripping] SCOPA apart". Having minutes of meetings and reports being tampered in 
the ANC Whip's office, and the Deputy President involved in charges of corruption and 
partisanship (February, 2006: 134), indicated patterns of inappropriate executive 
intervention. In the context, these interventions cannot be seen as coincidental, but 
rather as a weakness in the system. This weakness is located in the vulnerability of 
ministers to react to corporate influence (such as bribes or unacknowledged business 
interests) before performing their obligatory ministerial responsibilities under the 'close 
eye' of the legislature. 
Should a ruling party be able to use its majority to protect its political interests when 
performing an oversight function? Within this case study, it is clear that the executive, 
legislative and Constitutional actors who participated in the investigations and reporting 
on the Arms Deal, proved that there is no room for pushing an agenda other than one 
true to the democratic-Parliamentary codes of conduct. They showed maintaining the 
status quo, and tampering with the Constitutional mandate attributed to each level of 
government, harms the credibility these entities usually have in the eyes of the public, 
and therefore harms the democratic ideals underlining the purpose of these entities. 
SCOPA acted hesitantly in executing their share of the investigation. When performing 
a function of scrutiny and oversight, the committee should remain committed to its 
independent mission, which is to "exercise a rigorous oversight role (over the executive) 
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to ensure maximum value for each taxpayer rand ... " impartially (Annual Report: 
Standing committee on Public Accounts, 2005: 4). A lack of political will would appear 
to be part of the reason why members of SCOPA did not perform their oversight 
functions fiercely, resulting in less effective performance. The problem in this case is 
that irregularities between the branches of government hampered the route of oversight. 
More specifically, having discovered that the Executive participated in the process of 
making significant changes to the Arms Deal report, with the aid of the supposedly 
independent Auditor-General, SCOPA was forced, by the ANC majority (who were 
party to the Executive's role in the report) within the committee, to disregard some 
aspects of the case in its investigations. This gave rise to doubts about the integrity of 
the Executive and consequently the capacity of the Legislature. 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, having Gavin Woods (IFP) resign as chairperson of 
SCOPA, because he disapproved of the initial report handed over to Parliament 
regarding SCOPA 's investigation on the Arms Deal, emphasises the complexity and 
secrecy involved. Call and and February (2001) noted that, in their own view, the report 
was less than satisfactory, and left several questions unanswered. The view that Woods 
held was to some extent shared by former PAC MP, and now leader of the r ndependent 
Democrats (ID), Patricia de Lille, who remained critical of aspects of the arms 
procurement throughout the process: "I am proud of the institution (Parliament) but I 
think I am also duty bound to say where it has failed. With the Arms Deal it failed 
hopelessly, absolutely hopelessly" (National Integrity Systems, 2005: 36). 
4.2 Oilgate: PetroSA and lmvume 
There are two factors of significance to be noted in this case. Firstly, the nature of the 
conflicting reports released by SCOPA and the Public Protector, and secondly, political 
party funding to the governing party by means of underhanded negotiations between the 
executive and a public entity. The questions that the latter issue raises include, amongst 
others: How will such parties be held accountable and what are the limits for such 
'fundiAg projects'? Are there rules on political party funding? 
Currently, there is no effective regulation of the private funding of political parties in 
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South Africa. The basis for public funding of political parties is found in the 
Constitution vi (1997), stating only that only parties that are represented in the National 
Assembly or any provincial legislature may receive public fundingvii.This sets the 
context wherein the watchdogs in the media publicly questioned the respective agendas 
of PetroSA, Imvume Management, and the Government. 
The so-called Oilgate scandal was first pointed out to the public by the Mail and 
Guardian in 2005. The ANC came under pressure regarding allegations related to 
financial dealings between the energy company, PetroSA, Imvume Management (a BEE 
grouping) and a Swiss firm, Glencore (February, 2006: 125). These allegations centred 
on a R 11 million donation made by Imvume Management to the ANC in 2003, which 
was drawn directly from an advance payment of R15 million made by PetroSA to 
Imvume Management for the purchase of oil condensate (Davies, 2006: n.p). 
In January 2004, Glencore sought payment for its supply of condensate, which was 
allegedly again paid by PetroSA. What this means is that PetroSA (a public entity) had 
to pay twice for the oil condensate, since lmvume had transferred the advance to the 
ANC instead of using it for its intended purpose (Davies, 2006). The possibility that 
public money was effectively used to finance the ruling party led to a storm of events, 
which will be discussed below. 
During the first hearing held between SCOPA and PetroSA, the questions posed by the 
committee were directed at the PetroSA Chairperson, Dr Popo Molefe. Ms A Dreyer 
(DA) sought clarity on the actual request, for the advance payment, made by Imvume 
Mangement to PetroSA (PMG, 2005: n.p). Dr Molefe replied that lmvume Management 
requested an advance payment from PetroSA as it was experiencing cash-flow problems 
for that month. The contract had already been entered into with Imvume Management, 
and monies were due to be paid, as the delivery of the condensate was to be effected "in 
a matter of days" (PMG, 2005: n.p). When asking whether PetroSA had any idea of the 
close ,working-relationship between Imvume Management and the ANC, Dr Molefe 
denied any knowledge of the subject. He stated that he only joined PetroSA in 
September 2004 and was thus not intimately familiar with all the details of the Imvume 
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Management transaction (but the records did not indicate such a disclosure by Imvurne 
Management). There was thus no indication that the PetroSA Board had any knowledge 
of the kind ofrelationship referred to (PMG, 2005: n.p). 
What was brought to light within that meeting was that the request to PetroSA by 
Imvume was unusual in two respects. Firstly, it was a request for advance payment and 
secondly, Imvume Management requested that the funds be deposited into an account 
different to the one used for normal business purposes. However, PetroSA stated that 
the advance requested was received in the form of a pro forma invoice, which was 
'standard practice' (PMG, 2005: n.p), and Imvume nominated a different account from 
the one used for the previous payments allegedly because the request was made to 
address their temporal cash flow problem - so that they could pay end-of-year bonuses 
(PMG, 2005: n.p). This marked the beginning of the challenging road that lay ahead for 
proving substance in the allegations made against PetroSA, Imvume Management, and 
the Public Protector. 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, SCOPA's relies heavily on the Auditor-General and 
Public Protector for the bulk of its work, but members have often complained that the 
reports thus provided are usually of little assistance. The Auditor-General raised queries 
relating to the audit of PetroSA, which should have been actioned by SCOPA but the 
committee had, at the time of writing, provided no indication it would do so, or at least 
not as a matter of urgency (February, 2006: 126). 
Reports that were later released by SCOPA and the Public Protector differed 
substantially in their findings. According to DA MP Anchen Dreyer, SCOPA's report 
on the Central Energy Fund and its subsidiaries, and the 2005 report from the minerals 
and energy portfolio committee on the Public Protector's investigation into the Oilgate, 
were in "stark contrast" (Davies, 2006: n.p). Dreyer mentioned that SCOPA found the 
decision to pay the advance into a separate account as "irregular", whilst the Public 
Prote~tor found the transaction to be "in terms of the legal and policy prescripts that 
applied to PetroSA" (Davies, 2006: n.p). SCOPA also found there was "a lapse in terms 
of monitoring on the part of PetroSA with regard to the advance payment'', while the 
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public protector found the transaction was "well-founded and properly considered" 
(Davies, 2006: n.p). Another contrast evident on comparison, was that SCOPA found 
PetroSA "misled by Imvume", while the Public Protector did not protest against "the 
decision to approve Imvume's request, as it was presented to PetroSA, [because] an 
advance was not unreasonable" (Davies, 2006: n.p). 
However, a further and more in-depth investigation into the matter was launched after a 
complaint lodged by the Freedom Front Plus (FF+), in connection with the advance 
payment (Mail & Guardian reporters and Sapa, 2005a: n.p). It was alleged that, during 
her term as minister of minerals and energy, Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-
Ngcuka had improperly influenced PetroSA's decision to make the advance payment to 
lmvume. The Public Protector's report stated, concerning this issue, that such 
allegations made against Mlambo-Ngcuka were not substantiated by evidence, and were 
therefore without merit (Mail & Guardian reporters and Sapa, 2005a: n.p). Therefore 
the FF+ wanted the case re-opened in order for Public Protector Lawrence Mushwana to 
revise his report truthfully. Mushwana's response to this accusation was that, on the 
available evidence, he had not seen any offence and, although the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA) was an independent body, if he were to recommend that it opened a 
case, he would have nothing to show the said Authority. (Mail & Guardian reporters and 
Sapa, 2005a: n.p) 
Significantly, the focus of Mushwana's report was rather on Imvume repaying PetroSA 
the R 15 million it received in advance. The report made several recommendations in 
relation to the outstanding payments to PetroSA. "It was recommended that the board of 
PetroSA, in consultation with the CEO and its legal advisers, take urgent steps to ensure 
that the outstanding amount due to PetroSA, by Imvume, [was] recovered without 
delay," Mushwana said. (Mail & Guardian reporters and Sapa, 2005a: n.p). According to 
Mushwana "[t]he ANC and Imvume are not public entities, they do not perform public 
functions and are not part of any level of government... [therefore] [t]he state has no 
shareholding in Jmvume" (Mail & Guardian reporters and Sapa, 2005c: n.p). Mushwana 
declared that "the alleged payment was clearly made by one private entity to another and 
could therefore not have had any bearing on state affairs." (Mail & Guardian reporters 
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and Sapa, 2005c: n.p). However, according to the Mail &Guardian, the Public 
Protector's report conveyed all the hallmarks of a whitewash. "In fact, it is little more 
than a restatement of the government's version of events... [t]he thrust of the report 
[was] to find excuses for the government rather than getting to [the] bottom of the 
investigation", which the Mail & Guardian at that time saw as "the misuse of public 
money to benefit the ANC before [that previous] year's election." (Mail & Guardian 
reporters and Sapa, 2005c: n.p). 
According to the Mail & Guardian (2005c: n.p) "[t]he Public Protector dodge[d] the 
relationship between lmvume and the ANC, as well as the Rl 1 million 'donation' that 
passed between them, on the spurious grounds that this was a private matter which [fell] 
outside his jurisdiction." Even though opposition parties questioned Mushwana's report 
on the Oilgate scandal and pledged to take up the issue with the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA), the ANC said it accepted his findings (Mail & Guardian reporters and 
Sapa, 2005b: n.p) 
The FF+, on approaching the NPA to reopen the case for further investigations) 
specifically stated that "[t]he law is a double-edged sword. If PetroSA did not do 
anything wrong by making a non-owed payment to Imvume Management, then Imvume 
most certainly acted incorrectly by convincing PetroSA under false pretences to make 
the payment" (Mail & Guardian Reporters and Sapa, 2005b: n.p). Willie Spies (FF+: 
party MP and spokesperson on minerals and energy) concluded that, "[i]f you ask for 
money for a specific purpose and you use that money for something else, that would 
constitute fraud ... [ w]e hope this is part of a process to get to the real truth, even if it 
takes five years" (Mail & Guardian reporters and Sapa, 2005c: n.p). 
ln January 2006, the Mail & Guardian filed a court challenge against Mushwana's 
findings on the Oilgate scandal, seeking to have his report of June 2005, which avoided 
probing areas related to the scandal - and excused government and the parastatals 
involved, overturned and rewritten (Brummer, 2006: n.p). Mail & Guardian editor 
Feria! Haffajee said: "Mushwana tried to bury important allegations unearthed by the 
M&G, and he smeared us in the process ... [t]he public is entitled to unbiased and diligent 
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action by an institution as crucial to democracy as the Public Protector. His Oilgate 
investigation and report failed on both accounts" (Brummer, 2006: n.p). Later reports 
made by Brummer (2006: n.p) stated that Mushwana's "categorical absolution" of 
government bodies was in stark contrast to criticism made of PetroSA by both the 
Auditor-General and Parliament's Standing Committee on Public Accounts. 
Regarding the 'quiet diplomacy' of President Mbeki, which is being "practice[d] ... at 
home as well", Tony Leon (DA) stated that "he (the president) has been completely 
silent on Oilgate and he has been completely silent on Travelgate ... we have Oilgate, 
Travelgate, Zumagate and Gravyplane-gate. Where is investigate?" (Mail & Guardian, 
2006b: n.p). President Thabo Mbeki's "failed promises" in finance, service delivery and 
health were the focus of opposition Democratic Alliance leader Tony Leon's allegations 
(Mail & Guardian Reporters and Sapa, 2006b: n.p) 
At the time of writing, PetroSA has recovered RS million of the RI 7,7 million total 
owed by Imvume Investments. PetroSA chief financial officer Nkosernntu Nika has 
confirmed that the money is being repaid by Imvume at R500 000 a month, with just 
under RIO million outstanding (Le Roux, 2006: n.p). Nika added that interest is being 
charged on the outstanding amount at the prime rate plus two percentage points, and that 
they are also recovering the money through a court order, since a provision for bad debts 
relating to Imvume was created in 2004 (Le Roux, 2006: n.p). However, who is being 
held accountable for the series of allegations made on behalf of SCOPA and the Mail & 
Guardian? Does paying off debt to PetroSA provide enough reason to hush any further 
investigations? 
The conflicting remarks found in the reports emphasise the reckless attempts made to 
conceal the truth - mainly on the part of the Public Protector, especially since the case 
concerns allegations against government for accepting money for political party funding. 
Parliament must be seen to be both consistent and effective in enforcing accountability 
by means of the chapter nine institutions and SCOPA. When Parliament falls short of 
performing its required watchdog function, it decreases its credibility and tarnishes the 
image of government (as occurred in the case of 'Travelgate'). In this case, however, it 
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would appear that SCOPA did ask the right questions, but did not pursue the matter 
further in order to enforce accountability. Instead, meetings that followed considered 
the issue as closed. Although some of the opposition parties within SCOPA (mainly the 
DA) continuously wanted to raise the issue again in the subsequent meetings and direct 
the relevant questions (which they felt remained unanswered), neither Imvume, nor 
PetroSA or the Public Protector have given satisfactory accounts of the issues 
surrounding Oilgate. 
Who then should be held accountable to whom? This section argues that SCOPA failed 
to hold the Public Protector, Imvume and PetroSA accountable, because the proceedings 
lacked enforceability and most importantly political will, since ANC members in 
SCOPA primarily associate themselves with their political party before committing 
themselves to the committee's agenda of impartial Parliamentary oversight. Again, the 
'complimentary' roles that the Public Protector, the Auditor-General, and SCOPA 
should play wouJd appear to be unreliable. This should not become a reason for SCOPA 
to neglect its oversight role. Moreover, having the Public Protector 'watch over the 
governing party' (despite its reports being in stark contrast with reports from SCOPA 
and the media), complicates the process of oversight, and belittles SCOPA 's public 
image. SCOPA seems to be tormented by the inconclusive links amongst the relevant 
actors performing Parliamentary oversight and more specifically by dubious reports 
presented by the Public Protector on its investigations. The main concern when 
considering the mandate of SCOPA (as mentioned earlier) is that the committee does not 
seem to be taking any active responsibility within its disposition. 
4.3 State Housing Subsidies 
This case study concerns covert acts of corruption within many state departments, which 
have left SCOPA to attend to an enormous amount of unsatisfactory financial reports, as 
presented to them by the Auditor-General. Consequently, this study will provide an 
example of how government departments do not spend their respective budgets 
adequately (as referred to in the previous chapters), referring to the Department of 
Housing (DoH) specifically. 
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According to the Business Report (2006: 3), more than R2,5 billion in housing subsidies 
have been handed out since the inception of the state housing subsidy scheme in 1994. 
During his investigations, Mr Shauket Fakie (Auditor-General) identified R323 million 
in irregular applications that was used to conceal acts of fraud. From these subsidies; 
"money was granted improperly to government employees earning salaries in 
excess of the subsidy threshold, as well as to government pensioners; approvals 
were given Lo people after they had died and to people with invalid identity 
numbers; duplicate subsidies were given to the same individual or to the same 
household,· duplicate subsidies were given for the same property; and applicants 
aged under 21 were given grants." (Business Report, 2006: 3). 
Even though separate reports on audits conducted at the nine provincial housing 
departments were submitted to the respective provincial legislatures, most of the 
findings originated from deficient management measures that were generic throughout. 
It is for this reason that this case study will focus on the summarised findings that were 
presented to Parliament by the Auditor-General (AGSA, 2006: n.p). 
On 31 March 2004, focus areas were approved for a full performance audit at all nine 
provincial housing departments, focusing on the application and approval process 
pertaining to housing subsidies (AG A, 2006: n.p). The following subsidies are 
available to applicants: Individual ubsidies; Project-linked Subsidies; Consolidation 
ubsidies; Institutional ubsidies; Relocation Assistance; Discount Benefit Scheme; 
Rural ubsidies; the People's Housing Process; and Home Owner Allowance (AGSA, 
2006: n.p). All grants are subject to a strict selection process, in order to allocate the 
grants efficiently within the boundaries of the allocated budget. Therefore, the number 
of approved beneficiaries reflects specific beneficiaries for whom a subsidy has been 
approved. And beneficiaries are only identified after funding has been made available 
for an approved housing project and if the project has commenced (AGSA, 2006: n.p). 
According to t~e Doi-I, a total of 167 162 subsidies were approved by provincial housing 
departments during the 2003-2004 financial year, bringing the total number of subsidies 
approved by the departments since the inception of the housing subsidy programme to 
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2 436 404 (the information presented in the Auditor-General's report was extracted from 
the House Subsidy System (HSS) as well as other databases) (AGSA, 2006: n.p). 
Furthermore, the number of instances of [what] identified represented only 3,6 per cent 
of the 1,4 million beneficiaries. However the exception report only focused on 
government employees earning salaries in excess of R42 000 per year/month, and not on 
the entire working population (AGSA, 2006: n.p). It must be noted that approvals in 
any year will result in houses being completed in subsequent years, as projects can take 
between 18 to 24 months to reach completion. 
Therefore, within the Auditor-General's report, the housing applicant data on the HSS 
was compared to the government's payroll data, in order to identify instances of subsidy 
approvals to government employees who earned more than R42 000 per year (as at July 
2003), and were employed by government prior to the submission of their applications. 
The exception report indicated 7 353 relevant applicants. According to the selection 
process's preconditions, these applicants should have received either a reduced subsidy 
or no subsidy at all, since their income was in excess of the R42 000 annual threshold 
for qualifying beneficiaries (AGSA, 2006: n.p). However, this was not the case. 
SCOPA requested both National and Provincial Departments of Housing to attend 
hearings and explain the issues raised by the Auditor-General in his Report based on the 
performance audit (PMG, 2006: n.p). These issues included problems with personnel, 
filing systems, processing systems, failure to comply with Division of Revenue Act and 
the PFMA, inability to produce files, and fraudulent transactions. The Report analysed 
and compared the National and Provincial responses (PMG, 2006: n.p). 
During the hearings, firstly, members of SCOPA directed their questions at the Portfolio 
Committee on Housing and the SCOPA Chairs of Provinces. Questions included 
reference to the current capacity levels, whether capacity referred to numbers or ability, 
the methods for processing and allocating subsidies, new measures to improve systems, 
the loss of documents, the link between databases to check the applications, and the 
supervisory role of the national department. (PMG, 2006: n.p). Many questions were 
posed regarding the fraudulent applications, the reasons why problems persisted after 
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1994, and on the monitoring systems used by the national department. It became 
apparent that non-managers were able to override the system, thus avoiding the checks 
and balances that had been set in place, and several questions were asked about who was 
able to do so, whether there were records kept, how many overrides were linked to 
fraud, and the number of investigations and prosecutions arising from the fraudulent 
transactions (PMG, 2006: n.p). Mr T. Godi (PAC: SCOPA Chairperson) expressed the 
Committee's concern about the Auditor-General's Report and the manner in which 
questions had been answered at the hearing, and stated that SCOPA would draw up a 
resolution for tabling in Parliament on the basis of the answers provided (PMG, 2006: 
n.p). 
In the hearing held between the National Department of Housing (NdoH) and SCOPA, 
Mr T Bonhomme (SCOPA) pointed out that the Report of the Auditor-General (AGSA, 
2006) had raised some very serious issues. He asked for an explanation on how the 
allocation of salaries was implemented, as there seemed to be far too many loopholes. 
When asking for an explanation on how the loopholes had appeared, and why they were 
not detected during the pilot phase (in order to ensure protection of taxpayer's money) 
(PMG, 2006: n.p), Mr Mziwonke Dlabantu (Deputy Director General (DOG): NdoH) 
replied that he felt it necessary to 'explain the context' . According to Mr Dlabantu 
(PMG, 2006: n.p), the HSS system was introduced in terms of the Housing Act, when 
the NDoH was to manage the administration of subsidies. Initially the Provinces were 
allowed to use their own systems, and these developed simultaneously with the 
implementation of the programme, including manual systems, spreadsheets and other 
methods. Because of the manual systems it was not easy to detect misrepresentation of 
facts. This would not be possible until one overarching system was set up and 
implemented nationally (PMG, 2006, n.p). 
In response, Mr Vincent Smith (ANC: SCOPA) stated that most of the comments by the 
provincial SCOPA chairs had been directed towards skills. However a bigger issue was 
at stak,e: subsidies worth about R30 million had been awarded, post-2004, to 
government officials who should not have received them. By this stage the new systems 
had been implemented and should therefore have identified the fraud (PMG, 2006: n.p). 
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He asked whether this was merely picked up on a random sample, whether this was 
prevalent, whether the figures were accurate, and why these problems, which clearly 
arose from administrative fault, had occurred. Mr Dlabantu again blamed the 
occurrence of these deficiencies on the Jack of skills, and failed to answer the question 
directly. He argued that the post-2004 policy adjustments were significant and therefore 
the position would not have been the same as pre-2004 (PMG, 2006: n.p). The post-
2004 policy caused the bands of subsidy to be removed as qualifying criteria, and after 
2004 there would need to be a further analysis to determine whether an applicant would 
be excluded or whether he would qualify. Mr Dlabantu concluded that there were two 
broad issues that caused the deficiencies: firstly the policy, and secondly, the skills 
problem (PMG, 2006: n.p). However, one should bear in mind that training was 
provided on the use of these systems, and assistance was provided to the provinces in 
training when the systems changed (PMG, 2006: n.p). 
What is of significance in this case study is that any member of Parliament who had 
access to the housing subsidy system could take part in the scheme, because they could 
override any objections from the system. Anchen Dreyer (DA: SCOPA) commented 
that "these overrides take [the public] to the heart of the problem. It's not a problem of 
capacity, it's not a problem of the system, it's attitude (political will). It is designed for 
corruption" (Business Report, 2006: 3). 
Mr T. Godi subsequently stated that "[o]verrides are allowed in such a way that it allows 
a lot of wrong things to happen" he blamed it on the "senior managers (from the housing 
department officials) ... [who] [were] not doing their job, not by accident, but 
deliberately ... either [they] [didn't] see it, or (they] [were] shielding [those that had to be 
held accountable]" (Business Report, 2006: 3). Not surprisingly, and in contrast to the 
questions he posed during the hearings, Mr Vincent Smith objected to any criticism by 
stating that "[there are] people there who are incapable of doing their work'', thereby 
relying on the same excuses as Mr Dlabantu, who focussed on the 'skills problem'. 
According to the Business Report (2006: 3), Mr Dlabantu tried turning the tables by 
accusing SCOPA of not doing their own job, by being a long way off from meeting the 
deadlines for handing in finalised reports on the housing scheme (deadlines were set out 
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for November 2005 and March 2006). 
Most importantly, Mr T. Godi stated that the 'skills problem' answers were worrisome, 
especially because the lack of capacity was linked with corruption, and that SCOPA had 
regrettably not received the impression that NDoH appreciated the severity of the 
problem. The indication that some of the employees were deliberately overriding 
systems was critical, and needed urgent attention (PMG, 2006: n.p). The Committee 
was not completely satisfied with the answers given; they had been too generic and 
some basic questions had not been addressed, either because the 'Director General was 
too new in the post', or because other members had not been adequately prepared or had 
not fully appreciated the existence and severity of the problems. At its most recent 
hearing (at time of writing) on 14 June 2006, SCOPA requested that the NDoH perform 
in the light of transparency at all times, as the State machinery must serve the interests 
of the people, in order to spend the tax payers ' money efficiently. If the subsidies 
allocated for housing projects became self-serving, it was not aligned to the broader 
political vision of the country (PMG, 2006:n.p). 
4.4 General trends: Pulling the watchdog's teeth? 
These case studies have aimed to provide an in-depth analysis of the most common 
problem areas found in Parliamentary oversight, and the many challenges attached to 
enforcing the accountability of 'organs of the state '. Weaknesses in the system, which 
allow doubtful and underhanded negotiations between the executive and public entities, 
or between members from the governing party in the legislature and the executive; and 
for serious acts of corruption and fraud to be taken so lightly (linking ' lack of skills ' 
with corruption), are both alarming and disturbing. Both the Arms Deal and the Oilgate 
left a skewed image of how SCOPA performed its oversight powers over the executive, 
and how it challenged cases of dubious reports received from the Auditor-General and 
Public Protector. 
Have the rectification procedures followed by SCOPA (in assistance with the Auditor-
General and the Public Protector) become more lenient towards writing-off debt, or 
unsatisfactory behaviour, rather than on following strict recovering procedures? It 
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would appear to be a question of political attitude and will, which directly influence 
SCOPA's ability to deliver severe oversight measures when holding the 'state organs' to 
account. It does not seem as though the government has been challenged in any material 
way by the oversight measures undertaken thus far. If SCOPA does not frighten the 
postman and his challenges energetically and scrupulously, the committee might become 
a friendly 'Goofy' rather than a devoted and respectful watchdog. 
4.5 Summary 
The Arms Deal was the most obvious case study illustrating the failure of SCOPA, as 
well as the constraints that it works under. The temptation that attracted the ruling party, 
and made its appearance public, was the use of its majority representation within the 
executive and legislature to its own advantage (in protecting its political interests and the 
status quo). This became apparent in the oversight and investigative efforts undertaken 
by SCOPA and the Public Protector. The lesson learnt was that maintaining the status 
quo and tampering with the Constitutional mandate attributed to each level of 
government harmed the credibility of these entities, and did not comply with the 
democratic ideals ascribed to these entities. 
The Oilgate scandal, in its turn, appears to emphasise the loopholes within the political 
party funding system as supposedly manipulated by PetroSA, Imvume and the ANC, to 
the public's disgust. The inability of these entities to account for any dubious 
connections amongst each other emphasised the secretiveness of their transactions 
within the Oilgate scandal. The ' complimentary' roles played by the Public Protector, 
the Auditor-General, and SCOPA were brought into question. Having had the Public 
Protector include the governing party in the construction of its report (causing its reports 
to be in stark contrast with reports from SCOPA and the media), counted to the 
disadvantage of SCOPA, since the committee failed to prove itself substantial on the 
findings of its reports. 
On the other hand, the oversight of the State Housing Subsidies scheme has proceeded 
well, considering the progress SCOPA has made on holding the NDoH accountable to 
the Auditor-General's findings (as published in his summary report). However, one 
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remains sceptical, when viewing SCOPA's lack of effective oversight to date. 
Corruption and fraud are serious allegations against government departments, and if not 
dealt with accordingly, oversight will become a mere smack on the fingers. 
Normatively speaking this is unacceptable, since the incentive that should be created by 
SCOPA should prevent state organs from acting in a manner that does not represent 
their respective Constitutional mandates. One viewpoint this thesis strongly supports is 
that SCOPA must enforce the necessary rectification procedures vigorously when 
holding state organs to account and not simply direct watchful questions or passively 
accept the accounting entities' lack of participation. 
Without doubt, this chapter introduces complex and unpopular questions. Is there a 
need to isolate SCOPA from party politics? Has the ANC undermined the Constitution 
by its current approach towards SCOPA? What is the proper relationship between 
Parliament, its committees, and the chapter nine institutions? Is it a case of "feckless 
pluralism"? 
The essence of the problem, as derived from the case studies, is whether or not the 
majority of the members of SCOPA are now solely focussed on party political interests, 
and if this issue has became more embedded since the Anns Deal. "Institutions of 
democratic governance are only as strong as the extent of their capacity to withstand the 
weight of the most serious political challenge", while staying impartial (Calland and 
February, 2001: n.p). The executive must be held accountable to the legislature, not 
only be challenged or questioned by it. Investigations and hearings probed by the Public 
Protector, Auditor-General and SCOPA, have become clouded by the recent 
development of 'partnership' between 'Private Political Interests (political will)' and 
' Loopholes in the System'. 
; ' Lobbying', in this context, means to influence government policy by making representations to ministers, 
members of Parliament and government officials. It is about avoiding or achieving legislation or other 
government action that regulates activity and getting a share of resources . It is also about having one's 
view prevail over the views of others in the community (Tongue, 1999: 119). 
,;Sherman (1999: 151 ), on his study of secrecy in democracy, found that one of the areas that is becoming 
more and more secretive, is the growing reliance on the private sector for providing services and 
infrastructure. This has resulted in commercial confidentiality being maintained over documents recording 
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dealings between the government and the private sector (as was the case with Oilgate). In such a case, the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act (The Constitution, Act 2 of 2000) was created to prevent such 
incidents from happening, and with the intention of giving the public the power to gain information on 
dubious dealings concerning the use of public money . However, there are many occasions when this is not 
possible, arguably being a further incentive to partake in such dealings secretively. 
iii The DOD expected its budget to remain constant over several years at R9,7 billion in 1998 rand value 
(Calland and February, 2001 : n.p) . 
iv It would be na'ive to think that Ministers of the ruling party should not communicate with party members 
serving on Parliamentary committees and to jointly strategise in relation to political issues. The DA 
criticised the ANC for permitting its Ministers (Manuel and Erwin) to communicate with its members of 
SCOPA; the accusations extend to saying that the ANC's proposal for a second report on the Arms Deal 
was drafted by the ministers rather than the members of SCOPA and that the ministers met behind closed 
doors with the ANC study group before appearing in front of SCOPA at the end of February 200 I (Call and 
and February, 200 I: n.p). 
vzuma posed questions to SCOPA in his original letter, and on 31 January 2001 in his response to the 
Speaker's letter. There is nothing wrong with the Executive posing questions to Parliament, since it 
encourages open debate, but there is no compunction on the side of Parliament to respond, whereas the 
Executive is obliged to respond to Parliament (Calland and February, 2001: n.p) . 
visection 236 provides for the enactment of legislation governing political party funding, and consequently 
the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act (l 03 of 1997) was established in order to regulate 
the process. 
vii The !EC (Independent Electoral Commission) is responsible for managing the Fund, which is credited by 
monies appropriated by Parliament and donations from any source. Section 6 of the Act makes it a 
requirement for political parties to account for the monies they receive from the Fund and empowers the 
AGSA to audit any political party's financial records relating to monies received from the Fund. If there are 
any irregularities, especially where money was spent on activities that are not compatible with the 
functioning of a political party (see Section 5 of the Act), the accounting officer of the party is liable to 
repay the money to the JEC, which is then credited back to the Fund (Van Yuuren, 2005 : n.p). 
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION: FOCUSING ON THE ROAD AHEAD 
5. Background 
There are a number of popular notions prevailing, mostly stating that politics should be 
'cleaned up' or 'reformed'. History does not end with the achievement of some finite 
stage of Parliamentary institutionalisation, but rather enters into new phases of a never-
ending process of institutional evo lution, in the process of consolidation. South Africa has 
had almost twelve years to effectively institutionalise the mandate of the democracy. By 
developing the latter, committees (as argued by Strom, 1998: 47) can either practice 
positive or negative power in their given context. The South African Parliament includes 
elements of both. This thesis has revealed aspects of 'negative committee power' (Strom, 
1998: 47) in Parliament, as evident from the cases studied, where government used the 
available oversight structures (by using their executive power and their power over party-
members in SCOPA) to defend the status quo. 
This thesis has analysed the oversight structures in the light of theoretical assumptions. 
The consensus-seeking theory (Chapter Two, page 35) is significant when contextualising 
the specific challenges South Africa faces, due to dominant party pressure. The ANC has 
been criticised for using its big majority vote to influence policy- and Parliamentary 
decisions in a steamroller way when seeking 'consensus'. Checks and balances should 
therefore be installed in such a manner as to effectively limit any governing party's power 
in all spheres of government, since it has been possible to become a dominant party within 
a procedural democracy . 
In contrast, the powerful legislative committees in the US Congressional Committee 
system have proved themselves capable of coping with a complex, ever-growing 
workload despite the committees' policy hegemony. There the committees have 
increasingly been challenged by strengthened party leaders and by the growth of broad, 
cross-cutting issues (Davidson & Longley, 1998: 13). Within the American system, the 
'Congress at Work' initiative performs independently from the presidency, which implies 
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an effective separation of powers. 
In the case of Scandinavia, it would appear that the secret of their success lies in its strong 
political parties, a situation that forestalls the dominant ruling party challenges South 
Africa is faced with. South Africa is increasingly being challenged by a weak 
Parliamentary opposition which extends to all spheres of Parliament: in the decision-
making procedures, policy agenda setting, and committee proceedings. As soon as party 
politics become the prime driving force behind national governance, the mandate and 
independence of the legislature (and its legitimacy) is brought into question. On a global 
perspective, Shaw ( 1998: 15) supports this view, stating that, "whether established, new or 
future democracies are considered, pressures to enhance legislative authority can be seen 
at the committee level throughout the world''. For South Africa, there has been lack of 
conformity between what Parliament wants and what the bureaucracy is willing to do -
the dilemma of good legislation but bad implementation. Parliament has to put on its 
boxing gloves for the challenge, and put the committees into the ring: 
"strong commWees ... are at least a necessary condition for effective Parliamentary 
influence in the policy-making process ... When parties exert only a weak control 
over legislative committees, the committees are free to develop a life of their own 
and to make a strong contribution to the outputs of the legislature ... Parties and 
committees are ... contradictory and even mutually exclusive means of internal 
organisation [in a legislature}" (Strom, 1986, 303). 
The increasing prevalence of dominant ruling party versus weak opposition conditions has 
weakened the ability of committees to perform independently and efficiently. Members of 
SCOPA are no exception in this regard, as was the argument in the deliberated case 
studies. Heywood (2002: 319) even describes this generally as a 'corrupt culture': where 
assemblies corrupt the politicians by socialising them into the norms and values that 
distance them from the needs of the taxpayers. The absence of accountability through 
Parliamentary constituencies is part of the problem. 
5.1 Weaknesses of SCOPA 
Graham Richardson, the Hawke-Keating government's own local Machiavellian 
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equivalent has argued, "[y]ou can' t expect on every occasion that a politician will tell the 
truth ... He's not allowed to and it wouldn' t be sensible to do it" (Johnson, 1997: 176). 
Perhaps one could argue the same for a committee on scrutiny and oversight (having the 
power to influencing the public image of the government in such a big way): that you 
cannot expect on every occasion that SCOPA is holding state organs to account for 
financial malpractice - controlled by the same caucus, or without any prospect of a 
political agenda other than its mandate. 
Generally, there is no consistent understanding or approach to the execution of the 
oversight role in Parliament. The dominant party-based system has hampered effective 
oversight, as members of the Legislature are reluctant to call to account a Government that 
is made up of leaders of its own party. This attitude towards oversight has created a 
platform for other interests and influences (such as lobbyists and private interests) which 
influence committee members ' perspectives and oversight measures in a big way, by 
restricting their political will to act according to the mandate of the Constitution . 
Sometimes the working relationship between SCOPA and the departments are so close 
that the required separation of powers is not maintained. This also appears to be the case 
between the Executive, the Auditor-General , and the Public Protector respectively . 
Housing such a wide variety of interests between the independent institutions, the 
Legislature (the committees), and the Executive is contradictory with the mandate 
prescribed to each actor by the Constitution. 
Not having tabled a formal section on the committees within the Constitution has forced 
the question: have committees become an effective extension of the ruling party's 
interests? This issue was brought into context with regards to the 'principle-agent theory ' , 
discussed in Chapter Two, explaining how members in committees (from the governing 
party) effectively act as agents for the governing party. As argued in previous chapters, 
provisions should be written into the law establishing systematic reporting and evaluation 
requirements to be fulfilled by the agency in order to facilitate program review by the 
standing committee (which could ultimately contribute to institutionalising committees 
into the democratic structures more efficiently) (Rosen, 1982: 54). The institutionalisation 
theory (Strom, 1998: 23) also emphasised the need to institutionalise committees 
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effectively by making provision for committees, and SCOPA in particular, in the 
Constitution: as a specialised committee in Parliamentary oversight and scrutiny 
specifically. The latter would regulate the formal recognition of the powers and functions 
of SCOPA more effectively amongst all accounting entities. 
As alluded to by the organisation theory (Norton, 1998: 43), the specialisation of all actors 
in the Legislature, including the specialisation of the committee structures, needs to be 
incorporated into the Constitution in order to enrich organisational capacity. The 
organisational capacity of SCOPA is not prescribed by the Constitution, only limited by 
the powers given to it by the National Assembly Rules and by the political will of the 
representatives from the various political parties. Lack of consensus on the basis of the 
Committee's mandate, and being compromised by political party interests, constrains 
effective oversight. As argued, the tendency towards a dominant party political system 
weakens committees, since it subjects committees to single party dominance. SCOPA is 
victim to this structural 'deficiency' within the South African Parliament, since the 
Executive is also drawn from the Legislature. However, it would be more efficient in a 
party system such as in Scandinavia, where single party dominance is discouraged by 
means of strong, competitive, and future-orientated political parties in a decentralised and 
non-hierarchical setting. 
SCOPA has not been gathering independent information, other than from the Public 
Protector and the Auditor-General. The Committee therefore relies too heavily upon 
information from the departments themselves (as presented by the Auditor-General), or 
investigations by the Public Protector. This is especially of significance since both these 
independent institutions have allowed the Executive to influence their reports and public 
statements (as with the Arms Deal and the Oilgate). Having the Executive succeed in 
pushing the mandate of the governing party has been problematic. As the case studies 
argued, these independent institutions do not always present independent information, and 
therefore SCOPA must undertake a more investigative approach. Failure to do so has 
tarnished the public image of SCOPA, and will continue to do so unless the Committee 
acts more fiercely on its oversight responsibilities. 
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Alternatively, there have been structural constraints within Parliament, such as: lack of 
resources (skills, researchers and expertise), to implement and execute effective record-
keeping and oversight practices. However, as became apparent from the State Housing 
Subsidy scheme, Government sometimes relies on using the 'lack of skills and resources' 
excuse to dodge accountability. This cannot be tolerated, and SCOPA should consider 
these loopholes, but not let them prohibit the Committee's oversight and enforcement 
powers. 
It seems that the broad factor prohibiting efficient oversight, in the case of SCOPA, is the 
absence of strong political will within an embedded culture of accountability. It also 
seems to be the cavity in SCOPA's teeth, since it prevents strong enforcement of 
rectification procedures in cases of financial misconduct. The polarisation of interaction 
(due to political interests) amongst Committee members influences the relationship 
between the Executive and the Legislature in a negative way. This can be compared with 
the existing enforcement strategies which are rather weak, since they lack material 
intervention where necessary. Considering the fact that the chairperson arranges the 
committee agenda and proceedings, it is daunting to admit that Mr T. Godi (PAC: SCOPA 
chairperson) can easily become a mere puppet in the strings of the majority party (ANC), 
since party politics has become the dominant factor in Parliamentary proceedings. It is in 
the light of this challenge, that the proposal (Addendum A) suggests an alternative 
oversight structure. 
5.2 Strengths of SCOPA 
SCOPA allows detailed discussions on a wide variety of important issues, while giving 
members from all parties represented in the House a chance to participate in the 
Committee proceedings. It appears to have built the necessary foundation for public and 
political debate, by completely restructuring the remains of the Apartheid regime. 
Considering the widespread reform inventions and implementations Government had to 
deal with since 1994, while trying to institutionalise a liberal Constitution and vibrant 
democracy, the results have been impressive. However, it seems that 'bad habits' have 
been institutionalised too: in the context of this thesis, Parliamentary oversight and 
accountability have become normative terms, which have not been sufficiently practised 
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according to definition. 
Finn ( 1991) asserts that the law has two vital but limited roles to play in securing integrity 
in government. Firstly, a normative role provides the foundations for ethical regimes by 
setting the minimum irreducible standards that are to be expected of officials. Secondly, a 
Constitutional role provides the framework in which the ethical enterprise is to be 
prosecuted both by imposing Constitutional limitations on government, and contriving the 
general institutional arrangements and accountability mechanisms that hold government 
and its officials in check (in Caldow et al, 1997: 27). It seems evident that the focus of 
Parliament should turn more to the second role as presented by Caldow. 
SCOPA receives support from the independent Chapter Nine institutions (Auditor-General 
and Public Protector), by collecting independent information for their hearings and 
investigations from these entities. The reports range from investigations of conduct in 
state affairs, or the public administration in any sphere of government (The Constitution, 
1996: 182(a)). to audits on the accounts, financial statements and financial management of 
all state departments, municipalities and any other institutions or accounting entities (The 
Constitution, 1996: l 88(a)(b)(c)). These alternative reports (rather than having to conduct 
their own private investigations in all instances) are timesaving and ensure that SCOPA 
can use their time more efficiently. A problematic consequence of the latter is that 
SCOPA tends to rely on the judgement and thoroughness of the Auditor-General and 
Public Protector, which can influence SCOPA' s own reporting and operations in a 
restrictive way. However, if these independent institutions hold themselves accountable 
to their Constitutional mandate, and SCOPA acts according to the National Assembly 
Rules, their relationship can be seen as complimentary to the functioning of the 
committee. 
SCOPA also creates the opportunity to hold ministers and the President directly 
accountable to Parliament, and for state organs to comply with certain requirements or 
face the consequences of strict rectification procedures. If SCOPA can create an 
embedded culture of accountability and fuel the incentive for honest action (against 
underhanded negotiations between Government and the public-private sphere, as in the 
Oilgate scandal): it will provide reason enough to ensure its embodiment in future 
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Constitutional drafts for committee specialisation. 
5.3 Final Assessment: Outputs and Attributes of SCOPA 
The structures and functions of SCOPA have provided it with the mandate to oversee a 
large variety of organs of the state, in order to identify (and rectify) instances of financial 
malpractice, where taxpayers' money is not utilised strictly according to their provisional 
budgets. SCOPA has the opportunity to become an effective watchdog of Parliament, but 
by having a closer look (as attempted by this thesis) it seems that it is on the verge of 
becoming 'a friendly Goofy'. Even though accounting entities are faced with the 
'challenge' of being held accountable to Parliament, it seems that strict rectification 
procedures are not enforced. Unqualified financial reports are being written-off without 
deeper investigative efforts, and the Public Protector and Auditor-General have not been 
held accountable in cases of conflicting reports where Executive intervention has been 
obvious (such as in the Arms Deal and the Oilgate, and perhaps to a lesser degree in the 
State Housing Subsidies scheme). Where will the line be drawn? It seems easy to bypass 
the questions put by the Committee during hearings and to make empty promises for the 
'next annual report'. 
This thesis argues that, apart from the party system, the key to the influence of committees 
lies in three factors: expertisei, intimacl and supportiii. Essentially, SCOPA has not 
complied with either of these factors to their utmost potential, even though it is equipped 
with the necessary mandate. According to Calland (1997), SCOPA is "all dressed up with 
nowhere to go". South Africa could benefit from similar support to its oversight 
committee as in the UK, where qualified staff advise committees by means of expert 
researchers. The Addendum offers an alternative proposal. 
[n conclusion: the underlying challenge, loyalty to the governing party, remains embedded 
in the adopted Westminster system, which might not be as effective as hoped for. The 
horizontal separation of powers between the judiciary, legislature and the executive is 
problematic in the sense that the governing party predominantly 'owns the floor'. ln the 
case of South Africa, this means that the ANC has the upper-hand on all decisions taken in 
all three branches of government, since members primarily associate themselves with their 
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political parties, rather than with Parliament or the Executive separately. This issue has 
raised questions (as mentioned in Chapter Four), which have become controversial 
statements: there is a need to isolate SCOPA from party politics, the ANC has undermined 
the Constitution by its current approach to SCOPA, and the proper relationships between 
Parliament, its Committees, and the Chapter Nine institutions have not been consolidated. 
In the light of these statements, when reviewing it in terms of the oversight structures 
specifically, this thesis argues that the South African democracy and its ideals have come 
to resemble a system of"feckless pluralism". 
i Expertise emerges over time from committees with specialised responsibilities and a clear field of 
operation. Expertise is most likely to develop in permanent committees with continuity of operation and 
membership (Hague & Harrop, 2004:252). 
ii Intimacy emerges from small size and is reinforced by stable membership. Particularly when meetings 
take place in private, a small group setting can encourage co-operation and consensus, overcoming any 
initial hostility between members from competing parties (Hague & Harrop, 2004:252). 
•i• Support refers to the use of qualified staff to advise committees. Expert researchers can help busy 
politicians to produce well-founded recommendations (Hague & Harrop, 2004:252). 
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Addendum A: P ACRA T - A Proposal for Parliament 
PACRAT 
Public Accounts Committee Research Assistance Team 
-INCREASING THE EFFICIENCY OF PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT-
Project to be effective from January 2007[8] - January 2009[10] 
A LOGISTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
6. Executive summary 
In order to assist parliament, hereby a proposal for a compli~entary research structure 
to Parliament's Standing Committee on Pubic Accounts. This proposal aims to 
develop an alternative structure that will enhance the level of public participation in 
the parliamentary oversight structure (including proper research and departmental or 
public/private entity oversight visits). Consequently, this would result in reasonable 
workloads for different task teams (in assistance to the current oversight structure as 
already commissioned within Parliament), but with a more expansive and inter co-
ordinated approach. 
Therefore, the appointed task team would contribute to SCOPA maintaining a positive 
image in the public eye, by complementing its credibility and legitimacy. This public 
body would ideally consist of 12 experts, membership being divided between 
academics from 4 different universities, 4 members from two different NGOs and 4 
members from the independent, Chapter nine institutions (two members from the 
Public Protector- and two from the Auditor General institutions). They could 
subcontract others on an ad hoc basis if deemed necessary. The budget would make 
provision for an extra research panel (appointed by these experts), consisting of 20 
members. The research panel will consist of 45 (9 members per province) in total, 
since the other 25 (of the available 26) members are from the Parliamentary Research 
Unit (since 1997). Primarily they would meet with SCOPA and the Parliamentary 
Appointed Task Team on a monthly basis in order to discuss the schedule, priorities 
and findings. This public body will be known as PACRA T (the Public Accounts 
Committee Research Assistance Team). 
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6.1 Project Identification: Purpose and Significance 
PACRAT proposes a project in support of a more effective parliamentary oversight 
and accountability structure (via continuous evaluation and recommendations). This 
could be effective in addressing possible problem areas at an early stage, and provide 
a strong support framework to the National Assembly and Committee system. More 
specifically, it will also broaden the capacity of SCOPA in providing for more in 
depth and widespread evaluation structures. 
Therefore, PACRA T, if approved by parliament, aims to become the leading expert in 
research; acting as the guide dog for parliamentary watchdogs, by assisting in the 
planning, structuring and effective execution of all parliamentary oversight 
programmes. PACRA Twill be the first expert team consisting of such a variety, with 
the purpose of combining all existing parliamentary programmes more efficiently, in 
order to assist SCOPA in its research and oversight role. 
6.2 Project Plan Configuration Status 
6.2.1 Background: Implementing Agency 
P ACRA T has no previous experience, but based on the findings of the thesis, this 
project will specialise on assisting government accountability and parliamentary 
oversight. The members of PACRA T will consist of a wide variety of field-
specialists, in partnership with members of Parliament. This project aims to succeed 
during its trial time framework of two years, in order to continue its existence 
independently and efficiently, as an established organisation that enjoys continuous 
support and approval by government. 
6.3 Project Origin 
6.3.1 Need: Problem Identification 
Why could SCOPA benefit from additional assistance? Currently, there are about 600 
' 
public bodies that have to account to SCOPA, and according to the Corder Report 
(1999), only 200 bodies report. The fact that SCOPA meets only three times a week 
limits their time to effectively evaluate reports, in order to hold these bodies to 
account. Parliament employs and pays a research division situated at the Regis 
House, however their direct relationship with Parliament and its committees are 
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unclear. The Report on Parliamentary Oversight and Accountability (Murray and 
Nijzink, 1999: 136) identified several problems that national parliamentary 
committees have in dealing with the reports they receive. There is a logistical 
problem with a general overload of reports and late distribution thereof, leaving too 
little time to formulate responses. Many reports are simply ignored rather than used 
to hold the executive accountable. 
In addition, SCOPA consists of one manager, 4 clerks and 2 administration staff, with 
support from the Auditor General's office. The committee consists of 17 members, 
facing the challenge of needing expertise in all the areas that has to be overseen. Also 
each committee member does not have its own researcher, which stresses the 
workload. Even though it is considered to be better supported than other Public 
Account Committees, the biggest challenge still remains to be found in its the 
research capability (in order for MPs to be informed and make widespread and 
relevant recommendations). SCOPA's public image has been scarred by negative 
media coverage on cases such as the Arms Deal, Travelgate and Oilgate (which has 
brought the public to question their practises and openly have asked questions 
whether lobbying is taking place amongst MPs and the ruling party). The latter also 
provided reasons for three of SCOPA' s former chairpersons resigning. 
Amongst the structural challenges that Parliament faces, are the lack of resources to 
implement and execute effective record-keeping practices. The absence of official 
procedures or structures for handling written submissions contributes to this 
difficulty. There are also other difficulties in using written reports to gain an 
understanding of the level of parliamentary oversight activity. There is often no way 
to tell if a given report was ever presented to a committee, or that it was simply 
distributed for members to read on their own. The level of detail may be excessive, 
making it hard for committee members to find useful information, or the report may 
be very general, lacking detail on areas that are important to the committee (Corder, et 
al, l999, p13). 
As summarized by Senay and Besdziek (1999) the main challenges for SCOPA are 
"insufficient expertise and knowledge to allow them to undertake in-depth analyses 
and mount constructive challenges to the members of the executive and 
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administration." This skill shortage seriously erodes the prospects for a successful 
proactive committee oversight strategy and ultimately affects the ideal of a 
constructive oversight relationship between standing committees and the executive 
and administration. 
Therefore, based on the presumption that the latter is true, P ACRA T aims to address 
these problem areas by effectively combining expertise from the relevant state organs 
and independent institutions. 
6.4 Related Projects 
Existing research facilities include the Parliamentary Research Unit (since 1997). In 
2001 the European Union funded a study into the research facilities of South Africa 
and found that the Parliamentary Unit had, since its inception, experienced a variety 
of problems. The latter were identified as "the lack of clear direction and focus, the 
lack of job security and competitive salaries for researchers, and the lack of 
researchers" (EUPSP Research Evaluation Report, 2001). In 2001 the Unit had 13 
staff members serving 40 committees. Even though the staff has increased to 25 
permanent members, it still faces overwhelming challenges in effectively supporting 
SCOPA while providing assistance to all the other committees as well. 
In 2004, five years after the Corder Report was completed, a task team has been 
established to implement some of the recommendations of the report in order to assist 
parliamentary oversight. The task team consisted of 20 members of the NA and the 
NCOP. It included the Chief whips of the ANC, DA and IFP, the House Chairs, the 
Chairperson of the Committees of the NCOP, Chairs of the Joint Budget Committee, 
three DA MPs and one MP each from the IFP, UDM, ID, NNP and the ACDP. This 
task team, together with the Parliamentary Research Unit, should be guided by a 
committee of experts, by means of recommendations that chart a more inter-
connected approach for the road ahead. Currently there are no other projects that 
provide for the same project purpose as suggested by P ACRA T. 
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6.5 Project Purpose 
6.5.1 Objectives 
This project aims to provide an expert team that will help to co-ordinate the 
parliamentary oversight structure, in order to effectively include all parliamentary 
oversight bodies (as recognised within the constitution or as prescribed by the 
National Assembly Rules) and members from the public. 
P ACRA T would meet with members of SCOPA, members of the Parliamentary 
Research Unit, the Parliamentary Appointed Task Team, the Public Protector and the 
Auditor General as well as members from Non Governmental Organisations and 
academics from universities (as mentioned in the executive summary). The latter 
would contribute to ensuring public participation in our democracy, with the broad 
aim of enhancing parliamentary oversight and scrutiny. 
This would provide parliament with an early intervention strategy in order to escalate 
human and financial costs manifested by: 
late submissions of financial reports by the accounting entities 
insufficient time to evaluate all reports, or to visit the respective departments and 
to implement recommendations 
overlapping of functions by members of SCOPA, the Public Protector or the 
Auditor General 
lack of clear and collective objectives when addressing public hearings, in order to 
ensure that committee members are acting on behalf of the committee's interests 
and not on behalf of their political party's interests 
6.5.2 Beneficiaries 
PARLIAMENT Parliament will receive enhanced 
credibility and legitimacy if P ACRA T 
succeeds m providing a more inter-
connected oversight framework with 
more effective public participation and 
combined expert guidance. 
SCOPA SCOPA will be motivated to share the 
burden of their workload with other 
government appointed task teams and 
will also benefit from recommendations 
and guidance from experts independent 
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THE PUBLIC 
INTERN A TI ON AL COMMUNITY 
THOSE WITH THE POWER TO 
AMEND THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE NEAR FUTURE 
6.6 Indicators of success 
from the constitution or government of 
the day. 
Members of the Public are also 
beneficiaries of our democracy that 
promotes public participation. Therefore 
they are safeguarded by the aims of the 
project proposed by PACRA T, to better 
ensure that they are receiving value for 
their tax money. 
The international community could learn 
and benefit from experimenting with 
projects similar to P ACRA T, if the latter 
proves to be essential to an effective 
parliamentary oversight framework. 
By being provided with a framework that 
illustrates the importance and widespread 
influence of the committee system, this 
project could inspire the writing of a 
section on committees in the constitution, 
underlining the exact extent of their 
powers and functions (in correlation with 
other state institutions and public bodies). 
The following indicators would verify the success of the project: 
•!• An integrated approach to parliamentary oversight programmes and effective co-
operation between the relevant actors. 
•!• Increased pubic support and trust would be visible in the media, by means of 
positive feedback on the activities of SCOPA. 
•:• The decreased workload of SCOPA members would lead to better preparations by 
committee and therefore more efficient public hearings. 
•!• Increased public support (by being included in the expert panel) in parliamentary 
oversight will help strengthen the channels of public participation for the future 
(being complimentary to the mandate of the democracy). 
•!• Positive feedback on the activities of P ACRA T would lead to international 
recognition and possibly serve as a model for other democratic countries. 
•!• It would benefit a transparent relationship between PACRA T, SCOPA and the 
Parliamentary Appointed Research Team, the government and the public. 
•!• It could lead to extended communication channels between SCOPA and every one 
of the 600 public bodies that have to account for their financial programmes 
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annually, within five years of implementation (and thereby enhance the capacity 
and level of oversight). 
•!• Draft legislation (that proposes a section on committee functions and structures 
within the constitution) could be formally structured within five years. 
6.7 Implementation Strategy 
6.7.1 Project Activities: Throughputs 
The throughputs include monthly e-newsletters to the media and subscribed members 
that will comment on the projects and findings that P ACRA T has worked on. The 
latter will also be accessible from PACRAT's website. A debate column on the 
website will create the opportunity for any member of the public to raise his/her 
concerns regarding the practises of PACRA T, or to make helpful recommendations. 
An introductory conference will also be held in Cape Town, including all the 
participating members from SCOPA, PACRAT and the Parliamentary Appointed 
Task Team. The budget also makes provision for additional guests, such as other 
experts from the field and members of the judiciary. This will stipple the role each of 
the bodies has to play in order for PACRA T to achieve its goal of enhanced public 
oversight, and to increase SCOPA's legitimacy. 
In addition, monthly meetings will be held between SCOPA and the Parliamentary 
Appointed Task Team, in order to discuss the problem areas and projects that need to 
be dealt with, and in order to prevent the overlapping of functions. This will 
strengthen the communication structures and ensure that there are no 
misunderstandings regarding what has to be done in the given timeframe. 
Two public debates will be held: one before PACRA T starts its contract (August 
2006(7]), in order to raise public awareness and increase the level of overall support 
for this project. The second debate will be held at the end of the first year (November 
2007(8]), in order to get more inputs from the public and to take any concerns into 
account, but also to give feedback on the activities that PACRA T had participated in 
to that point and what the outcomes were. 
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6.7.2 Project Outcomes 
Therefore, within the two years of its trial performance, P ACRA T will provide the 
following outcomes; 
•:• Monthly e-Newsletters to the media 
•:• One introductory Conference with all participating actors 
•:• Monthly meetings with SCOPA 
•:• Monthly meetings with the Parliamentary Appointed Task Team 
•:• Two public debates 
•:• Two printed annual reports (20 published per annum). 
6.8 Budget 
Hereby a short summary of the provisional budget for the years 2007[8] - 2009[10] 
(the detailed budget is attached at the end of this document). 
Line-Item Totals 
SALARIES/TECHNICAL SUPPORT 3 172 000 
SKILLS ANO TRAINING 0 
DIALOGUE AND PUBLIC DEBATE 60 940 
TRAVEL AND TRANSPORT 286 800 
ADMINISTRATION/COMMUNICATION 60 600 
6.9 Timeframes 
August 2006(7) 
Sc tember 2006 7 
January - December 2007(8) 
Janua -December 2008 9 
ACCOMMODATION 567 000 
SUB GRAND TOTAL 4 147 340 
Monthly newsletters to Media 
Monthly meetings with SCOPA 
Monthly meetings with Parliamentary 
appointed Task Team 
Public Debate: November 
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Monthly meetings with SCOPA 
Monthly meetings with Parliamentary 
appointed Task Team 
Annual Report: December 
January 2009(10] Final Newsletter to Media 
Final meeting with SCOPA 
Final meeting with Parliamentary 
appointed Task Team 
6.10 Project Organisational Structure 
Experts The Experts ' Headquarters will be 
situated in Parliament (the Parliamentary 
Research Unit). From there they will 
organise their meetings with SCOPA and 
the Parliamentary Appointed Task Team, 
as well as with the rest of the members 
from PACRAT. This expert panel 
consists of 12 members; applications for 
these positions will be carefully revised 
in order to select members with the most 
experience and extensive expertise m 
government oversight and accountability. 
Researchers The Researchers (those already employed 
by Parliament (25) and the other 20 
employed by the expert panel) will be 
situated In Regis House, from where they 
will organise their reports, public visits 
and correspondence with the expert 
panel. 
Researchers from Parliamentary Unit As mentioned, the Researchers from the 
Parliamentary Unit will be situated in 
Regis House with the other selected 
researchers. In order to ensure no 
duplication of work, their storage and 
filing of reports will be done in PMG' s 
offices (Parliamentary Monitoring 
Group), being effectively filed with other 
' 
parliamentary committee meetings' 
reports. Their work will be 
complimentary to the documents that 
PMG receive from SCOPA within the 
meetings (since PACRAT will be 
ensuring that more in depth analysis and 
documentation are made of all their 
additional visits to the accounting entities 
as well as reports on the 
recommendations and outputs' results). 
Administrators The administrators will be divided in 
order to have one assisting the researcher-
110 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
team and the other assisting the experts in 
their respective administrative duties. 
The latter includes updating the website, 
sending through the monthly e-
newsletters and keeping track of events 
and other filing necessities. 
The organisational structure and facilities therefore consists of the following actors 
and factors: 
•!• 12 leading experts 
4 Senior Researchers from different Universities 
4 members from different NGOs: IDASA (PIMS)(2) and Black Sash(2) 
4 members from the Chapter 9 Institutions 
45 researchers: 20 independent researchers and 25 from the Parliamentary 
Research Unit serving on an ad hoc basis 
•!• 2 Administrators 
•!• Offices - Already Equipped 
PMG (Parliamentary Monitoring Group): Storage and Filing 
In Parliament (Parliamentary Research Unit): Expert Headquarters 
In Regis House: Appointed Researchers 
•!• Stationary & Supplies - xtra 
Writing material: Pens, pencils, permanent markers, white board markers, 
staplers, hole pressers, binding materials for conference notes, 6 laptops, 2 
printers and miscellaneous (administration and contingency costs). 
6.11 External Dependencies 
In order for this project to be successful, it is highly dependent on Government 
agreeing to subcontract their current venues and researchers to P ACRA T as a partner 
in oversight functions. Therefore Regis House, the Parliamentary Research Unit and 
the 25 researchers that are already employed by parliament, should continue to be 
parliament's responsibility in terms of maintaining the facilities and paying its 
researchers (and not adding that to PACRA T's proposed budget responsibilities). 
Also, it should be agreed that any additional skills and training conferences will be 
presented by the Tsimeni Consulting agency that is already paid and contracted by 
government. This project is also dependent on the unconditional commitment of the 
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appointed experts to this project, in spite of their existing work responsibilities, by 
signing a contract that they agree to form part of this independent public body, that 
will adhere to certain rules and responsibilities. In addition, this project is dependent 
on excellent co-ordination of the different fields of expertise and the different 
contributes each of the participating actors have to add. It is also dependent on 
members of SCOPA being transparent in their needs and limitations, in order for 
P ACRA T to be of valuable assistance. 
The success of this project is also dependent on excellent reporting, well presented 
newsletters, the success of the public debates and the introductory conference (in 
order to assure the public and government that P ACRA T is managing its 
responsibilities proficiently). 
6.12 Reporting 
Except for P ACRA T reporting to the public, internal reporting is also crucial between 
PACRA T, and members of SCOPA and the Parliamentary Appointed Task Team. 
Even though P ACRA T meets with both of the latter monthly, members of P ACRA T 
meet on a two-weekly basis. It is the responsibility of the Researchers to give 
qualified reports (verbal and written submissions) on their findings and deliverance 
(on the basis of the constructed agenda, timeframes and requirements), to the expert 
panel. 
Also, the expert panel will meet weekly, in order to discuss the quality of the reports 
and findings up to that moment, in order to ensure efficiency. The two Auditor 
Generals and Public Protectors will be in charge of the proceedings, having agreed 
amongst themselves who will chair the meetings and take overall responsibility as the 
head accounting personage for the team. 
Also SCOPA and the Parliamentary Appointed Task Team will be held responsible to 
report on their own findings and recommendations monthly to SCOPA, in order to 
follow an integrated approach at all times. 
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6.13 Monitoring 
The Chairperson (and any member(s) from the team he needs to assist him) will 
monitor the reporting structure in order to ensure that it works efficiently (in order for 
the members to deliver on their respective responsibilities according to schedule). 
The categories that will be monitored are: 
•:• Compliance with the timeframe 
•:• Adherence to the shared agenda and different responsibilities 
•:• Documentation of oversight and oversight projects 
•:• Presentation and filing of written reports 
•:• Levels of participation from the accounting entities 
•:• Interaction of P ACRA T with parliamentary structures and visa versa 
•:• The nature of results and arrangements produced by meetings 
6.14 Evaluation 
Evaluation will broadly take place by means of the annual reports, which takes into 
account the reports and findings of all the responsible oversight entities, as well as the 
comments retrieved from the public debates (and the public's expectations) and 
feedback from the media. These reports and summarised findings will be presented 
objectively; ensuring that PACRA T is adhering to its stated purpose and objectives. 
These evaluations will also take into account the results of the performance delivered 
on the categories that were monitored. 
6.15 Assumptions and Risks 
6.15.1 Assumptions 
Certain assumptions are made m order for this project to be successful. These 
include: 
•:• The continuous funding by government for the duration of this project. 
•:• The agreement for the available facilities to be used by members of PACRA T, 
such as the offices, researchers and skills and training facilities. 
•:• That the respective expertise are willing to commit themselves to this project for 
at least a period of four years, since this will ensure that if this project gets 
contracted for another two years by parliament, it has experienced staff that can 
train others. 
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•:• This project also assumes that parliamentary oversight needs a more integrated 
approach and that SCOPA and the Parliamentary Appointed Task Team will 
benefit from co-ordinating assistance from PACRA T, in order to become more 
efficient. 
6.15.2 Risks and abatement strategies 
Risks 
That the public might be hesitant towards 
government allocating tax money for 
such a project 
Abatement StrateITTT 
The Introductory Conference for the 
participating actors scheduled for August 
2006 and the Public debate scheduled for 
September 2006, will raise awareness of 
the importance of the project P ACRA T 
proposes, in order to gain approval and 
support. The latter could result m 
financial support from international or 
local organisations . 
• 1--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--1~~~-><--~~~~~~~~~~~---t 
That government might be hesitant to By having members from the Public 
employ an independent institution to co- Protector and Auditor General institutions 
ordinate parliamentary oversight chair this project, it complies with 
Lack of funds available from government 
to fund this project 
Initial lack of response and 
correspondence from the different 
government departments in the provinces 
requirements of our constitution. Also, 
by working m close contact with 
members of parliament and the 
Parliamentary Appointed Task team, this 
project rather proposes to support the 
current institutions, by focussing on its 
efficiency. 
A sponsor will be sought as a backup to 
government funding, by both subsidising 
the amount and letting government pay 
back by means of monthly payments 
without interest. Or the sponsor will pay a 
percentage of the total amount. 
A detailed description of this project and 
the dates and times of both the visits to be 
made to these departments by the experts 
or researchers will be handed to the 
relevant head accounting entities after the 
Conference to be held in August 2006. 
The latter will include the dates that 
reports have to be submitted to PACRAT, 
with clear reference to penalties that these 
accounting officers and departments face 
when they do not collaborate. 
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6.16 Human Resource Strategy 
Human resources will therefore effectively consist of; 
•:• oversight specialists of government, by including members of SCOPA 
•:• a Parliamentary Appointed Task team that strife to implement recommendations 
that have been made in order to enhance government accountability 
•:• informed academics from universities that follow different schools of thought 
•:• members of independent institutions, as structured in Chapter 9 of the 
constitution, more specifically sharing the responsibility to hold state organs 
accountable 
•:• members from non-governmental organisations that advocate what is best for the 
public's interest, considering all requirements of being a sustainable democratic 
society 
•:• Parliamentary appointed researchers as well as other independent researchers that 
contribute to objective analysis and collection of the relevant material 
Therefore the strategic importance of the composition of human resources relevant to 
the organisation of PACRA T, will be complimentary to a more co-operative approach 
to oversight (by the relevant actors), by ensuring a 'hands on approach' on all aspects 
this project addresses . 
• 
6.17 Procurement Strategy 
All vacancies for PACRA T will be advertised in the Rapport, die Burger and Mail & 
Guardian, with the applications being sent to the project manager, to be considered by 
a panel consisting of influential members of SCOPA (2), members of the 
Parliamentary appointed task team (2), an Auditor General and a Public Protector. 
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ADDENDUM A: DETAILED BUDGET 
• 
SALARIESffECHNICAL SUPPORT 
Experts 
Salary per Expert 
#Experts 
#months 
Researchers 
Salary per Researcher 
#Researchers 
#months 
Researchers from Parliamentary Research Unit 
Salary per Researcher 
#Researchers 
Administrators 
Salary per Administrator 
#Administrators 
Offices- fully equiped 
In Parliament (Parliamentary Research Unit): Expert Headquarters 
In Regis House: Appointed Researchers 
\ 
Working 
Column 
6000 
12 
24 
3000 
20 
24 
0 
25 
2000 
2 
0 
0 
Sub-Totals I Line-Item Totals 
3172000 
1728000 
1440000 
0 
4000 
0 
0 
116 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Storage and Filing: PMG (Parliamentary Monitoring Group) 0 
SKILLS ANJ) TRAINING 0 
Tsimeni Consulting 0 
DIALOGUE AND PUBLIC DEBATE 60940 
Venue and catering 37500 
Introductory Conference: Cost per person 200 
#people 100 
Monthly meetings with SCOPA: Cost per meeting per person 70 
#meetings/months 10 
#people 25 
13440 
Monthly meetings with Parliamentary appointed Task Team: Cost per person 
#meetings 6 
#people 32 
10000 
Public Debates: Cost per public meeting 5000 
#meetings 2 
TRAVEL AND TRANSPORT 286800 
Airline tickets 86400 
Travel for expert panel: Cost per person per ticket (return) 1200 
#number of experts 12 
#trips for the total period 6 
54000 
Travel for research panel: Cost per ticket (return) 1200 
#researchers 45 
117 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
#trips for the total period 1 
- Public TransporUShuttles 
.. 
38400 
Travel for expert panel: Cost per person per semester 800 
#number of experts 12 
#semesters 4 
108000 
Travel for research panel: Cost per person per semester 600 
#researchers 45 
#semesters 4 
ADMINISTRATION/COMMUNICATION 60600 
Computers 51600 
Computers: Cost per Lap Top 5000 
#Laptops 6 
maintenance per month 600 
Printers: Cost per printer 3000 
#printers 2 
Stationary and supplies 3000 
Annual Reports: Cost per Report for two years 300 
#Reports 40 
Advertisements 9000 
Cost per advertisement (three advertisements for two weeks) 1500 
#Advertisements 6 
ACCOMMODATION 567000 
Hotel 324000 
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Protea Hotel: Cost per person per night 200 
#nights (experts) 3 
#people (experts) 12 
#nights (researchers) 
#people (researchers) 45 
I 
Private/other T 243000 
Other: Cost per person per night 150 
#nights (experts) 3 
#people (experts) 12 
#nights (researchers) I 
#people (researchers) 45 
\ I 19 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Bibliography 
Ad Hoc Joint Sub-committee on Oversight and Accountability Final Report. (3 September 
2002). In Oversight and Accountability Workshop. (28 September 2005). Cape Town: 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 
AGSA (Auditor General South Africa). (January 2006). "Report on the findings identified 
during ..a performance audit of the approval and allocation of housing subsidies at provincial 
housing departments". Published by Authority, RP 12/2006; ISBN 0-621-36402-9. 
Available online <http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2006/06/06 l 4ag.pdf> (Accessed 6 July 
2006). 
ANC. ( 1998). "The state, property relations and social transformation". In Umrabulo, no 5. 
Anonymous. (22 October 2004). PAC's Pheko under fire. Mail & Guardian, n.p. 
Anonymous. (15 March 2006). SCOPA to probe R323m scam. In News 24. Available 
online at http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/Politics/0,,2-7-
12_ 1898697,00.html. (Accessed 16 March 2006). 
Besdziek, D., Senay, C. (1999). "Enhancing oversight in South Africa's Provinces: 
Institution and concerns." Published in African Security Review Vol. 8 No. 2. 1999. 
Available from www.issafrica.org/Pubs/ASR/8No2/senay.html. (Accessed 23 February 
2006). 
Bezuidenhout, Jessica., Jurgens, Andre., Mzilikazi, WA Afrika. (2001). Manager tells how 
he got Mercedes from the Arms Deal. Sunday Times, n.p. 
Brummer, Stefaans. (31 January 2006). M&G wants Oilgate report overturned. In Mail & 
Guardian, n.p. 
120 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Calland, R. (1997). All Dressed Up With Nowhere to Go? The Rapid Transformation of 
the South African Parliamentary Committee System (In Comparative Theoretical 
Perspective). Bellville: School of Government, University of the Western Cape. 
Calland, R., February, J. (2001). Democracy and the Arms Deal: An interim review. Cape 
Town: Idasa. 
Campbell, C.C., Davidson, R.H. (1998). US Congressional Committees: Changing 
,, 
Legislative Workshops. In Davidson, R.H., Longley, L.D. (Editors). The New Roles of 
Parliamentary CommWees. Great Britain: Frank Cass and Company Limited. 
Carrim, Yunus . (1999). Policy-making in a New Democracy. Johannesburg: Centre for 
Development and Enterprise. 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. (2001 ). Survey of Public Accounts Committees 
in the Commonwealth. In Weimer, J. (2002). Best Practices of Public Accounts 
Committees. Thesis in the Handbook for Public Accounts Committees. South Africa: 
Association of Pub I ic Account Committees. 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. ( 4 February 1996). Act No I 08 of 1996. Cape 
Town: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. (1999) . Act No 108 of 1999. Cape Town: 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 
Corder, H., Jagwanth, S., Soltau, F. (l 999). Report on Parliamentary Oversight and 
Accountability. University of Cape Town: Faculty of Law. 
Cox, G.W., McCubbins, M.D. (1993). Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the 
House. Berkeley: University of Califomja Press. 
121 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
DA. (8 May 2004a). "SCOPA to lose its teeth claims DA". In Daily Dispatch. Online 
edition <http://www.dispatch.co.za/2004/05/08/South Africa/cscopa.html (Accessed 25 
May 2006). 
DA Press Statement. (24 September 2004b). "ANC needs to take Accountability, 
Transparency, more seriously". 
DA (Ifemocratic Alliance). (28 October 2004c). From Lapdog to Watchdog: Giving 
Parliament back its teeth. Cape Town. 
Davidson, R.H., Longley, L.D. (Editors). (1998). The New Roles of Parliamentary 
Committees. Great Britain: Frank Cass and Company Limited. 
Davies, Richard. (29 March 2006). DA complains about conflicting Oilgate Reports. Mail 
and Guardian, n.p. Available online at <www.mg.co.za/printPage.aspx?area= 
/breaking_news/breaki ng_ news_ national 
Diamond, L., Plattner, M.f. and Scheddler, A. (1999). The Self-Restraining State: Power 
and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder: Rienner. 
Dreyer, Anchen. (14 September 2005). SCOPA reports point to non-compUance with rules 
and laws. Available online at idasact.org.za. (Accessed on 26 February 2006). 
EUPSP Research Evaluation Report. (2001). Cape Town. 
February, J. (20 August 2002). Research Thesis: SCOPA and its oversight role. First Draft, 
unpublished. Cape Town: IDASA. 
February, J. (2006). More than a law-making production line? Parliament and its oversight 
role. ln Buhlungu, S., Daniel, J., Southall, R., Lutchman, J. (Editors). State of the Nation. 
South Africa: HSRC Press. 
122 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Franks, C.E.S. (1997). In The changing roles of parliamentary committees. Edited by 
Longley, L.D., Agh, A. Lawrence University, Wisconsin: Research Committee of 
Legislative Specialists, International Political Science Association. 
Habib, A., Herzenberg, C. (2004). "Popular control over decision-makers. In Graham, P., 
Calland, R. (Editors). Democracy in the time of Mbeki. Cape Town: Idasa. 
Hahndiek, Perran. (2005). Oversight in the National Assembly Portfolio Committee System. 
Unpublished paper, Cape Town: Idasa. 
Hamlyn, Michael. (15 June 2006). Scopa slams housing grant admin. Business Report, page 
3. 
Heywood, A. (1997). Politics. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. 
Heywood, A. (2002). Politics. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. 
TDASA. (n.d). The SA parliamentary committee system in a comparative perspective: 
Developing a theoretical paradigm for ongoing research. Unpublished draft. Cape Town: 
ldasa. 
IDASA. (15 May 2001). Democracy and the Arms Deal. (An Interim Review by IDASA). 
Cape Town: JDASA (PIMS). 
IDASA. (August 2003). A Submission to Parliament. Democracy and the Arms Deal. Cape 
Town. Available online at idasact.org.za. 
Johns, Gary. ( 1997). Divided Loyalties: Party and Conscience. In Caldow, W., Clark, C.L., 
Jonson, E. (Editors). Accountability and Corruption: Public Sector Ethics. Australia: Allen 
& Unwit. 
123 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Johnson, Elizabeth. (1997) . In Conclusion. In Caldow, W. , Clark, C.L, Jonson, E. 
(Editors). Accountability and Corruption: Public Sector Ethics. Australia: Allen & Unwit. 
Kotze, Hennie (Editor). ( 1998). Parliamentary Dynamics: Understanding political life in 
the South African Parliament. University of Stellenbosch: The Centre for International and 
Comparative Politics. 
Leigh, D., Vulliamy, E. (1997). Sleaze: The Corruption of Parliament. London: Fourth 
Estate. 
Le Roux, Mathabo. (14 July 2006). South Africa: PetroSA Recovers R8 Million of Rl8 
Million Owed By Imvume. Jn Business Day, n.p. 
Lodge, Tom. (2003) . "The ANC and the development of party politics in modern South 
Africa" . Paper presented to the African Studies Centre at Leiden University. 
Macozoma, S. (1996). The role of standing committees. In Parliamentary dynamics. Edited 
by Kotze, H. University of Stellenbosch: Centre for International and Comparative Politics. 
Macozoma, S. (1997) . The role of standing committees: An ANC perspective. In H Kotze 
(ed.), Parliamentary dynamics: Understanding political life in the South African 
Parliament. Stellenbosch: Centre for International and Comparative Politics. 
Mail & Guardian Reporters and Sapa. (29 July 2005a). 'No evidence of wrongdoing' in 
Oilgate. Jn Mail & Guardian, n.p. 
Mail & Guardian reporters and Sapa. (30 July 2005b). Oilgate: It's not over yet. In Mail & 
Guardian, n.p. 
124 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Mail & Guardian reporters and Sapa. (1 August 2005c). Oilgate: FF+ to charge Imvume 
with fraud . In Mail & Guardian, n.p. 
Mail & Guardian Reporters and Sapa. (2 February 2006b). DA: ' Oilgate, Travelgate . . . 
where ' s Investigate?' . In Mail & Guardian, n.p. 
Mezey, M. (1979). Comparative Legislatures. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
J 
Moe, T.m. (1984). "The new Economics of Organisations". In American Journal of 
Political Science Yol 28 p 756. 
Murray, C. , Nijzink, L. (2001) . Government oversight and accountability. Edited by 
Briginshaw, L. Cape Town: Printing Creda Communications. 
Murray & Nijzink. (2002). Building Representative Democracy: South Africa 's 
Legislatuers and the Constitution. Cape Town: Printing Creda Communications. 
Nhleko, Nkosmathi Phiwaymkosi . (2002). Oversight and Accountability. Unpublished 
presentation by House Chair: Oversight and Accountability. 
Nijzink, L. (200 I). Opposition in the new South African Parliament. Paper presented at the 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation conference on opposition politics: Cape Town, South Africa. 
Norton, P. (1994). "The Legislative Powers of Parliament". In Flinterman, C., Heringa, 
A.W., Waddington, L. (editiors). The Evolving Role of Parliaments in Europe. Antwerp: 
Maklu. 
Olson, D. (1980). The legislative process: a comparative approach. New York: Harper & 
Row. 
Olson, JP. (1983). Organised Democracy. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget. 
125 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Parliamentary Centre of Kenya. (3 May 2001). Strengthening accountability and oversight 
of key parliamentary committees in Kenya. In Report on the workshop for select 
committees dealing in.finance .. 
PIMS Record. (18 August 1995). "Parliamentary Whip". Published at PIMS: ldasa. 
PMG (Parliamentary Monitoring Group). (24 August 2005). "Central energy fund: 
PetroSA, oil pollution control South Africa; IGAS; Petroleum Agency South Africa; 
Strategic Fuel Fund: Hearing." Published at PMG: Cape Town. Available online 
www.pmg.org.za (Accessed 7 June 2006). 
PMG (Parliamentary Monitoring Group). (14 June 2006). "Housing Subsidy Allocations in 
Provincial Departments: Hearings". Published at PMG: Cape Town. Available online 
www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=7948 (Accessed 6 July 2006). 
Polsby, N. (1975). The Changing Nature of Parliamentary Committees, in Agh, A & 
Longley, LD ed., Comparative Legislative Studies 2: The Changing Roles of Parliamentary 
Committees. Research by Committee of Legislative Specialists, international Political 
Science Association, Appleton: Lawrence University. 
Public Service Commission (2005). "Evaluation of Departments' Annual Reports as an 
Accountability Mechanism (1999 & 2002) and Treasury Guidelines for Legislative 
Oversight through Annual Reports". Published in Cape Town: Paliament 
Rommetvedt, H. (1998). Norwegian Parliamentary Committees: Performance, Structural 
Change and External Relations. In Davidson, H. Longley, D. (Editors). The New Roles of 
Parliamentary Committees. Great Britain: Frank Cass and Company Limited 
Rozen, Bernard. (1982). Holding Government Bureaucracies Accountable. United States 
of America: Praeger Publishers. 
126 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Satori, G. (l 987). The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Chatham: Chatham House 
Publishers. 
Shafer, B. (1991). Is America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism. Oxford: 
Claredon. 
Shaw, Malcolm. (1998). Parliamentary Committees: A Global Perspective. In Davidson, 
R.H. ~ Longley, L.D. (Editors). The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees. Great 
Britain: Frank Cass and Company Limited. 
Simey, Margaret. ( 1985).Government by consent: The Principle and Practice of 
Accountability in Local Government. England: Henry Ling Ltd, Dorset Press. 
Sherman, Tom. (1997) . Secrecy n democracy. In Caldow, W., Clark, C.L., Jonson, E. 
(Editors). Accountability and Corrupt;on: Public Sector Ethics. Australia: Allen & Unwit. 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts Annual Report (19 January 2005). Parliament of 
the Republic of South Africa. (Ref: 19/36/1/1/7(1)). 
Strom, Kaare. (1986). "Deferred Gratification And Minority Governments in Scandinavia". 
In Legislative Studies Quaterly. Vol. 11, No. 4, pp583-605. 
South African Parliament. (2005). Mapping the future: The strategic plan of Parliament 
2004-2008. Cape Town: Government Printers. 
Tonge, Sue. (1999). The virtues and vices of lobbying. In Caldow, W., Clark, C.L., Jonson, 
E. (Editors). Accountability and Corruption: Public Sector Ethics. Australia: Allen & 
Unwit. 
127 
_,.,-
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Van Vuuren, Hennie. (2005). Transparency International Questionnaire. In National 
Integrity Systems. Available from: www.ipocafrica.org/pubs/reports/NatlntSystQues.pdf. 
(Accessed 2 June 2006). 
Venter, A. (1998). Government Politics in the New South Africa. Pretoria: Van Schaik 
Publishers. 
Wehner, J. (2002). Best Practices of Public Accounts Committees. Thesis in the Handbook 
for Public Accounts Committees. South Africa: Association of Public Account Committees. 
Zajc, D. (1997). Functions and powers of the committee in the new parliaments: 
Comparisons between the east central and west central European countries. Longley, L.D., 
Agh, A. (Editors). The Changing Roles of Parliamentary Committees. Lawrence 
University, Wisconsin: Research Committee of Legislative Specialists, International 
Political Science Association. 
128 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
